Towards Understanding of Contemporary Migration

Causes, Consequences, Policies, Reflections

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Massive migration flows, which have recently spilled over Europe, have come to the fore of political, security, media and scholarly debates. Hot political disputes on the vulnerability of the European Union and its future are instigated, especially when it comes to the sustainability of Schengen agreement, inspiring also quite diverse viewpoints on (desired) immigrants in EU as well as a readiness of nation states to cope with growing stocks and flows of foreigners and how to respond to the so called ‘migration crisis’ invoked by sudden and voluminous arrivals of more than a million of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants coming over sea, air and ground, in their search for a mere survival, life in peace and economic prosperity both for themselves and their families. Majority of them who strived to run away in 2015 were pushed by long lasting armed conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and were accompanied by Pakistanis, as well as Somalis, Libyans and other citizens, bound to leave their countries of origin due to their vast dissolutions with disorder instigated by overturns of Arab spring in 2010s. Enormous numbers of people heading for Europe, their perseverance to reach Germany, France, Austria, etc., and perspective of their continuous arriving in years to come, obviously open up controversies related to Europe’s response and thus its political fragility and lack of common attitude. As an almost omnipresent issue appearing in the public discourse, media and public opinion, it seems that contemporary migrations have indeed become a ‘new spectre haunting’ Europe.
Prominence these rising concerns have gained in past few years nonetheless have set the contemporary migrations as one of the principal subjects of public judgment, where the anticipation of their scope, extent and effects reaches almost dramatic proportions. Recent findings from Eurobarometer Survey (spring 2015) thus show that 38% respondents quote ‘that immigration is now top of most important concerns facing the EU’. When compared to previous year (24% in autumn 2014) (King and Lulle, 2016), this rise indicates that European citizens increasingly rate immigration as ‘a concern’ altogether with crime and terrorism, whereas in earlier years they were mostly worried for economic issues: the crisis, unemployment and public finances (ibidem). What additionally started cropping up on the horizon is a peculiar moral architecture that contemporary migrant waves provoked by seemingly endangering the political, economic and cultural grounds of Europe in the eyes of the many. Ethical and legal controversies that started surrounding migration and official authorization of mobility were largely set upon distinguishing of ‘strangers’ and producing the ‘citizens’ (Balibar, 2012), through a complex interplay of stigmatization, exclusion, integration and tolerance (Ambrosini, 2015). In its most intimidating forms, the character of contemporary migrations became delineated ‘by claims that refugee flows are pushing Western societies to the breaking point’ (Welsh, 2016: 72), thus providing justification to advocate restrictiveness concerning the freedom to settle. Notwithstanding, a dozen of worried chaplains hurriedly contest these, sometimes even conspiring appeals and claims, by deeming that free movement is basic human right (Nett, 1971, cit.fr. King and Lulle, 2016) and overall propagating a more ‘humanitarian’ approach.

Whatever position is taken, ascending obsession with the migrations – nowadays acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power, to recall Marx and Engels’ words, somehow confirms that the ‘new spectre’ is indeed haunting Europe. Still, could this only recently posited timely and relevant scientific, research and political topic – solely adjusted to historical presence (Welsh, 2016), appear as suffice to discern a complex amalgam migrations contain? Obviously, the ‘spectre’ is going to haunt itself if left only to intimidating ‘concerns’ that exclude the consideration of demographic causes and consequences, deeply associated with wider socio-economic, global perspectives of emigration,
along with transit of foreign nationals from Near East and Africa, that is particularly linked to military conflicts, arms trade, political contexts and turnovers. Only through weighed and tenacious analysis, huge gaps existent between the policy responses, public concerns and literature might be closed. Only in this way, the ‘spectre’ will lose its perseverance and the complex character of migrations, in their varying and intersecting realities and histories, will be disclosed.

Voluminous scholarly analysis has exactly mirrored the complexity of migrations as contemporary and global phenomena that reveals the variety of their ‘realities’ and their historical grounding (King and Lulle, 2016). Famous paradigm of the ‘age of migration’ that Castles and Miller have coined some two decades ago (Castles and Miller, 1993) precisely subsumed this altering shape migrations took since the 1980s, becoming globalized, diversified, accelerated, politicized and therefore highly contested processes and concepts. Notwithstanding the fact that more and more countries have been drawn into ‘global migration matrix’ where new types of ‘mobility’ has sprung up, other than those conventionally defined as ‘the movement of people to another country leading to temporary or permanent resettlement’ (Bartram et al, 2014, cit. fr. King and Lulle, 2016:24) and lasting for a certain period of time (6 months to one year). Rather than being confined into a more or less stable corpuses or patterns, contemporary migration display altering and fluctuating modes that are equally hard to delineate, discern and classify. New forms, motives and patterns of mobility thus problematize all previously established divisions of international moves resulting in an urge to reiterate usual typologies and binary distinctions (forced vs. voluntary migration, temporary vs. permanent one, legal vs. illegal, low skilled vs. high skilled) (King and Lulle, 2016).

Not only are migrations’ typologies blurred when it comes to directions (immigration vs. emigration) but also their geographies, temporalities, purposes and goals are very hard to unequivocally classify and dismantle. While they are more and more recurring, circular, return, seasonal, temporary, long stay, residential, tourist, transnational, etc, geographies of new mobilities are also altered and therefore some traditional sending countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, have become destination ones. Both policy papers and research articles gradually started noting this changing nature of migration flows, by further
encompassing it through a notion of mixed migration, which denotes the mixing motives of people for displacement that cannot solely be marked as forced or voluntary (Welsh, 2016; Van Hear, 2010, cit.fr King and Lulle: 23). Enormous persistence of migrants to reach particular locations – whatever the motives might be, indicates a complex set of dimensions that contemporary mobility as well started gaining through developing of networks and devising of strategies. New social transformations arise as a result of migrants’ countering a power of national states and supra national policies (ibidem) all of which have also been very clearly evidenced nowadays. Moreover, ‘... (potential) migrants increasingly enact their own agency via their social networks, transnational family connections, and links with specific recruitment channels and employers. The meso level of networks, associations, agencies and brokers is seen as increasingly important in explaining how contemporary migration “works”’ (Faist, 1997, Castles, 2010, cit. fr. King and Lulle, 2016: 26).

However, not only do we live in an ‘age of migration’ (although global share of migrants is as small as 3%). We also live in an ‘age of controlled migration’ or ‘forced international immobility’ (King and Lulle, 2016), where the migrations mobilized a vast regulative machinery through a so-called ‘migration management’. This increasing political articulation and regulation of migration has been systematically securitized during the last decades, simultaneously provoking ongoing global debates on securitization vs. humanitarianism. Namely, massive arrivals and passing through Balkan migration route (Beznec, Speer, Mitrović Stojić, 2016) have displayed a Janus-faced character of contemporary migration, as the securitization itself occurs concurrently with the massive global inequalities which are growing at a tremendous pace and along with the demographic disparities emerging as a result of shrinking aged populations of the West and North and growing young populations of the South striving to live similarly to those better off. Entirety of these processes also has been marked with an inclusion of a number of stakeholders (states, civil society, and supranational organizations), who, in varying and altering extents, seek to balance in between humanitarianism and securitization, i.e. control and migration management and assisting to those in need. On the other side are the migrants themselves, driven by urges of mere survival and opting to
live in peace in welfare states somewhere far from home. But, with this rising multiplication of migratory elements, it becomes clear that differentiation and segregation among peoples open up contested viewpoints on EU ‘welfare chauvinism’ in group and out-group variations (Cliquet, 2010), thus revisiting old dichotomies of South vs. North, rich vs. poor, ‘us’ and ‘them’ (King and Lulle, 2016), whites and non-whites, socio economic integration vs. wider paradigm of ‘home making’ and resettlement, etc., overall calling for a thorough interrogation.

Points and oppositions emerging in these debates only demonstrate the puzzling topology of migrations. Our volume aims exactly at discerning the internal linkages and drawing the ‘dots’ that in sum help forming, evolving and constituting contemporary migrations: its complex social grounds, the weight it has in social processes, as well as the effects it produces on the very social core. Aim to encompass the multifaceted and intricate phenomena that permeate and reflect upon numerous regions of social life as migrations are, hence, does not imply a limiting into historically and conventionally set disciplinary boundaries. Albeit these points have been frequently underlined, namely that migration is a very complex phenomenon and therefore it should be studied and grasped through interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary lenses in order to get to understand its complex demographic, economic, social, cultural, political, humane, gendered, personal and other aspects, it looks as if much of this endeavors stayed unfulfilled, at least when it comes to local scholars.

Quite the contrary, without a need for an a priori confining into a particular social ontology – either by giving primacy to societal mechanics in governing the course of action, or vice versa, setting of this volume implies a profound permeation both on the theoretical and methodological level, suffice to cover numerous fragments of migratory processes into a coherent, but still, very detailed explorations. Exactly because of this, a predominantly empirical focus of each of the chapters in this volume converges with a variety of theoretical approaches and diverging methodologies. Being critically reassessed, they are nonetheless employed precisely to find the possible pathways in explaining the varying, even so, mutually linked aspects of contemporary migration – ranging from the geopolitical and economic structures, as well as demographic conjunctures, over the means of politically-territorialized regulation, all the way to an active agency, that sets histori-
cally uncertain course of migration, driving it through strategic aiming – itself imbued with varying patterns of perception and experience.

Although one might find a predominant, but still not exclusive focus on the region of former Yugoslavia as historically-bound and contextually limited, it nonetheless, presents a major advantage of this volume. Namely, exactly the perspectives from a region where the migrations have had their profound social effects might offer the reader insightful and challenging attestation of the overall complexity this phenomenon historically bears. Balkan states are today faced with two-fold challenges related to mass migration flows. On one side there is a constant and huge emigration of youth, especially highly educated professionals and talents (estimated emigration from Serbia is around 15,000 per year), (Nikitović, 2013), while on the other side, Balkan countries are expected to receive and settle refugees and emigrants who are not welcome to arrive in European Union. Some of these questions were opened up in this book and tried to offer some plausible answers.

Therefore, the editors of this volume have been inspired to invite different scholars from the region of ex-Yugoslavia and try to make a contribution in terms of closure of this gap by way of pursuit of multidisciplinary viewpoints. Editors set out a goal to cast more light onto the cumulative causality (de Haas, 2008) of contemporary migrations of various kinds, so called economic and non-economic (asylum, refugees, etc.,) in an overall endeavor to get to better comprehend both events and processes which are hardly going to be seized in the context of reproduction of the global neoliberal capitalism. Therefore the contributions of the authors in this book deal also with the institutional frameworks (strategies and laws) of both former Yugoslav republics and EU, alternatively attempting to bridge migration policy, securitization and human rights through building specific human security approach. We also offer a plethora of migrants’ lived experiences en route, the ambiguity of their decision making, dilemmas, push-backs, etc. Empirical evidence reflected in this volume prove for the full righteousness of King’s advocating for removal of binary oppositions in migration studies because of – as will be seen later in the chapters – their varying courses, dependency and effects they produce, all of which underline the need to widen the explanatory frame and instead offer grounded, fragile, specific, quite divergent aspects of lived experiences. Only then the ‘spectre of migration haunting Europe’ demises, by being replaced by less fearful, but more fruitful understanding.
Most of authors of this book as will be demonstrated bellow and in the very texts, have been initially provoked by recent transit migrations to Balkans on their way to destination in European Union but then they researched deeper into the wider contexts of both sending and receiving as well as transit territories to dig out hidden forces and global economic, geopolitical, neoliberal, structural determinants of uprooting people and creating the current so called migration industry. A good deal of the volume is also devoted to the coping strategy of migrants themselves and their national groups as a way of overcoming of barriers and settling in quite restricted and uncertain mobility. All of these evolving components that compose the social breadth and depth of migration present a core of this book. As well, they are reflected through the very order of the chapters. Thus, what follows from the particular problematic elaborated in the chapters of this volume is composed through a four-fold perspective of Causes, Consequences, Policies and Reflections, that both separately and jointly, will cover the entirety of fragments and compound a comprehensive outlook into the multiplicity migrations possess.

Starting with the Causes, Part I deals with the complex problematic instigated within the layers of societal forces and their multiple intersections whose cumulative effects profoundly initiate migration. Thus, Damir Josipović (Chapter 1.1.) offers an insightful investigation of the long-term, political-geographical and demographic constituen-
cies and effects they have through forced resettlement from the Middle East, particularly Syria. What Josipović seeks to explore is a structural and historical interconnection of the whole myriad of factors that impacted and facilitated the course of contemporary migration, through employing the concept of ‘migration industry’. It might be immediately clear that the migration industry subsumes diverging and covert economic interests that indissolubly reflect on geopolitics, and even more importantly, demographic structures within the areas of geopolitical interest. Josipović thus effectively demonstrates that the destabilization of Middle East bears evidence for prolonged involvement of local and global powers. Lasting war, that provoked constant alternations of Syria’s borders together with a complex ethno-religious amalgam and emerging economic, infrastructural and ecological limitations, impacted the demographics of Syria and provoked a massive movement. Moreover, this process has reflected the geopolitical interplay of crises
management along the Balkan route and displayed a lack of strategic planning that somehow lead to a neglect of the possible effects it might have in dealing with the low fertility across Europe.

Inexorably related to the previous points, Maja Korac-Sanderson (Chapter 1.2.) critically examines the EU framing of extraterritoriality, border crisis and security and their role in producing the notion of a so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. Korac-Sanderson argues that the prevalent notion of security within which the current migration patterns to the so-called Global North are framed, resulted in further hardening of the external borders of ‘Fortress Europe’. This ‘ossification’ through ongoing processes of bordering and reborder security corresponds to emerging global social order characterized by unprecedented levels of inequality. Korac-Sanderson offers a remarkable critique of these disparities, as they exactly cause the global reproduction of insecurity of peoples of the Global South as well as the Global North. As she argues in the conclusion, instead it appears as rather necessary to reconceptualise security toward a model of human security – the one capable of acknowledging the embeddedness mobility has within wider, global socio-economic realities and their systemic character.

Part I finalizes with an exploration offered by Nada Sekulić (Chapter 1.3.) on some of the underestimated connections between broader social contexts that strongly influence forced migration in the contemporary world. While the mainstream emphasis in migration studies is put on migration control (‘migration management’), security issues, inclusion and costs of receiving countries, less attention is given to the conditions existent in the countries of origin, particularly the ones shaped with armed conflicts. Namely, Sekulić puts forward the argument that the establishment of sustainable and humane solution for the forced migration crises worldwide appears to be indeed difficult – if not impossible, if the huge and explosive growth of the investments in arms industry, military expenditure and arms trade in the world today is not taken into consideration. Core of this argument reveals peculiar logic revolving around fueling the wars and armed conflicts worldwide that, precisely because the arms trade appears to be rather lucrative business performed without transparency among the most developed states, indubitably produces migrant crises. Through analysis of an abundant amount of data, Sekulić exquisitely shows the scope of the arms trade in the Middle East and its relation to emerging migrant crises.
Slightly departing from the previous debates, Part II focuses on diverse migratory Consequences that emerge from demographic, political and economic constellations and reversibly affect them. Thus, Vladimir Nikitović (Chapter 2.1.) gives a precise outline of the population decline that started evolving in the region of former Yugoslavia due to below-replacement fertility and net emigration. Initiating the analysis from the migration cycle concept, which assumes general shift from an emigration to an immigration situation in conditions of the below-replacement fertility, Nikitović reassesses whether the transition to the net immigration stage across the whole region is possible by the mid-century and what might be the effects of the assumed international migration patterns on future demographic change in the region, particularly in the light of the rising numbers of the asylum seekers from West Asia and North Africa. Nikitović thus performs projection simulations on the grounds of the model used for the 2015 UN World Population Prospects in order to get a methodologically consistent set of future population dynamics across the region. As the projections clearly indicate the expected negative demographic momentum in the region, Nikitović concludes that the transition to stable net immigration will increasingly gain in importance over the next decades and even become an ultimate policy goal for the whole region.

Deeply linked with the previous considerations also are the effects of political and socio-economic distortions that occurred in the region of former Yugoslavia and consequently helped forming the (e) migration impetus, as it is the case with one specific social group investigated by Jelena Predojević-Despić (Chapter 2.2.) – the highly educated immigrants who left Serbia in the 1990s and settled in USA and Canada. At first place, Predojević-Despić offers a comprehensive look into the structure-agency ambivalence in migration theory. After successfully bridging it, she sets the grounds for thorough examination of differences in motives of the highly educated persons who emigrated from Serbia during this period for choosing the country of destination, as well as in plans for possible return to the country of origin. Through analyzing the data gained from a large-scale survey conducted among the emigrants of Serbian origin in the United States and Canada, Predojević-Despić thus effectively displays that the human agency, although strongly influenced by severe political and socio-economic conditions in the country, contributed significantly to the making of a
decision to emigrate. Still, one additional component the human agency brings into explanation is exactly the possibility to discern qualitative differences in motives – as it is the case with the respondents in Canada, who mostly chose economic reasons and pursue the standards of living, thus differing from the respondents in the USA, who mostly seek the professional advancement.

A similar investigation of intentional and strategic inclinations to migrate, nonetheless evolving as a consequence of (perceived) socio-economic limitations, is performed by Anica Dragović, Marija Drakulovska-Chukalevska and Ivana Dragović (Chapter 2.3). Through depicting the attitudes of Macedonia’s youth towards emigration, authors are seeking to distinguish the traits of potential emigrants and the key migratory determinants, actively shaping the migratory motivation. Among the major findings of analysis performed on non-probabilistic sample of the student population, Dragović et al. highlight the cross-section of limiting job opportunities, along with education, better quality of life, and particularly, the size of the family and the age, as the most influential variables in emigration selection for the youth. Still, the intentionality towards migration, as they show, as well rises through reflection on a context in which a person lives, availability of information and the environment where they want to go and existence of migratory networks, particularly as family security strategy that, as they clearly demonstrate, exists in developing countries.

Course of our investigations takes another direction in the Part III, where the Policies, as an important aspect of migration and their possible political articulations, become the focal point. Mirjana Rašević (Chapter 3.1.) thus seeks to find the existence of a reciprocal relationship between migration and development in key national strategic documents of Serbia. Assuming that a coherent policymaking has to imbue both the spheres of migration and population development, Rašević offers a critical analysis of the modality and contents of (non-) integration of the emigration/immigration and mobility issues in the key existing national documents in the spheres of development, economy, employment, social policy, health, education, science and youth policy. While finding examples of balanced integration accompanied by an awareness of the limitations and potentials of migration in the strategies for industrial, educational, and scientific and technological development, integration of the migration issue in the relevant docu-
ments rather differs in extent and quality. Exactly this altering contents and recognition of migration issue, that is either missing, being presented only nominally or even being incomprehensive, bring to an overall conclusion, as Rašević critically claims, that the implementation of these documents would reduce emigration flows and increase immigration flows towards Serbia.

Questions of emigration from Serbia and their possible societal effects are further explored by Mirjana Bobić and Milica Vesković-Andelković (Chapter 3.2.). First offering detailed theoretical reconsiderations, Bobić and Vesković-Andelković initiate the explicative course of the present day migrations of youth (15–30) in Serbia, conceiving it as result of bleak living standard, dependency on families of origin, all of which are combined with profound regional disparities in between capital and the rest of the country. Obviously appearing as a strategy and effect of push factors, Bobić and Vesković-Andelković project that, due to youth emigration from Serbia is going to continue, there have to be serious adjustments to its consequences. Therefore, in line with contemporary theoretical assumptions on transnationalism and social networks, they propose a diaspora option and brain circulation as foundation for a kind of a ‘win win’ solution. Latter would imply, as they claim, policy shifts in national and particularly local/regional networking of migrants with homeland, both real and virtual, that presuppose various sustainable actions: common projects, exchange of expertise (‘know how’) and resources, trainings, workshops, circular moves and potentially programming of returns.

Ružica Jakešević (Chapter 3.3.) concludes the Part III with an investigation of actual policy changes concerning security in Croatia, emerging in the light of European migration crisis. As she remarks, only recently migration became surrounded with such an unprecedented level of strengthening the security approach with the recent crisis, which proved to be a very powerful mean of political mobilization at domestic level in many countries, in bilateral relations between different countries, whether transit or destination ones, as well as at the EU level. By using the theoretical standpoints of the constructivist Copenhagen school of security studies that conceives them as speech acts, Jakešević first sets these practices and decisions into a broader context of securitization and explains how the security policy of Croa-
tia gradually became shaped under the influence of recent migration crisis. By minutely indicating the changes in security policy, practices and competences of individual institutions in Croatia, Jakešević exquisitely demonstrates the policy inclusion of migration through strengthening of securitization approach.

Finally, **Part IV** intrinsically rounds up the previous debates, but still, offers unique *Reflections* on both the active and concurrent as well as the long term aspects of migratory processes, in their profound ethno-historic, geographic and social unfolding. Andrej Kubiček (*Chapter 4.1*) thus delineates a long term perspective on migration of the Roma, offering a profound historical and sociological understanding of the social status formation in the context of migration. By employing the concept of a pariah people or *Pariavolk*, introduced by Max Weber, Kubiček successfully manages to study such a diverse and intertwined relationship of migration, social status and identity (either as a self-cognition or as stigma), as it is the case with Roma. While the concept of *Pariavolk* primarily implies a ritual separation from the social environment, it also encompasses connection between the migration and economic situation of one group. Relying on diverse and indeed rich empirical data, consisting of historiographical and ethnographic material, Kubiček nonetheless elegantly traces the mutually intertwined aspects of Pariah social status, where the spatial mobility, (charismatic) legitimation of trade and (imposed) segregation congregate and form the Roma social position.

These peculiarities of the migratory social position and its composition are further interrogated by Danica Šantić, Claudio Minca and Dragan Umek (*Chapter 4.2*). Core of their exploration revolves around the formation of migratory course through the Balkan Route in 2015. While the Balkan Route somehow complemented the existing maritime routes in the Mediterranean with new overland itineraries, it also introduced a shift of geographical gravity of the refugee-related migrations. More specifically, by focusing on policies and strategies implemented in Serbia and other countries along the Balkan route to face the several ‘crises’ of the past few years, authors trace political-territorial dynamics of articulating the increasing number of refugees from Asia and Africa on their way to Europe. Particular attention is thus paid to the management of the refugees and the (socio-demographic) characteristics of the related migration flows, which authors in detail present and discuss. Still, what Šantić et al. as well explored is a system
of refugee camps in Serbia and the migratory course of the refugees themselves, thus introducing additional dimension into analysis based on ethnographic enquires into the geographic composition of contemporary migrant flows along the Balkan route.

This course, at the very end, is extended in highly complementary research – also deposited on an ethnographic exploration among the migrants stuck in Belgrade parks and refugee centers on their way to EU, performed by Stefan Janković (Chapter 4.3.). Concentrating on peculiarities of migratory transfer to Western Europe from Middle East and Central Asia, Janković offers an in-depth analysis of this process, comprehended through its mobile, active and uncertain unfolding. Primarily conceiving it through a prism of liminality – a concept denoting the mediative stage found in rituals, Janković thus gives the particular emphasis to the bodies and spaces, as well as the practices, overall composing this process. He first examines the establishment of ‘liminal vector’ or the migratory course as an effect of schemes of habitus which, together with means they dispose, are reflected in ethical principles migrants recall: ‘humility’ or ‘exchange’. Furthermore, migratory transfer is analyzed with special emphasis given to the violence faced and development of specific strategies and mechanics of performing ‘liminal vector’. At the end, analysis focuses on liminal everyday living and liminal microcosm disclosed in Belgrade parks and refugee centers which, through internal composition of social differences, finally get to restructure the very process of migratory transfer.

A multiplicity of contemporary migration, as offered in diverge but still highly complementary chapters of this volume, thus might bring in front of the reader the possible and varying aspects of this process and hopefully lead to insightful and thought-provoking inquiries and conclusions. Exactly because of this, instead taking the simple, binary combinatory where the migrations would exclusively be apprehended as either negative or positive, a broad ranging perspectives offered by the authors of this volume reflect the overall complicity migrations contain. Acknowledgements, therefore, go first to them and enormous efforts they have invested in composing of their chapters, along with collectively taken efforts in cross-reviewing and commenting of the chapters thus, further enhancing the quality and accessibility of each. Of course, special praise has to be given to the reviewers of our volume – Anna Krasteva, Mirjana Morokvašić-Müller and Attila Melegh, who all have unconditionally accepted this, by no means, easy task. Their expertise, responsibility and diligent reading, we believe,
have largely helped in upgrading the overall quality of the book. As well, we are sincerely thankful to our colleagues from the Department of Sociology and the Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, for their overall support to make this volume published. Nonetheless, the same words of gratitude go for our colleagues from the Serbian Sociological Society. Along with them, we express the special words of appreciation to the publisher, hoping its reputation will be once more attested with this publication. Last but not least, we are honestly grateful to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, whose financial support made this publication possible.

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Part I
Causes
1.1. Geopolitics and Migration: Migration Industry as an Important Factor of (de)stabilization of Europe and the Middle East

Damir Josipovič

Introduction

Geopolitics and migration are closely intertwined. The economic and demographic writings suggest that migration boosts economy as well as it bolsters demography of a given state. Yet, the geopolitical context epitomises an initial ‘layer’ in creating the circumstances readily used or misused for triggering the massive population movements. Migration in its terrestrial or maritime place-changing dimension tends always to be a consequence of a decision – be it forced, coercive, obligatory, intentional, deliberate, voluntary or pseudo-voluntary (Josipović, 2013). But the process of migration cannot be sustained without some kind of its counterpart. To put it simplistically, there is always a need for two places, two areas, or two counterparts in interaction. Geographically, to determine the population ‘transfer’ from one place or region to another, there is a need for an intrinsic spatial shift. Outside of binomial thinking we may speak of individual fates, experiences etc., which form a ‘soft tissue’ of such a shift. But ever since we wanted to assess any kind of extent, scope, or magnitude of resettled people we had to retreat to Cartesian type of thinking, so daringly put in the Edmund Husserl’s work The Crisis of European Sciences
(Husserl, (1941) 1970). Revealing the Galilei’s erroneous starting point thoroughly affecting the modern sciences, Husserl inferred that there was no possible bridging between the ‘objectified science’ and ‘transcendental subjectivism’. Albeit problematic, Euclidean idealistic space is present in any of categorizations used in analysis, and thus subject to built-in biases, which may be slightly overcome by the qualitative assessment of the ‘raw data’. So, in negotiating the role between the aforementioned two ‘extremities’ (Euclidean points A and B) the power-geometry shapes the overwhelming relations of the ‘migration context’ through the ‘invisible hand of power’, to paraphrase Adam Smith’s famous buzzword. How this invisible hand operates in the 21st century and how drastically will this new paradigm change the future ‘management of migration’ could be perceived, broadly speaking, from the Syrian case.

To synthesize the whole apparatus at work, the notion of migration industry will be used. But migration industries under various names and labels have been known for a long time. Probably the most renowned was the migration-trade at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Austro-Hungary at that time ravished huge population aboard to the new world. One cannot deny the resemblance of factors at work thence. Nowadays circumstances are less affluent. The outbreak of refugee crisis, as many scholars refer to it, marked a new era with very uncertain prospects for Middle East, Mediterranean, and Europe. More than a million refugees mostly from the Middle East and parts of Africa (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea, Somalia etc.) entered EU only in 2015. The main direction of migration flows switched from the Mediterranean (maritime) route to the so-called Balkan (terrestrial) route. This change caused enormous pressure on the borders of South-East European countries. Apart from Greece (as the easternmost Schengen country) the pressure on smaller countries ‘guarding’ the Schengen outer border like Hungary or Slovenia was immense.

1 Unlike in Hernández-León (2008: 154), the notion of migration industry, here, follows the importance of the geographical and geopolitical aspects and the interplay of official and semi-official (or unofficial) networks involved in facilitating migration, as proposed by Kurz (2016) or Josipović (2016).

2 As suggested in other recent works (e.g. Koser, 2007), migration is today and was then facilitated by a similar intertwined network of individuals and agents including labour recruiters, immigration lawyers, travel agents, brokers, housing providers, remittances agencies, immigration and customs officials etc.
Having only two million inhabitants, Slovenia received or transferred more than 220,000 refugees in a one month period (October 15 – November 15) and around 400,000 until the end of 2015. In 2016 it was already obvious that the Balkan route diminished in significance. Revised data showed only 359,583 refugees from 17 September 2015 to the end of 2015, and additional 97,940 refugees until 8 March 2016 – altogether some 460,000 – entered or transited Slovenia (source: Ministry of Interior, Yearly reports 2015 and 2016). According to the Slovenian Ministry of Interior, the migration statistics were ‘balanced’ with the deduction of ‘illegal border crossings’. The legal refugees, without prejudicing their later refugee status, became ‘migrants within the regulated migration flow via Western Balkan route’ (Yearly report 2016: 3). Within the geographical shift of the majority of migrants from the route across the Mediterranean to its eastern fringe, the role of migration industries changed and lucrative business shifted. It is now much more difficult to trace all the facets and particles of such a mobility engine. Findings en-route from Greece to Austria describes the intertwined role of certain semi-legal groups to facilitate governments in their efforts in migrant selection.

In February 2017, Slovenian Prime Minister Miro Cerar shocked the international community saying at the Maltese European summit Slovenia is endangered via the Adriatic route.3 Such a plain exaggeration unsupported with evidence shows an out of touch statements without clearly perceiving the role of moderate politicians. But to understand such a gesture, one should return to September and October 2016, when the Slovenian government, especially the Ministry of Interior and its Minister Vesna Györkös Žnidar maintained that Slovenia is under a threat of possible reopening of the Balkan route. From then on, the governmental discourse was accruing more and more radical statements all the way to the adoption of very restrictive ‘Act on Foreigners’, which was heavily criticised by Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe, as to be in conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights (Muižnieks, 2017). Slove-

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3 He is a founding member of the Miro Cerar Party / Stranka Mira Cerarja – SMC (later renamed into the Modern Centre Party / Stranka Modernega Centra – SMC) founded in the face of the 2014 parliamentary election in Slovenia. Some describe the change in his political behaviour as the direct impact of the new personal advisor Asaf Eisin reportedly from London’s consulting agency ESBR, who also supported Aleksandar Vučić, the Serbian Prime Minister, in his election win.
nian establishment reacted in an ‘orbanistic’ way repeating the notion of ‘dirty outsiders’ and ‘corrupt Europe’, who dare to interfere into the internal affairs of a sovereign country.4

Inasmuch as the ongoing tramp of populism throughout Europe propels such rhetoric, the fright-sowing became blatantly normalised, although it, among other issues, pushed the European Union to the brink of its existence. The renowned cohesion of European identity shows cracks of an underdeveloped idea. The Schengen Treaty area is under constant alarm ever since. There were ideas of limiting it to six member-states only. The so-called ‘little Schengen’ would comprise of Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Benelux countries, since other member-states, including Slovenia, seemingly could not be trusted.5 It seemed that the old image of ‘common Europe’ disappeared. By the beginning of 2016 it looked like this was only a ‘nightmare’ to the European dream, since the main ‘issue’, the refugees from the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa, was ‘diverted’ back to the ‘beaten path’ across the Mediterranean Sea.6 This was achieved through the involvement of Turkey and the German-Austrian facilitation of bargaining Turkey’s status (visa regime) in a future EU enlargement. As some reported, that was the most preposterous act of the European liaison throughout its sixty plus years of existence (Videmšek, 2016). As if it was forgotten that this ‘threat’ of the fleeing came from the bloody wars and vicious persecutions. What the political establishment was talking about were not the human fates but the possible threats of an imaginary tide of immigrants who would terrorize and overwhelm Europe and impose its ‘aggressive Islamic way of life’ over ‘our European values’. The public arena was flooded with trivial agenda and the sense of fear without

4 Moreover, the Minister eventually pointed out that she has got ‘good information’ that the Geneva Convention will soon be changed.

5 Some commentators argue that the newly outlined position towards public and the enforcing of Slovenian-Croatian boundary show intrinsic dependency on Germany and Austria in order to establish additional barrier before entering the ‘German territory’ and to provide for ‘better selection’ of immigrants. Indeed, the evidence set forth at the Royal Geographical Society in London last September (2016) supports this idea (Josipovič, 2016).

6 It should be stressed that the Central Mediterranean migration route from Libya to Italy actually never ceased to operate. In this way, the Western Balkan migration route could also be seen as a temporary ‘anomaly’ (cf. Širok, 2017). Moreover, the Italian economy accrued substantially from the migration industry (ibid.).
really addressing the core of the ‘problem’ itself: not only millions of people were fleeing, but they were fleeing from evil places having their proper geographical names. We were talking about Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan etc. and the millions on the move, forced to flee for their lives. Before we move on to the explanatory part, we should, according to Ranuccio Bianchi-Bandinelli, take a good look at ‘what’ happened, ‘were’ it happened, and ‘how’ it happened, to prevent falling into the trap of ideological mistake when explaining ‘why’ it happened beforehand (Bianchi Bandinelli, 1978: 10).

Geography of forced migration has a history probably as long as of humans. Here are some insights of the circumstances in which the majority of later refugees had resided before the armed conflicts escalated. The preponderant part of the recent refugee influx to Europe was coming from Syria (more than 50 % in 2015). Its civil war has been raging for six years with some signs to end owing to the peace talks in Celino-grad/Astana (Kazakhstan) including the majority of warring factions, including the Asad’s government, secular opposition and Kurds, but excluding Al-Kaeda branch Jabhat Fateh al-Sham formerly known as the al-Nusra and Daesh (al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham; i.e. ISIS/ISIL). But what were the causes of such a devastating war? Was it the global conflict on the resources escalating into a local war or was it the state totalitarianism imposed to the Sunni Islamic fundamentalists who nowadays try to ‘liberate’ the country from its imposed secularism? Was it the rage of the subjugated population wanting democracy and multiparty system or was it the mass executions like that of 20,000 casualties against the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982? Was it the intolerance of the ethnic and religious diversity or was it the demographic explosion and the lack of arable land and water in an arid country? There is, for sure, a plethora of reasons and, as habitually, the answers are multifaceted. In trying to resolve the research question, we will concentrate on the demographic, political-geographic, and socio-economic aspects which could have had a decisive role in the evolving conflict.

Refugees and legacy of the empires

Forced and planned migrations in eastern and south-eastern parts of the former Ottoman Empire were immanent for the last century. After its collapse, the Empire was not peacefully split into various
mandate territories and states mostly under the auspices of the French and the British. A new redistribution of population began already in 1915, after the first Turkish massacre onto Armenians. In this way became then Syrian territory a polygon of many migrations for decades to come. After both world wars and the establishment of the post-war Syria, the hallmark of forced migration was represented by the Palestinian refugees. By 1995 some 342,300 refugees were encamped in Syria, most of which were Palestinians (337,300). Apart of that some 300,000 persons were internally displaced (mostly the population from Golan Heights, Quneytirah (Kuneitra) district). By the end of 1997 and the Golan ceasefire with partial demilitarization, the number of IDPs steadily decreased (125,000), while the number of Palestinian refugees, mostly without Syrian citizenship, remained high (357,000) due to lofty birth rates, while other refugee groups decreased to about 4000. Twenty years later (mid-2014) the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East reported 530,000 refugees in Syria out of 5.1 million Palestinian refugees in the region (Figure 1.1.1.).

Figure 1.1.1: Palestinian refugees in the Near East region on July 1st 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestinian refugees, July 1st 2014.</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Share of the Palestinian refugees in total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>760,000</td>
<td>2,790,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td>23,301,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>*2,100,000</td>
<td>6,607,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>4,510,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNWRA 2016.*

(*mainly with the Jordanian citizenship*)

New tensions had started soon after the referendum in 2000 and with the re-election of Baschar al-Assad in 2007 for President of the Syrian Arab Republic\(^7\). Not more than three years were needed, after a succession of the Arab spring revolutions all the way from Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, to an escalation of the Syrian conflict. While Tunisia and Egypt managed to stabilize, sometimes by chastely undemocratic means, Libya and Syria were less successful in doing so. Libya faced a coup-d’état after the execution of a long reigning colonel Muammar al

\(^7\) Baschar al-Assad was re-elected in 2014 by the regime-loyal groups.
Gaddafi and is still struggling with the regional militias fighting for domination over traditional regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, respectively. Contrasting Libya, the situation in Syria quickly deteriorated from 2011.\textsuperscript{8} It evolved into what happened to be the most brutal civil war at the moment with many factions fighting their own way (Regime loyal troops, Kurdish YPG, Al-Nusrah, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, 'Islamic State', Christian militias etc.). The number of internally displaced and refugees soared.

By the end of 2013, according to the UNHCR, there were already 6.5 million internally displaced persons. That number increased to 7.6 million by the end of 2014 (source: UNHCR). On top of it, the number of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries has sharply risen from 2.9 million (mid 2014) to 4.1 million (mid 2015), to reach 4.7 million by mid-2016. The main ‘receiving’ countries were Turkey and Lebanon, both with more than a million of forcibly emigrated from Syria (Figure 1.1.2.).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline

\textbf{Syria} & \textbf{IDPs (internally displaced)} & \textbf{Turkey} & \textbf{Lebanon} & \textbf{Jordan} & \textbf{Iraq} & \textbf{North Africa} & \textbf{Total persons displaced} & \textbf{% of all population} \\
\hline
Mid-2014 & 6,000,000 & 789,700 & 1,117,100 & 604,900 & 225,500 & 161,500 & 8,898,700 & 38.7% \\
Mid-2015 & 7,600,000 & 1,805,300 & 1,172,800 & 629,100 & 249,700 & 156,500 & 11,613,400 & 50.5% \\
Mid-2016 & 6,500,000 & 2,743,497 & 1,048,275 & 655,217 & 247,339 & 146,977 & 11,341,305 & 49.3% \\
\hline
Change 2015/14 & +1,600,000 & +1,015,600 & +55,700 & +24,200 & +24,200 & -5,000 & +2,714,700 & +30.5% \\
Change 2016/15 & -1,100,000 & +938,197 & -124,525 & +26,117 & -2,361 & -9,523 & -272,095 & -2.3% \\
Change 2016/14 & +500,000 & +1,953,797 & -68,825 & +50,317 & +21,839 & -14,523 & +2,442,605 & +27.4% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}


\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{8} Destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa through the 'Arab Spring' should not be confused with unilateral actions aiming at punishing the disobeying regimes. Thus, by 2011–2012 there already was a plan for creating and financing the rebels since Syrian government refused to let Turkey-Qatar natural gas pipeline across its territory (source: Project Censored, October 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2016). Moreover, the former US General Wesley Clark talking to Amy Goodman on Democracy Now! March 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2007 announced that only ten days after 9/11 the Pentagon already had the plan to attack Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia.
\end{flushright}
The figures show that until mid-2014 almost two fifth of the Syrian population was already displaced. In a single year until mid-2015 the number of displaced rose for 2.6 million to 11.6 million displaced, rendering the displaced a majority (50.5 per cent) over people who retained their homes. While the number of Syrian refugees increased in all neighbouring countries, it is significant that it decreased in North Africa. This means, first, an accelerated immigration to Europe via Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, and second, slim chances of temporary exile in Egypt – a former ‘bigger sister’ of the short-lived United Arab Republic.9 Moreover, the mid-2016 data (Figure 1.1.2.) reveals new major transitions of population. With the siege of Aleppo former IDPs moved mainly to Turkey (almost one million), and with the establishment of the ‘air-bridge’ between Italy and Beirut, the number of refugees significantly declined in Lebanon (–125,000). The overall decrease of the displaced population (–272,000) owes predominantly to migration along the Balkan route (Figure 1.1.2.).

According to Videmšek (2016), the Balkan migration route, a major arena of humanitarian en-route calamity, presented a spectacular showdown of EU’s incapability to cope with the migration flow initiated by the very core EU member states. Being under pressure of high number of refugees, the countries along its way invented up until then unseen ‘measures’ for preventing people from crossing the border regardless of weather, or other circumstances (Videmšek 2016). Though instructed by Germany and partially Austria, the governments in countries like Hungary, Slovenia, and Macedonia introduced a cutting wire as a means of preventing trespassing. All the en-route countries did, was facilitating the refugee convoys. It meant a ‘construction’ of corridors to the ‘desired’ land – Germany (ibid.) and escorting the ‘agreed number’ from one border to another. From September to 7 December 2015, according to IOM Macedonia 2016 not less than 313,656 people crossed the border at Eidomene (Sehovo) / Gevgelija and traversed the former Yugoslav states Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The structure of refugees showed a then predominantly male population (56.8 per cent) escaping the recruitment for obvious reasons. These numbers changed dramatically in its structure rendering, again for ob-

9 United Arab Republic (UAR) was a tentative all-Arab federation according to wishes of the Egyptian president Nasser. It lasted from 1958 to 1961, and it comprised of Egypt and Syria. The prospect membership of the North Yemen did not live to it (Stanton 2003, 109).
vious reasons, the later refugee waves (beginning of 2016) intensively more feminized (over 60 per cent). It is critical to mention that the number and share of ‘unaccompanied minors’ rose to 17,000 (5.4 per cent), while children (21.9 per cent) and women (15.9 per cent) represented 38 per cent of the en-route refugees (Figure 1.1.3). Among the origin countries, Syria represented 58.5 per cent of refugees, followed by Afghanistan (24.1 per cent) and Iraq (10.6 per cent) (Figure 1.1.4.).

Figure 1.1.3: Refugees entering Macedonia from Greece at Eidomene (Sehovo) by gender and family status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2-Nov-15</th>
<th>7-Dec-15</th>
<th>2-Nov-15</th>
<th>7-Dec-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>124,488</td>
<td>178,063</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29,688</td>
<td>49,881</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children with family</td>
<td>39,976</td>
<td>68,625</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>9,788</td>
<td>17,087</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>203,940</td>
<td>313,656</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM Macedonia, Contact Group, situation as of December 2nd, 2015.

Figure 1.1.4: Refugees entering Macedonia from Greece at Eidomene (Sehovo) by citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>2-Nov-15</th>
<th>7-Dec-15</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>132,219</td>
<td>183,499</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>41,195</td>
<td>75,505</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>15,671</td>
<td>33,211</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>6,231</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4,327</td>
<td>5,416</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>2,158</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>203,940</td>
<td>313,656</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM Macedonia, Contact Group, situation as of December 2nd, 2015.
In spring 2016 the Balkan route closed and thus emerged the Eidomene (Sehovo) and Aegean refugee crises. The refugees reoriented back to the perilous central Mediterranean Euro-African crossing (Figure 1.1.5.)

Figure 1.1.5: East Mediterranean refugee routes (2016).

Illustration by the author.

In the last months, the Balkan route desiccated with some 10,000 trapped en-route at Eidomene on Greek-Macedonian border (Hladnik Milharčič 2016). With the last agreement between the EU and Turkey, it seems that the even more dangerous ‘Mediterranean’ route will regain its pivotal role as gateway to Europe via Italy and Malta.

The making of Syria – causes of the conflict

To move onto the question of contemporary migration and the role of migration industry, we have to emphasise its profound, long-term historical roots leading to these spaces. In the following section the imperial heritage, geopolitical insurgencies concerning borders, resources, and relations among different ethno-religious groups are examined, as they form the actual causes of the conflict. The geopolitical establishment
of what later became Syria was very complex. Precisely its complexity represented a fertile ground for pronounced sectarianism evolved in the last century. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the local predominantly Arab political elite aimed at creating one Arab state within the whole French mandate. Namely, during the French reign (until 1946) the Syrian territory was split in six states or regions (Aleppo, Damascus, Lebanon, Latakia, Jabaal Druze, and Alexandretta) to mirror supposedly very different traditions of its population. With such a *divide et impera* policy, the French aimed especially at protecting the Christian community of Maronite (Levantine Christians) concentrated in western, Mediterranean parts of the country, from Lebanon all the way to Alexandretta in today's Turkey (see Figure 1.1.6.). With special relations with Alawites, the French also wanted to prevent Aleppo and Damascus administrative states from direct access to the Mediterranean (cf. Biger, 2015).

**Figure 1.1.6: General map of Syria.**

*Illustration by the author; *dotted line marks the Syrian desert and other arid or semi-arid areas.*
Though Arab-speaking by vast majority, Syria resembles a strikingly divergent ethnic and religious development (Figure 1.1.5) and specific ethnic geography. Its territory comprises of 60 per cent of desert or semi-desert, and its population is dispersed in crescent-like shape from the Lebanon and Antilebanon Mountains to the Euphrates River (Figure 1.1.6.). Such a geography profoundly shapes Syrian traffic, communications and the urban network.

As visible from the Figure 1.1.7., population growth in Syria was extremely high. From 1945, when there were 2.9 million inhabitants, the population soared to 22 million before the war out-broke in 2011. Such an increase is typical for ethnically diverse areas (cf. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Kosovo, Palestinian territories) where geographically compact minorities systematically exercised comparably higher fertility rates in order to demographically compete with more numerous neighbours. Such fertility behaviour was by some authors drastically labelled as ‘aggressive breeding’ (cf. Stanton 2003). Despite high fertility, typical for most groups, there were significant shifts in the ethnic and religious structure of Syria: Sunnis and Alawite gained percentage, while Druze accrued numerically but their share stagnated. The most profound shift was exhibited by Levantine Christians. At first (in 1945) their share steadily increased to 15 per cent in 1980. After the Lebanese civil war and massive migration to France and other European countries, their share decreased to about 9 per cent in 2011 (Figure 1.1.7.).

**Figure 1.1.7: Ethnic and religious structure of Syria.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic structure of Syria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1945:</strong> 2,949,819: 88.5% Arab speakers, 8.5% Kurdish speakers, 3% Turkish speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1961:</strong> 4,593,000: 91.4% Arabs, 6.5% Kurds, 2.9% Armenians, 1.3% others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994:</strong> 13,812,284: 89% Syrian Arabs, 6% Kurds (partly without citizenship), 2% Armenians, 3% others (Adyghe-Circassian, Turcoman/Turkmen, Turks etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004:</strong> 17,920,844: 89% Syrian Arabs, 6% Kurds (partly without citizenship), 2% Armenians, 3% others (Adyghe-Circassian, Turcoman/Turkmen, Turks etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1945:</strong> 2,949,819: 68.9% Sunni, 11.4% Alawite, 3.0% Druze, 1.4% Isma’ili &amp; Shia, 4.8% Orthodox Christians, 5.2% Other Christians (Syrian Orthodox/Catholics, Greek Catholics, ‘Latin’, Maronite, Chaldean, Protestant, Nestorian), 3.5% Armenian Orthodox, 0.6% Armenian Catholics, 1.0% Jews, 0.1% Yazidis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the official Syrian censuses and estimates according to Michael Izady, 2015.

Steadily declining populations of Levantine Christians, mainly due to emigration (but also due to immigration of predominantly Sunni Palestinians), are of many denominations. The Maronites, as the most numerous, are predominantly concentrated in Lebanon. Since the partition of the French Mandate territory and subsequent Lebanese independence, the Maronite minority in Syria is primarily located around the port of Baniyas. The Lebanese territory itself was disputed by Syria and long absent from the official Syrian maps, since Syria never fully recognized its de facto cession from the former French Syria in 1946. Lebanese regional council adopted its constitution in 1926 but it would not have been recognized until many amendments (in 1927, 1929, 1943, and 1947) were implemented. By the Lebanese Shiite Muslim community, it was deemed problematic and biased in favour of the Maronites and the Sunnites. In the absence of censuses, the estimations were the only tool to fulfill the constitutional provisions. According to one US conducted survey from 2011, it heavily relied on the 1987 data of the Collelo’s group: the Sunnis and Shia Muslims shared a 27 per cent of population, while Maronites represented 21 per cent. Another 8 per cent were attributed to Greek Orthodox Christians, 4 per cent to Greek Catholics, and 7 per cent to other Christian denomination (Syriac Catholics, Assyric (Nestorian and Chaldean) Christians, Armenian Apostolic Christians, Armenian Catholics, Melkites etc.), while 5 per cent were represented by Druze communities (Collelo et al., 1987). Despite the complex ethnic and religious structure the constitution determined a 50:50 division of the seats in the local Parliament.

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10 The 1932 census in Lebanon determined 243,920 persons in emigration among whom Christians predominated with 85 per cent (123,397 Maronites (51 per cent), 57,031 Greek Orthodox (23 per cent), and 26,627 Melkites (11 per cent), while Muslim and Druze population represented only 15 per cent (36,865 persons) (see Collelo, 1987).
an-Nuwaab) with 128 representatives (64 Christians, 64 Muslims) whereby Druze are allocated to the Muslim quota. Besides, the president should always be a Maronite, while the Prime minister should be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim. Interestingly, the constitution allows election partaking to those aged 21 and above in order to prevent communities to profit from higher fertility and consequently higher turnouts. Nevertheless, the fertility rates have remained high in Syria as well as in Lebanon. Only recently, after 2002, the Lebanese total fertility rate fell beneath 2.1 children per woman in a child-bearing age. On top of it, Lebanon is densely populated with more than 440 inhabitants per square kilometre. Hosting another 1.2–1.5 million refugees from Syria (apart from some 450,000 Palestinians according to UNRWA\textsuperscript{11}), Lebanon exhibits a critical overpopulation with some 550 to 600 inhabitants per square kilometre (source: Lebanon Demographics, UNRWA, 2014).

a) Boundaries with Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan

According to the Sèvres Treaty from 1920 Lebanon was foreseen as a Syrian province along with the area of Alexandretta and Antioch (today’s Hatay region in Turkey). According to the 1938 agreement, following the Lausanne Accord from 1923 and several other agreements between French and Turks, the French tacitly allotted Antioch area and the whole northern border strip between Tars and Tigris to newly established Turkey. The border strip along the railway Ankara–Baghdad was of strategic importance for Turkey, though with such a solution many Arab and Kurdish territories were split. On one hand the solution from 1938 created Kurdish enclaves in Syria geographically detached from the compact Kurdish territory of Turkey and Iraq. On the other hand, Arab areas along Euphrates remained enclaved in Turkey. Another problematic decision was that around Iskenderun (Alexandretta) and Antakya (Antioch) where a considerable part of Alawite territory along the Mediterranean coast was ceded by French to Turks on a behalf of counterargument of Turkey. Syria never accepted neither of these cessions (Biger, 2015). Thus, the plan of creation an Alawite

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{UNRWA}: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
state/region stretching from Tartus to Alexandretta failed. Another problem represented the western Iraqi boundary. In the mandate territory of Syria, French retained the contact to Tigris as a navigable river. So, geographically Syria occupies a coast-to-coast part of Mesopotamia. While Euphrates represents a dominant physical geographical feature and an axis in north-eastern half of the country, the Tigris’ banks are divided with Turkey from the city of Cizre to the confluence with Khabur. The main problem of establishing the Syrian-Iraqi boundary was the Sinjar Mountains (Jebel Sinjar) with Yazidi population. The outcome of international negotiation with French, British, and Americans yielded the whole Sinjar as part of Iraq.

The Golan issue was a direct result of a division laid by British in their mandate area of Jordan and Palestine. Curiously enough they have split the area along the only major river – the Jordan River. That thoughtless decision caused immense future tensions and conflicts. On top of it the British did not follow any of the renowned principles for delimitation. Part of the boundary was laid on the bank of the Tiberias (Genezareth) Lake, while the upper parts of the Jordan River were not used as a boundary course. Consequently, the Golan Heights dispute emerged and, though frozen at the moment, it still persists (Biger, 2015).

The boundary with the Jordan Kingdom remained almost undisputed though it had gained a peculiar course, too. Running mostly through the Syrian desert it created problems for Druze community of Daraa and Suwaida west off the Druze Mountain being partially left out in the Jordan Kingdom.

b) Infrastructure and economy

Oil production is among the most lucrative businesses in Syria, especially the oilfields east of Hasakah (in Al Djazirah i.e. ‘Mesopotamia’). The pipelines from Mosul and Tikrit – both in northern (Sunni) Iraq – run to refineries in Homs (just of the Antilebanon Heights) and in Baniyas (one of the three most important Syrian ports on the Mediterranean coast built by Yugoslav companies in 1960’s) but as well to Lebanese refinery of Tripoli. There is another pipeline cutting through southwest Syria and Golan Heights from Jordan to the refinery of Sidon in Lebanon. Already in 1995, the biggest share of exports
represented oil products (2.6 billion USD or 63.4% of 4.08 billion USD worth exports). Very important raw materials (textile and fabrics for clothing, raw wool) accounted for 14.2% (580 million USD) in 1995. Main markets for Syrian goods were Italy (18.1%), Germany (14%), France (9.6%), Turkey (9.3%), Lebanon (6.9%), Spain (6%), and Greece (3.7%). The five EU countries accounted for more than a half (51.4%) of all Syrian exports, which has clearly set Syria as a Europe’s raw materials supplier country. On the other hand, imports showed remnants of Soviet and Yugoslavia oriented import market. By 1995 the highest share of imports (worth 6.51 billion USD) still came from Ukraine (7.9%). Other main exporters to Syria were Italy (7.9%), Turkey (7%), Germany (6%), South Korea (4.8%), France and Japan (4.4% each). The main imports vary from metal products (21.4%) and machinery (19.5%) to nutrients (15.4%) and means of transport (12.1%). Especially high import costs of nutrients (over 1 billion USD in 1995) have germinated the upcoming food shortages and caused high imbalance in foreign trade which could not be overcome by rising price of crude oil.

c) Demographic and ecological constraints

The ever-increasing total population (3.495 million in 1950, 8.979 million in 1980, 14.5 million in 1995, and 23.3 million in 2014)\(^\text{12}\) concentrating along the so-called Fertile Crescent (Figure 1.1.5.) pressed upon the agricultural water resources provoking the increased fertile soil erosion. Syria occupies a huge arid, desert and semi-desert areas – 80 per cent of the territory is uninhabited, 60 per cent of which is Syrian Desert. The on-going ecological degradation, aridization, soil erosion, arenization, and denudation, drives people out of their traditional areas of extensive farming and pasturing into the cities and suburbs. Overpopulation further deteriorates scarce natural resources such as water for irrigation, and areas suitable for energy production. Henceforth, the regional population density differs dramatically. While the national average in 1984 was 58.8 inhabitants per square kilometre,

the density in the Mediterranean littoral and highlands was as high as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre (Valentine, 1985).

Around the turn of the 20th century population growth reached 1% per year. Ever since it only increased: to 2.5% by 1950’s, to 3% in 1960’s and mid-1970’s to culminate in 1975–1982 period by 3.8% per year (Valentine, 1985). Such a massive accretion was partly due to the unfinished demographic transition (cf. Kaa, 1987), and rapid modernization of the country. On the other hand, population policy from 1959 seemed to have little effects of any kind, and was not systematically imposed due to varied and delicate ethno-religious national setting (ibid.).

Syria made huge improvements in the quality and accessibility of medical care. Extremely high birth rates (45.8 per thousand in 1977) and lowered mortality rates (7.4 per thousand in 1977) show that the Syrian republic evolved into a well-organized country with universal health care for all citizens in less than three decades. As of 1950–1955 period, the mortality rate was as high as 21.4 per 1000 inhabitants. Child mortality in 1970 was still at 123 per 1000 surviving children, while in 1979 it decreased to 66 per 1000 surviving children (Valentine 1985: 405–406). Such demographics without massive immigration have enormously contributed to the so-called young demographic regime with 48.1 per cent of population younger than 15. The elderly (above 64 years of age) were represented by as little as 3.7%, making the active contingent (15–64) as big as the young (ibid.). Disproportionate population pyramid (3.3 children per every economically active inhabitant) announced extensive population growth similar to that of Sub-Saharan Africa. Though by 1980, Syria mirrored two rather different population styles: one of the cities and urban areas with ‘progressive’ population exercising birth control visible through the sex ratio at birth (1071 men per 1000 women), and another from rural areas with traditional fertility behaviour with limited or nil birth control (1038 men per 1000 women). That those two demographic facets sharply contrasted one another is visible also through the rate of urbanization (47.9 per cent in 1981) and through prolonged life expectancy of (primarily urban) population (63.8 years per men and 64.7 years per women in 1981) (ibid.).

Syria shares a range of similarities with Iraq. The type of governance was state planned socialism with the leading workers party of
BAAS/BAATH. As the statistical data show, these proto-socialist and secular pan-Arabic totalitarianisms were in both cases ruled by a minority over the huge majority. The Sunni Iraqi Arabs (the leader was Saddam Hussein from Tikrit area) represented 18% of Iraqi population vs. Alawi ruling family of Assad (‘the Lion’ of the 1970 coup) with Alawites comprising 13% of Syrian population (Figure 1.1.4.). In both countries, we were witnessing the decay of traditional Christian (Armenian, Assyrian, Chaldean etc.) community (Izady, 2015). Ethnic cleansing wiped the Yazidis from Sinjar Mountains and northern Iraq, as well as from north eastern Kurdish territories in Syria.

Modern, pro-social and secular Arab republic, formerly part of the United Arab Republic (with Egypt), became a presidential republic in 1973. In the national parliament, there is a majority (127 of 250 members) reserved for farmers and workers, while the remaining 123 seats are distributed according to the proportion of other professions (!). High percentage of illiteracy (as much as 36% in 1990) is the remnant of the colonized Syria where the older population, especially women, traditionally did not attended schools. After the presidential decree in 2002 all children with no exceptions were obliged to attend elementary schools. The rate of illiteracy rapidly improved from 79 % for females older than 15 in 1970 to less than 21 % in 2012. Among males the illiteracy rate fell from 29 % in 1970 to only 9 % in 2012. Illiterate population is strained among populations from peripheral and rural areas.

According to the World Development Indicators, Syria reached 100 per cent enrolment rate of boys and 96 percent for girls in primary education in 2003, prior to the war. It remained as high as 94% in 2011, before the outbreak of the civil war. By 2012 the enrolment dropped to 62 (boys) and 61 (girls) per cent and is still decreasing. Compared to Central European countries (averaging at 95 per cent for boys and 92 per cent for girls), the Syrian pre-war education statistics are more favourable. Even in Iraq, which shared a similar ruling exposition, the primary school’s enrolment was very high already in 1980 (99 % for boys and 88 % for girls). According to World development indicators Syria spends as much as 5.1 % of GDP on education, more than all of the post-socialist countries of Central Europe, except Slovenia (5.6 %). Within the Visegrád group the expenditures range from 3.9 % in Slovakia to 4.9 % in Poland (in 2011).
Conclusion

First and foremost observation leads to the conclusion that Syria incipiently received imposed boundaries – from Sèvres to Lausanne accord (1920–1923) it lost parts of Eastern Cilicia / Kilikya and a 500 kilometres long strip of land north from the Stambol / Istanbul – Bagdad railway. In 1936, it lost further territories to Turkey through the French cession of the former Alexandrette Sanjak (later Turkish province of Hatay). At the same time the Sunni areas of neighbouring Iraq were incorporated into the newly created state of Iraq. Such a superimposed boundary – artificial creation of Syria alluding the Assyrian ancient Kingdom – with linguistic, religious and ethnic structure stimulated minorities to either procreate and gain its percentage (i.e. Alawites) or are forced to gradually emigrate (i.e. Syrian Christians).

High population growth causes overpopulation and retracting of the natural resources: water access was limited to 90 per cent in Syria and only 85 per cent in Iraq (WDI 2012). Beside the on-going ecological degradation (aridization, soil erosion and denudation), overpopulation was a salient problem in terms of distribution of resources such as water, arable land, pastures, irrigation, and areas suitable for energy production. Industrialization and urbanization redistributed population making the cities centres of secularism while the remote rural areas were breeding of all sorts religious orthodoxies.

As for Europe and the European Union, it needs to be emphasised that the renowned integration capacity failed over the disintegrative discourse, promoting the Fortress of Europe concept which eventually emerged into the ‘Fortress of little Europes’. The concept of European neighbourhood fails as long as the Mediterranean is not Europeanized enough in the eyes of the ‘common’ Europeans. This refugee crisis confirmed that EU notoriously lacks the cohesion and integrative instruments for crises circumstances. The European controversy once again won by defending the Schengen from the outside (from Macedonia towards Greece) alluding to the great schism along the former east-west (Iron Curtain) divide (Josipović, 2012; Tunjić, 2006).

With the temporary closure of the Balkan route, the reorientation of migration flows towards Eastern Mediterranean fringe temporarily ceased to contribute large figures of refugees and migrants of all kind.
The Central Mediterranean Sea route re-establishes a perilous *déjà vue* of stacked boats on outer islands of Lampedusa, Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria. The January 2016 events and the establishment of organized flights (the so-called air-bridge) from Beirut to Italy may involve organized trafficking and state-run like systemically supported illegal facilitating of migration (Eritrea, Somalia, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali etc.) via the central Mediterranean route.

Alternative to the ‘Fortress of Europes’, the European Union could recognize the demographic potential of refugees and could develop or use current programmes of permanent inclusion of forced migrants from the Middle East or elsewhere. It appears that the European optic maintains the intrinsic dualistic makeup. By nurturing the deceptively perceived centre-periphery relationship, it cannot institutionalize the abundance of identity expressions often detached from such perceptions of self-sustaining Europe.

It seems that the major goal for settling high number of refugees is solely in purpose of facilitating the demand in low-wage sectors of economy and unburdening the sundering demographics. Depopulation and instability stemming from it (pension funds, nurture, medical care etc.) already dictate a steady influx of immigrants on a yearly basis. The German case provides for elusive machinery (i.e. migration industry) of taking the advantage of the main migrant/refugee wave from 2015/16. By ways of seizing the mind of a desperate the so-called recruiting was more than successful. Huge majority of refugees ended up in Germany (1.3 million) who socially overdid this experiment outplayed with the help of Turkey and the Balkan suzerains. The countries from Greece to Slovenia found themselves in a position of gatekeepers tailored to suit the wishes of the mighty. Even Austria found itself in an uninformed position not exactly knowing what to expect and how to intermingle. Setting aside the problem of potential dissolving of the Schengen system and creating a more trustful ‘small’ Schengen with Germany as a core country and the surrounding satellites, most of the other countries ‘en-route’ are moving towards the uninformed ‘orbanization,’ entrenching themselves in wires, fences and walls which historically never prevented the human mobility.
References


1.2. Bordering and Rebordering Security: Causes and Consequences of Framing Refugees as a ‘Threat’ to Europe

Maja Korac-Sanderson

The so-called refugee crisis in Europe, and the related rise of and concern about illegal migration have transformed its ‘borders and border thinking’ (Kallious et al., 2016) into spaces of advanced surveillance technology, watch towers, and naval patrols along its Mediterranean ‘liquid’ border, as well as razor wire, armed guards and guard dogs along much of the Hungarian ‘solid’ border facing the ‘non-EU world’. All these exceptional procedures and practices are considered necessary for the governance of migrations and mobility more generally. They are regarded as legitimate security measures of ‘defence’ of EU borders from ‘invading’ migrants, the notion created by portraying the people who are currently trying to reach the EU borders as seeking welfare not asylum.¹ This has created a ‘risk discourse’ and a security response according to which the border is seen as ‘vulnerable’, while the people crossing it are construed as a threat (Spijkerboer, 2017).

¹ Fargues (2015: 2) quotes an official in the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade who explained the situation of ‘countries like Hungary, Croatia, and Austria’, as facing ‘an unprecedented quantity of (unarmed) invaders who do not have, and do not ask for, refugee status. Their intended destination is Germany, where they believe a new life in wealth and social security awaits them’ (emphasis added).
The security measures undertaken by EU governments emerge in a different light when statistical data on the global displacement are consulted. The global data tell us that in 2015, one person in 113 has been forcibly displaced by war, which constitutes the rise of over six million persons fleeing armed conflict compared to 2014 (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, in 2015, 24 persons were fleeing conflict every minute, compared to six persons in 2005 (ibid.). These data, therefore, show the continuation of rise and proliferation of armed conflict and violence in the Global South, causing displacement, deepening poverty, and producing high levels of human insecurity. Further consideration of the data on global displacement also demonstrate that Europe, i.e. EU, is far from being the principal area of refuge for the people fleeing war. A word of caution is required here. The UNHCR data on the number of the displaced people in Europe include figures from Turkey. This is, however, distorting any reliable assessment of the pressure felt by, and the humanitarian support required from, the EU member states, the ones that allow for the European continent to be seen as part of the Global North. With this methodological problem in mind, it is safe to argue that it is the developing regions of the world that took a vast majority of the displaced people in. They hosted 86 per cent of the world’s refugees, or 13.9 million persons, in 2015, while the least developed countries provided asylum to 4.2 million refugees or 26 per cent of the global total (UNHCR, 2016). Data also show that the three top receiving countries in 2015, were Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon, ranked by the number of displaced people they took in: 2.5 million, 1.6, and 1.1 million respectively (UNHCR, 2016). Additionally, and very importantly, the most accurate way to determine which countries or regions have been most affected by the rising numbers of displaced people is to look at their relative numbers, that is – the number of migrants in relation to country’s population. In this sense, a country such as Lebanon, with total population of just under 4.5 million is clearly experiencing a crisis, given that it currently hosts some

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2 Given the significance of the number of the displaced that Turkey took in, and for clarity of discussion here, it is important to compare this figure with the number of refugees in ‘other countries of Europe’, as the Report states (UNHCR, 2016: 14): Germany (316,100), the Russian Federation (314,500), France (273,100), Sweden (169,500), the United Kingdom (123,100), and Italy (118,000) (ibid.).
1.1 million people who fled war or 183 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, out of 65.3 million displaced people in the world, according to data for 2015, as many as 40.8 million are internally displaced, meaning that well over 60 per cent of the world’s displaced populations remain in their countries as de facto but not de jure refugees (UNHCR, 2016). This brief consideration of data on global displacement, hence, demonstrates that EU has built a fortress to protect itself from ‘illegal’ migrants who in actual fact are the peoples fleeing civil unrest, armed conflict and devastating poverty in the Global South. The basic global displacement trends outlined here also remind us that human insecurity is directly linked to existing global structures of power, which determine ‘who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not’ (Thomas, 2001: 160). From this perspective the ‘refugee crisis’ and the ‘illegal’ migration concerns emerge as the notions produced by the processes of social construction of threat in Europe and show that ‘the relation between security and migration is fully and immediately political’ (Bigo, 2002: 9).

In the following sections of this Chapter, I shall first critically engage with the trend of turning migration, and the forced migration in particular, into a ‘border security’ issue. In doing so, I outline the concept of human security that, as I argue, needs to be centre stage in any discussions about security. To do so, as my discussion points out, it is critical to tackle the emerging global social order characterised by historically unprecedented levels of inequality that is causing global reproduction of insecurity of peoples, of the Global South as well as the Global North. My discussion of the global economic and development trends supports the argument that security of peoples cannot be pursued for one group at the expense of another. This approach requires a shift from the focus on state security to that of security of people. The discussion of the security question is followed by a critical overview of the EU responses to the contemporary challenges of displacement and migration in general. I argue that the measures taken are in effect re-bordering security concerns. My discussion points to a range of problems and shortcomings of the current security measures, all of which raise social, political, legal, as well as moral questions. I conclude this

3 The second and thirds ranked countries in 2016 for the largest intake of refugees in relation to their population were Jordan (87) and Nauru (50) (UNHCR, 2016).
critical analysis of the contemporary trends in framing migration and policies to curb displacement of people in Europe, by arguing that there is an urgent need to reconceptualise security and to link it to a model of mobility that recognises its global and systemic character.

The security question: Can ‘we’ be safe if ‘they’ are not?

Migration constructed as a threat has been central to the EU immigration policies since the 1990s, increasingly turning migration, and forced migration in particular, into a ‘border security’ issue. Since 2001, and the events of 9/11, it has taken a more extreme form, because of the association between (forced) migration and terrorism. As Bigo (1994) has argued, migration and asylum have become part of a security continuum in the EU and beyond, which facilitates transferring security concerns from terrorism, the fight against organized crime and border controls to the free movement of displaced people. Viewing migration within the security frame has political, social and economic consequences. Sabet (2013) and Cornelius (2004) note, for example, that since September 11, 2001, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) service is the most heavily funded administrative body in the federal government, creating as well as mirroring the notion of threat and a need to ‘confront associated risks’.

Framing (forced) migration in security terms sustains fear of refugees/migrants and policies of territorial and administrative exclusion, Huysmans (2006) study shows, because it implies a particular way of arranging social and political relations. The one that is centred on state security concerned with threats to country’s borders and linked to the military and arms solutions to protect them. This state security paradigm has detrimental consequences for the security of people who are in need of protection and sanctuary. It is not surprising, therefore, that

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4 My analysis and focus in this chapter is on EU immigration policies, thus, measures developed and introduced to control entry of immigrants, i.e. borders. Consequently, I am not discussion EU immigrant policies that regulate different realms of lives of migrants once they are allowed in. These policies range from various elements of selective workforce participation to selective and hierarchical way of settling in, and other specific ethnic rights policies, which EU member states introduce to various degrees.
in April 2015, the UN Security Council president rebuked Europe over a plan for destroying smugglers’ boats in the Mediterranean carrying thousands of people fleeing armed conflict and civil unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, by saying that the issue was ‘not about protecting Europe, it is about protecting the refugees’.  

Thinking about security requires, however, to move beyond considering state borders alone, and to focus instead on human security, that is – ‘the ability to protect people as well as to safeguard states’ (Heinbecker, 1999: 6).6 To do so, it is paramount to consider humanity and human security embedded within a global social structure of the capitalist world economy that has been developing for over four centuries, rather than within discrete sovereign states (Thomas, 2001: 162). This further requires moving away from notions of ‘security of the individual’ currently conceived in neoliberal sense of ‘competitive and possessive individualism’ embedded in ‘property rights and choice in the market place’ (ibid.: 161).

Without a shift in focus to human security within the security approach to migration, the tension between border security and security of the people fleeing war will continue and will only amplify when confronted by fear from being besieged and encircled, the anxiety that has been reinforced by EU governments’ border security actions, which breed the ‘warrior culture’ (Hage, 2016). Framed as a state security matter, migrants are perceived as ‘public enemy’ (Bigo, 2002), feeding into the siege mentality. In turn, this justifies legally, morally and politically the emphasis on combating irregular migration over protecting lives of the people who have been smuggled illegally (Spijkerboer, 2017). Spijkerboer shows that the right of states to exclude aliens from their territories leads to exclusion of illegal passengers/migrants from their main positive obligations under the right to life (2017). In other words, a limited notion of the right to life is used for illegal cross-border passengers/migrants, compared to those who cross borders by travelling legally. States, consequently, do not have any reporting system of deaths of people who attempt to cross borders illegally, and act as if they do not have any responsibility for their deaths,

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because they rely on non-state actors, that is – smugglers, and die outside their territory (Spijkerboer, 2017).

Although so-called irregular cross-Mediterranean migration was initially triggered by visa requirements imposed on third-country nationals in the wake of Europe’s economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the number or irregular migrants, as Fargues (2015) reminds us, stayed at the same level of tens of thousands until 2013. In 2014, however, their number sharply increased to over 200,000, and in 2015, to over one million (Fargues, 2015). As analyses point out, security measures implemented in response to this increase have not solved the border problem. Rather, more controls in one area push people towards riskier crossings, increasing human insecurity (Fargues, 2015; Spijkerboer, 2017). This well documented consequence of restrictive immigration policies is embedded in the fact that agency ‘is central to forcible displacement’, hence, forced migrants as people who have agency, ‘search actively for options’ to their predicament (Korac, 2009: 45). In doing so, many opt for dangerous opportunities, the decisions that are hard, if not impossible, to understand without the research strategies that can ‘reveal the subjective world of the actor’s experience’ (Korac, 2003: 53). To understand why people opt to put their lives at risk, in the hands on unknown smugglers and criminals, it is necessary ‘to read the world through “illegal” eyes’ (Khosravi, 2010: 6). That can help understand how and why the Mediterranean has become the most lethal ‘liquid’ border crossing of the 21st century. Between 2000 and 2015 (Nov 13), 26,018 deaths were reported for 1,277,399 persons crossing, meaning that every time an ‘illegal migrant’ took a decision to pay a smuggler to cross the Mediterranean, s/he was also taking the risk of a 2.0% probability of death during the journey (Fargues, 2015). As Spijkerboer suggests, these people die not because they are targeted by states, but because they are ignored. In that sense, he rightly associates these deaths with Bauman’s (2004) notion of ‘wasted lives’ of the ‘surplus population’ that is systematically ignored by states, because it consists of people whose position is a by-product of impersonal global processes (Spijkerboer, 2017).

Complexity and brutality of these global processes caused by the systemic changes of economies of the globalised world have been well documented. Studies show (e.g. Sassen, 2014; Thomas, 2001) that during the closing decades of the 20th century global economy agenda, and development policies in particular, were dominated by a neoliberal vi-
sion of the economy,\textsuperscript{7} causing unprecedented deepening of inequality – between states, within states and also between private corporations. As Thomas (2001: 160) argues, ‘this has a direct impact on the contemporary human experience of security’ (emphasis added). Indeed, these global trends have been affecting the emerging and fast growing insecurities experienced and deeply felt by people in relation to job security, income security, health security, environmental security, and security from crime. Related concerns for the security of people have led the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to draw attention to the concept of human security in its Human Development Report, in 1994.

Although UNDP has played a critical role in bringing attention to human security, this was not sufficient to change the global trends that are undermining it. Since the late 1980s and the mid-1990s in particular, inequality has actually increased dramatically and with it also the levels of human insecurity in the contemporary world. Oxfam Report (Hardoon, 2017) reveals that at the end of 2016, eight men owned as much as the poorest half of the world’s population. They do so, at the time when one in ten people survive on less than US$2 a day (ibid.). Furthermore, between 1988 and 2011 the incomes of the poorest 10 per cent increased by just US$65 per person, while the incomes of the richest 1 per cent grew by US$11,800 or 182 times as much (Hardoon, 2017). The report also shows that big businesses did very well in 2015–16, resulting in the world’s 10 biggest corporations together to have revenue greater than the government revenue of 180 countries combined (ibid.). If this trend continues, the report points out, over the next 20 years, 500 people will hand over US$2.1 trillion to their heirs, the sum larger than the GDP of India, a country of 1.3 billion people (Hardoon, 2017).\textsuperscript{8} Due to this global trend in the past nearly three decades, the world is faced with a brutally acute increase in poverty and related abuse of human rights. This often prompts populations to challenge gross injustices created by this sharp rise in inequality by violent means. This in turn, is

\textsuperscript{7} The neoliberal model of the economy places its faith in the market rather than the state. It focuses on export-led growth based on free capital mobility. It has been promoted since the 1980s by IMF, the World Bank and other so-called global governance institution.

\textsuperscript{8} To put the figure trillion into perspective requires imagining wealth that can be consumed within 2738 years, if one spends US$1 million every day (Hardoon, 2017).
causing increase in violence and armed conflict as means to secure a fairer share of the world’s wealth (Smith, 1997), and by the same token, it also causes a rise of displacement we are witnessing today.

Sassen’s (2014) study discusses these global inequality trends. They were made possible by growing expulsions from the workforce and growing exploitation, caused by continuous lowering of wages (ibid.). While the global processes brought about the unprecedented inequality globally, causing extreme conditions in quite a few countries of the Global North (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal), its effects on the Global South have been particularly brutal. Sassen’s detailed analysis shows that over 20 years of restructuring programmes imposed by IMF and World Bank, have resulted in a far greater burden of debt than before international financial intervention was introduced. This is due to the particular model of neoliberal development that has been promoted and implemented by these so-called global governance institutions, since the 1980s and the 1990s, in particular (Sassen, 2014). One of the consequences of this neoliberal model of development is that many governments of the Global South currently pay more to their international lenders than they invest in basic components of development such as education and health (Sassen, 2014: 27; 80–116). This has grave consequences for human security of their populations, because it relates to both income poverty as well as human poverty, measured by illiteracy, short life expectancy and health (Thomas, 2001: 162).

What makes critical analyses of the global neoliberal economic trends and rising inequality illuminating and relevant for a critical analysis of the on-going framing of (forced) migration as a ‘threat’, is the argument that the dynamic of neoliberal, economically driven globalisation is ‘resulting in the global reproduction of Third World problems’ (Thomas, 2001: 165). Growing inequality, risk and vulnerability have become ‘an emerging global social order’ and not simply linked to the state system (ibid.). In this regard, Sassen’s argument that these distinct global processes are caused and shaped by what she terms the ‘systemic edge’, is particularly important (2014; 2015). This ‘edge’ is characterised by expulsion as its key dynamics. Expulsion from the diverse systems, such as: economic, social, biospheric, is ‘fundamentally different from the geographic border in the interstate system’ (Sassen, 2014: 211). These ‘emergent transversal geographies’ of ‘power/privilege/extraction’ cut across the traditional divides of the modern state system, and comfortably coexist with them (Sassen, 2015: 175). Beneath the specifics of each of global domains and enor-
mously diverse social orders ‘lie emergent systemic trends’, which are shaped by a ‘very basic dynamics of liberated profit seeking and indifference to the environment’ (Sassen 2014: 215). They are linked to the emergence of ‘predatory formations’, which go well beyond the power of elites, and involve ‘pieces of law and accounting, technical capacities, the willingness of the executive branch of government to see with the eye of global corporations, and such’ (Sassen, 2015: 176). This is not to say, Sassen clarifies, that the destructive forces associated with expulsions at the systemic edge are all interconnected. Rather, they cut across our ‘conceptual boundaries’ and, consequently, remain invisible to our ‘conceptual eye’ (ibid.). Thus, Sassen points out, it is necessary to destabilize ‘master categories and powerful explanations, in order to re-theorise’ (2015: 176).

Instead of capitalizing on this type of insight and knowledge, by engaging in an informed debate about the sources of threat to security in order to elucidate strategies to increase human security that cannot be pursued ‘for one group at the expense of another’ (Thomas, 2001: 161), the EU response to the workings of the systemic edge and related global and local expulsion dynamics have remained within the familiar highly generalized discourse about global security, as well as old, well-established boundaries related to the notions of sovereignty and state security. Consequently, it continues to put emphasis on ensuring national border security, by widening the area of control.

**Outsourcing and re-b/ordering security**

As ‘the politics of insecurity’ continues, characterised by security framing as a technique of government, in Foucauldian terms (Huysmans, 2006), security remains the frame of reference in which migration is discussed. Consequently, EU has implemented ‘parallel migration strategies’ such as ‘the externalisation of EU borders’ through the establishment of cooperation agreements with seventeen third countries that now support ‘EU border management objectives’ (Koff, 2014). In other words, as Koff explains, it is ‘a policy strategy that

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9 This refers to governmentality linked to the particular technologies and strategies that currently rationalize and invest the space of borders in western states.

10 For more information on externalisation of EU borders see Geddes (2005) and Lavanex (2006).
attempts to manage migration closer to its source’ (2014:6). In doing so, the EU has funded technical assistance in third countries and integrated migration into regional development strategies (ibid.). However, the latter, as Gabrielli’s analysis demonstrates (2007), actually means that the signing of trade agreements and concessions of economic aid are now subject to the application of ‘best practices’ in curbing migration. This link, as it will be discussed below, has far reaching human security consequences, as well as political and socio-economic costs.

The process of ‘outsourcing border controls’ (Andersson, 2016) or ‘outsourcing the process of bordering’ (van Houtum, 2010) has in effect led to reborder security in Europe and beyond, by establishing bordering mechanisms in places that are far away from a border that is intended to reach. This practice has also led to people being forced to remain in places that ‘appear on no maps used by ordinary humans’, as Bauman points out (2004:80). In addition to treating (forced) migrants as ‘human waste’, as Bauman contends, the ‘export of a security model’ has created stronger smuggling networks, and higher, not lower, numbers of people using them, as Andersson’s analysis shows (2016). Moreover, and very importantly, he argues that by creating a security path of dependency in bilateral cooperation, the migratory ‘threat’ becomes self-perpetuating (ibid.). It becomes strategically used, for example, by ‘co-operating states’ as a bargaining chip, as was the case of Libya until 2011, or Turkey since 2015, with far-reaching political consequences.11

It is worth referring here to just one example of quid pro quo arrangements made in exchange for outsourcing border security that is linked to the so-called externalisation of the EU borders. It relates to a bilateral readmission agreement signed between the Italian and Libyan governments. It aimed to ‘foster collaboration in matters of irregular migration’ and triggered a well-known collective expulsion, using military airplanes, of some 1,500 migrants from Lampedusa to Libya, in October 2004 (Andrijasevic, 2010). At the time, it was announced by the EU officials as an example of improvement in political relations between Libya, Italy and Europe. Shortly after the incident of collective expulsion, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported that the EU’s eighteen-year long arms embargo on Libya was lifted (HRW 2006, note 282). In this sense, migratory ‘threat’ becomes the asset to be used by ‘cooperating states’ for their political and economic ends (Andersson, 2016).

Migratory ‘threat’ and the border security demands it creates is also an asset for a European defence sector, as Bigo shows (2001), in need of new market niches and for security forces that need to justify their role in times of austerity and as their traditional role is at risk of diminishing. Analyses demonstrate how this dynamic has contributed significantly to the momentum for more research funding from the EU for this sector (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010; Andersson, 2016). Such a context, even though border controls are failing, has created a market for even more controls, in a self-perpetuating dynamic, as Andersson's (2016) study shows. In other words, the so-called externalisation of the EU borders, linked to framing migration as a ‘threat’, aims to transfer the ‘risks’ of migration to third states. In doing so, however, it generates further risks, feeding into the need for more reinforcements. This situation, Andresson further argues, is also politically useful, because it dissipates blame and accountability across a multitude of actors and over a large geographical area, allowing most actors to escape accountability and responsibility (2016).

The process of rebordering security, discussed so far, and its consequences for the displaced are grave and alarming. Particularly so, when the regime of border security transforms borders into a matter of life and death for certain segments of the world's migratory population (Albahari, 2006).

Humanitarianism embedded in the regime of migration control

Disturbing images of people struggling for life in the border zones of Greece, Italy and Hungary that resemble those from the edges of the war zones have become an integral part of daily lives of the citizens of the Global North and the EU, in particular. The recent levels of displacement, combined with the current restrictive regime of migration control in Europe, have caused the transformation of some of the actual borders of the EU states or gateways to the EU territory into ‘zones of humanitarian government’ (Walters, 2011). Walters argues that when the border becomes a site of suffering, violence and death, and a political zone of injustice and oppression, they become ‘humanitarian borders,’ which tend to compensate for the ‘social violence’ emanating from the border security approach to the migration control system (ibid.).
Indeed, over the past years of so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe, there has been a number of well-meaning and generous civil society initiatives and actions in various troubled borders zones on the edges of the EU or places through which the displaced people pass. Their activism ranges from providing basic assistance (e.g. health, food, clothing), as well as legal, administrative and technical support (e.g. advice on asylum rights, access to shelter, or transporting people to the desired border crossings),\(^{12}\) to lobbying governments to lessen the restrictive border controls and immigration policies. Initiated and lead by local NGOs, church organisations, and hundreds of thousands of local and international volunteers/citizens, they ‘made visible the social and human consequences behind such a migration process’ (Zugasti, 2016:5) and forged ‘horizontal political solidarities’ (Kallious et al., 2016).

While humanitarianism connected to civil society’s actions has been softening as well as challenging many brutal aspects of the current migration control mechanisms, they have also enabled politicians to continue to use a rhetoric of threat, fear and insecurity without having to face accusations of inhumanity. In this sense, as Walters (2011) points out, ‘humanitarian border’ delineates ‘politics of alienation and politics of care’ happening in one place and at the same time. In other words, when humanitarianism is embedded in the regime of migration control, NGOs activities, and those of international NGOs (INGOs) in particular, often become mechanisms that normalise the very regime that produces the need for humanitarian intervention.

There is no doubt that INGOs initiatives in the current EU zones of humanitarian engagement, follow key elements of a humanitarian script in which intervention is mobilized as an act of charity and protection (Aradau, 2004). However, analyses show that often, such as in the case of deporting irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Libya, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is jointly responsible for any violation of fundamental rights asylum seekers and irregular migrants might have suffered (Anrejevic, 2010). In this regard, some may be prone to take this and other similar examples as clear signs that humanitarianism and ‘humanitarian government’, associated with border zones, is ‘completely immersed in the biopolitical

\(^{12}\) Most of these types of civil society engagement are well documented on internet and on social media, iz special reports and other publications (e.g. Bojovic, 2016; Forced Migration Review 2016; Kallious et al., 2016).
context of the constitution of Empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 36). I am inclined, however, to support Walters’ point, that there is enough evidence to argue that humanitarianism is susceptible to co-option and capture by EU border strategies of policing and control (Walters, 2011).

Reconceptualising security: Concluding remarks

The discussion in this Chapter has outlined how the EU policies on migration, and those on external border security strategies in particular, are developed around traditional notion of security, rather than in relation to the people centred, human security questions, such as: What is security? For whom is security? What threatens security?

My discussion of the current so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe aimed to bring together often distinctly separate fields of study, as well as separate policy spheres. In doing so, my analysis linked migration to the global economic and development trends, reminding us that the emerging global social order characterised by unprecedented inequality is causing insecurity of peoples globally. In this sense, it supports arguments that to pursue the security of peoples it is necessary to move away from the notion of security that focuses on the state.

To avoid social, legal, political, and moral shortcomings of the contemporary security framing of migration and their grave consequences, migration and displacement cannot be treated as separate policy spheres. Rather, they need to be considered in relation to larger political and economic fields. In other words, a shift is required from persisting with short-term, state security-focused controls of migration to an overarching political strategy that takes into consideration the globalised nature of human mobility and its embeddedness within wider, global socio-economic realities. Some of the latter trends as outlined in this Chapter, cause global reproduction of insecurity of peoples, across and within state and regional borders and boundaries. Consequently, there is an urgent need to reconceptualise security by putting human security centre stage, and by linking it to a model of mobility that is global and systemic. In this sense, human security introduces an alternative vision of political community, the one that is not solely state bound.

To develop and implement a security strategy that is embedded in such a model of mobility, it is necessary to move away from national/
state or narrowly regional approaches. Reconceptualization of security and the related strategy, requires a shift from threat scenarios to considering opportunities and rights, because the former have been counterproductive and abusive, as the discussion in this Chapter has pointed out. In this sense, instead of framing migration as a ‘threat’ to Europe, it is paramount to address global-level expulsion dynamics, outlined in this Chapter, in order to shift their destructive mechanisms towards a model of ‘human economy’ that is not based on obscene inequalities in wealth and opportunity, but on human security for all. Furthermore, it is also necessary to tackle the destructive ground/state-level dynamics of the chaos-producing border security model, discussed earlier in this Chapter, by reintroducing legal pathways for migration, the move that would refute politically constructed ’doomsday scenarios’ of migration ‘threat’ to Europe. This will, in turn, acknowledge that migration and displacement, as its ‘forcible mode’, are structural phenomena that cannot be remedied by punitive border policies embedded in state security concerns.

References


1.3. Military Expenditure and Arms Trade in the Middle East and their Impact on the Refugee Crisis in Europe

Nada Sekulić

This Chapter represents an attempt to show some of the underestimated broader social context that strongly influence forced migrations in the contemporary world.

Despite the surprisingly optimistic and hardly acceptable findings of several institutes and optimistic scientists that we witness decreasing of warfare since World War II and even that they are less likely to be internationalized (Uppsala University, Peace Research Institute, Lacina etc. in: Sekulić, 2015: 239–240), the rude reality is that in recent years at least 15 armed conflicts erupted which had international dimension, most of them in Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, northeastern Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Burundi), in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq and Yemen); in Europe (Ukraine) and in Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Pakistan), which caused massive forced migration. In addition, the most disastrous conflicts that had erupted two or three decades ago, like those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, former SFRY haven’t been solved successfully, cumulatively increasing tragic consequences. Today, Syria is the world’s biggest producer of both internally displaced people (7.6 million) and refugees (3.9 million at the end of 2014) and Afghanistan (2.6 million)
and Somalia (1.1 million) are the next biggest refugee source countries. (UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency, 2015).

**Figure 1.3.1: The Increase in the number of people displaced by wars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of displaced persons in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>42.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>43.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNHCR, 2015.*

Overall picture looks very pessimistic if we take into consideration that worldwide, only 126800 displaced persons could return to their home in 2014, which is the lowest number in last 31 years (UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency 2015). The conditions in which refugees live deteriorate progressively and more and more of them are simply surviving in the transitory position at the edges of societies, without rights and in inhuman living conditions, representing some of the outcasts in the contemporary world (with significant proportion of children among them) with ‘no space’, ‘no choice’, ‘no jobs’, and ‘no logo’ (Klein, 2009).

United Nations have five legal instruments related to international migration. These are: The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants and Members of Their Families (1990), The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), and The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), together with the instruments covering the rights of migrant workers of the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, even those who ratified all documents found very difficult to apply them consistently in their concrete policies (International Migration Report, 2015, UN).
First and the most fundamental of these conventions defines that refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin based on a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The Convention aims at protecting refugees from various forms of persecution in the transit and destination countries and to prevent inhuman treatment or penalization because of illegal entry or stay. Convention includes paragraph which forbid the expulsion of refugees. The principle of non-refoulement is fundamental part of the convention. ‘It provides that no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom. Rights of refugees include access to the courts, to primary education, to work, and the provision of documentation, including a refugee travel document’. Convention endorses the principle of the unity of family, welfare service for refugees, rights concerning their property, freedom of movement etc.

Some of the recent tragic examples highlight the discrepancy between the international law and the reality. In the previous years, huge numbers of refugees tried to escape war undertaking smuggling route over the Mediterranean Sea. After the shipwreck near Lampedusa, in which more than 350 people had died (2013), Italy was strongly criticized for preventing refugee ships from Africa (Libya, Eritrea, Somalia) to safely dock at the Italy harbors, assuming that such an attitude had indirectly caused the catastrophe near Lampedusa. After Lampedusa and the next shipwreck near the same island which followed soon after the first, Italian government initiated the overall rescue operation Mare Nostrum. The monthly cost of Mare Nostrum was 9 million Euros, leading to a total of 114 million Euros in 2014, with EU contribution of 1.8 million Euros. Mare Nostrum is well known as extremely expensive humanitarian operation, particularly for Italian economy. The operation saved many lives, since at least 150,000 migrants arrived safely to Europe. The Italian government had requested additional funds from EU in order to continue the operation, but EU refused. Instead, the Mare Nostrum

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was replaced by joined EU Operation Triton in November 2014, which focused more on fighting smugglers than rescuing migrants. During the operation, individual EU countries reintroduced border controls. As a consequence, in first three months of 2015, 479 refugees drowned or went missing, and in April 2015 five boats with approximately 2000 people sank in the sea with death toll of more than 1200 people. Only in April 2015, 1308 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. As a response, EU ministers doubled the size of Operation Triton to €120 million, but didn't change essentially the conceptual framework of the mission and actually together allocated fewer resources for rescuing migrants than the previous Italian—rescue option whose budget was much larger. Later on, Operation Sophia was established by the EU Council with the explicit mandate to contribute to the ‘disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean by efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels used or suspected of being used by smugglers.’

Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey and Lebanon into Greece surpassed the central Mediterranean route (from North Africa to Italy), while the majority of migrants in Greece were this time from Syria. Most of them still continue their journey through Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, facing tightening of borders when they try to cross to Hungary and Croatia on their way to Western Europe, which is their final destination. There are many field reports of their abusing and suffering, caused both by smugglers and the border police and by general inadequate reception condition.

The costs of the Sophia operation reached €11.82 million for one-year. It was the first operation which was explicitly authorized to apply coercion, which had never been applied in previous similar operations. More precisely, EU has mandate to ‘take all necessary measures’ against

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a vessel and related assets, including through ‘disposing of them or rendering them inoperable’, treating them almost as they were pirates. Also, mandate gives them power to enter on the territory of a sovereign state without its consent. Such an agenda hardly fits to peace enforcement measures and constitutes a qualitative shift in the EU’s security and defense policies towards migrants. ‘The narrowness of the operation’s mandate – i.e. only targeting the traffickers – leaves open the question of the migrants... In and by itself, the operation cannot be a solution to the migrant crisis, and no one in Brussels is contending that it could. If the mission is successful, networks would be disrupted and their ability to bring refugees into international waters severely curtailed, at least from the Libyan coast and for a certain period. Yet this does not mean that the migrants would disappear or that all smugglers would be neutralized. A successful operation may result in a reduction in the flows but also lead to a shift in the routes of migrants.’

19 Routes of transactions through which humanitarian funds pass to reach refugees are not always transparent. Usually, it is clear who is the first recipient (usually multilateral organizations like Red Cross/Crescent, UN organization, big NGOs, or World Bank), but after that, the path is elusive and hindered. There is a lack of information on what has been delivered to whom and the feedback from the refugees is underestimated. There is no aggregated data, and the efficiency of the humanitarian operations is hard to measure objectively at local level (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2016).

20 First-level recipients can choose how to distribute the aid in a way which is extremely difficult to quantify. The way how domestic humanitarian stakeholders in the local areas are selected is particularly obscure. They often competitively struggle to access international funding, and when they receive the funds it is almost impossible to track the distribution. Particularly the pooled funds established for emergency response can’t be followed despite the fact that the contributions through this channel are increasing (US$583 million in 2006 to US$900 million in 2011). In 2011, 5% of total international humanitarian aid was channeled via pooled funds. Reason is because the Emergency response funds (ERF) are aimed at countries that may


not have a UN humanitarian agenda and may not regularly participate in the UN appeals process (Emergency Response Funds, 2011).

Costs for humanitarian aids seem huge and the inability of the international community to stop wars and build and preserve peace obvious. The annual budget of European Commission for humanitarian aid is approximately €1 billion per year since 1992 and covers around 110 countries. The estimations are that it fulfills the elementary needs of 120 million people every year (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2016).

If we look into the distribution of the humanitarian aid in the recent years, the biggest recipients of the aid are the countries affected by wars and natural disasters. For example, the planed humanitarian aid of EU for 2017 covers €10 million for Somalia, €8 million for Afghanistan, €3.9 million for Myanmar, €3.8 million for Egypt, €3 million for Libya. All of these wars are certainly at least in some degree international conflicts which concern the interests of the most powerful countries in the world.

Paradoxical side of contemporary wars is that the ‘mediators’ who are trying to bring peace to the warring parties and to help affected people in the local areas with the sums that look huge at first glance, have their own interests in fueling wars and actually contributed themselves to the initiation of the armed conflicts profiting enormously from them. Somalia, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Syria, all of them are the zones of the conflicts of a larger military forces which invest in them in different ways, which are difficult to follow in transparent way. It is also paradoxical, but at the same time quite illustrative, that the most influential members of the UN Security Council, most responsible for the improvement of the peace policies in the world today, are the most powerful supporters of the military profiteers. Consequently, the issue is not just about the arms smuggling on the global military market, but also about the issue how the top military corporations are protected and subsidized by the extremely profitable defense contracts with the states entitled to improve peace on the global level. In international trade, governmental programs and policies are exempted from the rules of free trade and investments. This is a loophole for the richest states and corporations in the world to make enormous

profits through military selling, using political lobbying, ‘classified activities’, covert actions, coercion (shaping foreign military policy), monopoly and sowing the conflicts worldwide to boost their interests. USA and European corporations even lend money to other countries to purchase weapons from them (Anup Shah, 2013). The question is logical: is the global improvement in peace policies possible today if the key figures are those who gather the greatest profits from the military markets today (Figure 1.3.2.)?

Figure 1.3.2: Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2015.

![Pie chart showing global distribution of military expenditure in 2015](image)

Source: SIPRI 2015.

Only in Syrian war at least 16 countries have had their interests or investments, and among them are also those who appear as the most important benefactors in providing humanitarian aid for the country – Russia, United States, United Kingdom, France, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia.

If we look into the military budget of USA, we see that in 2001 it was $397,334,000,000 (3% GDP) rising most continuously in last 12 years to $668,841,000,000 dollars (4.4% of GDP) in 2012. China started from $45,422,000,000 (2.1% of GDP) in 2001, while in 2012
its military budget was $157,603,000,000 (2% of GDP). China spent altogether $1,147,494,000,000 in last 12 years on military expenditure. Russian military budget also increased rapidly in the same period, from $36,090,000,000 (4.1% GDP) in 2001, to $90,646,000,000 (4.4% GDP) in 2012. Russia spent altogether $713,417,000,000 in last 12 years. In accordance to some sources, actually the military budget of the most developed countries decreased during last two or three years, while the military budget of those in the East exploded. However, these reports ignore that the share of developed countries in the arms trade is increasingly shifting to private corporations whose arms trade profit increased rapidly (International Peace Bureau, 2012).

In 1941. Harold Lasswell coined the term ‘garrison state’ – a world in which specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society (Lasswell, 1941). The possibility of introducing ‘socialization of danger’ which would conjoin and mutate businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians, scientists and civilians into social body structured as power pyramid fueled by and aimed at overall militarization of society, proved to be applicable theoretical concept today as it was during the World War II.

This concept, which can be classified as one version of elite theories, was repeated and reformulated after Lasswell two decades later in C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite (1956). At the beginning of sixties president Eisenhower mentioned in one of his speeches ‘military-industrial complex’ of America in a positive sense as a ‘delta of power’ of American people. Just the opposite, Wright Mills was concerned that military complex could use executive power of the state in order to promote their own corporate interests. Bonds between the political, industrial and military elites can merge them into the ‘iron triangle’ driven with their mutual interests, which works against the interests and benefits of the majority of people, while presenting itself as a most important pillar of the society. Even more, they can organize their activities behind the public scene, behind the public rules and law and beyond the democratic control, obstructing the possible class struggle response and defending effectively their position. The whole process takes time, which means that the elites who represented interests of majority of people at one moment can transform overtime, and in accordance to the ‘iron

law of oligarchy’ of Michels (2001), actually they will be transforming into the exclusive, self-oriented and self-perpetuated group.

At the present time, when barely 80% of people in the world hardly have any wealth, while the richest 2% altogether possess more than a half of the globe, this approach rings a bell. Gap is progressively increasing – in 1960s, the richest countries in the world were 35 times richer than poorest ones, while today they are about 80 times better off. Seen from that perspective, the migrant crises is, from one side, the expression of the growing gap between the rich and the poor in this world, and from the other, expression of the unsustainability of the world based on such dynamics. Rich countries try to compensate the gap by providing around 130 $ billion aid (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2016), which at first sight seems as a lot of money.

However, if we take into consideration just investments and profits from arms industry and arms trade (not to mention other sources of profit stemming from developing countries), and were they go, it is obvious that the intention of the most developed stakeholders in the contemporary world is not to disseminate peace or wealth to the majority of people in the world. Just the opposite, they are fueling wars and poverty.

Arms trade and forced migration crises

The arms selling and fueling wars may be interpreted as the most representative form of neo-colonialism in the era of the corporate capitalism. Namely, there are several dominant forms of neo-colonial dependency of developing world. One is draining them through debts and loans, the other is draining their natural wealth, the third one is exploiting their working class, followed by exploitation through unfair trade rules, and finally by arms sales and wars. The sellers in the arms trade are the most developed countries, and recipients are the underdeveloped and developing ones. While the first gather financial profit, together with natural resources, oil, mines etc. of the affected countries the majority of people in the developing ones literally buy their own

death, poverty and sometimes ‘democracy’ (Sekulić, 2007). The wealth of our planet is extremely concentrated. This is completely incompatible with the political and humanistic idea of democracy, and the most perverted form of putting them together is to disseminate democracy to the developing world through military interventions and wars.

We can mention only two among many examples. Syrian oil industry was a billion dollar one before the war providing 25% of country’s economic output. During the war, the governmental forces and rebellion forces fought for the access to oil and gas negotiating from time to time so that both sides could eventually profit. When EU and USA decided to support Syrian rebellions in 2013 they violated the international law, collaborated with those who committed most of the massacres in Syria and took huge profit from oil based on that cooperation. ‘A report published in December 2014 by the US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) shows that American, British and Gulf defense strategists see the Mediterranean as an opportunity to wean Europe off dependence on Russian gas, and boost Israel’s energy independence. As part of this process, the report revealed, military action is viewed as potentially necessary to secure Syria’s untapped offshore gas resources, which overlap with the territorial waters of other Mediterranean powers, including Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’.24 In another case of Kosovo, politicians who were directly involved in bombing of Serbia and who were humanitarian liberators of Kosovo became later directly involved in privatization process as new owners (consortium of Portugal Telecom and Albright Capital Management,25 Wesley Clarke’s stake in Kosovo coal etc.)26

The following figure represents the rise of global arms sale in period of seven years, showing clearly one-way flow of the arms sale to the developing world and rapid increase in arms trade.

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Figure 1.3.3: The rise of global arms trade towards the developing nations (2004–2011).


Figure 1.3.4: Suppliers of the Arms to Developing Nations 2004–2011.

In 2011, the 100 largest contractors sold $410 billion in arms and military services. Just 10 of those companies sold over $208 billion. There are only 10 companies with the most military sales worldwide. These companies have benefited tremendously from the growth in military spending in the U.S, which has the largest military budget in the world. The three top military corporations are: BAE Systems – selling aircraft, artillery, electronics, vehicles, missiles, ships with the total sales of $30.7 billion in 2011 and the gross profit of $2.3 billion. The second is Boeing (BA) selling aircraft, electronics, missiles, space arm, with the total sales of $68.7 billion and the gross profit of $4 billion. The third is Lockheed Martin (LMT) selling aircraft, electronics, missiles, space arm with the total sales of $46.5 billion and the gross profit: $2.7 billion. Put it simply, annual profit of each of these corporations individually at least three times exceeds the total annual EU budget for humanitarian aid. The United States particularly have an enormous responsibility for fueling military conflicts throughout the world. The issue is actually not about the political dominance of USA more than about neoliberal policies that support corporate profits. The arms suppliers express no concern about the side effects of their trade. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates


that ‘some 110 million land mines threaten children in more than 70 countries’ and that they are chillingly effective: ‘82.5 percent of amputations performed in ICRC hospitals are for land mine victims’ (Giroux, 2003:69). September of 2011 was followed by a massive increase in weapons market by USA, with their main partner Saudi Arabia, who distribute weapons to the other countries in the Middle East, to all warring parties, including ‘terrorists’.

International arms trade is considered one of the three most corrupt businesses in the world. ‘Parts of the arm trade is as elusive and rotten as the drugs trade’ (Neild, 2002: 195). The issue is not just about the smugglers and criminals, but about the states who try to surpass the international conventions and norms in their endeavor to gather profit from arms sales.

**Figure 1.3.5: Cargo flights with weapons from the Balkan:**

![Cargo flights with weapons from the Balkan](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/weapons-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-east-revealed-arms-trade-syria)

Source: BIRNOCCR.29

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Munitions and the weapons are also sent from Balkan countries which clearly illustrate peripheral, marginal and subordinate position of Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania to the most developed countries of the world, being used as arms trade pipeline to the Syrian warring area.

Since the upsurge of the Syrian conflict in 2012, eight ex-socialistic countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Montenegro, Slovakia, Serbia, Romania) exported €1.2 Billion of weapons and ammunition to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and UAE. Planes from these countries have transported thousands of tones of unidentified cargo since 2014, landing in the military bases of Saudi Arabia and other mentioned countries which are the key arms providers for all warring parties in Syria. From the military bases, weapons are transported by road or airdropped by military planes to the warring zones.30

These weapons are used by Free Syrian Army, by different Islamic groups, by Al Qaeda, by governmental forces, as well as by Sunni forces, causing more deaths, increased impoverishment, new tragedies for the growing number of the unprivileged people and new waves of forcibly displaced people.

* * *

It is very difficult, or indeed impossible even to imagine sustainable and humane solution for the forced migration crises in Europe and worldwide if we don’t take into account the huge and explosive growth of the investments in arms industry, military expenditure and arms trade in the world today. In times of economic crises, military expenditure has positive effects on the economic growth of the states (International Peace Bureau, 2012) and most of them readily rely on these profits. Since the arms market makes big profit, many states are against measures to improve transparency of the kind of trade, fueling wars and armed conflicts worldwide and facing migrant crises thereafter. World is devoting more public money now to the military sector than it was spent 25 years ago, during the Cold War.

There are several international resolutions aimed at disarmament. Some of them are: ‘Habitat I’ (1976), General Assembly ‘Resolution on

the Reduction of the Military Budget’ (1981), General Assembly ‘Resolution on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development’ (1983), UN ‘Conference on Disarmament and Development’ (1987). Their importance today is underestimated, despite the fact that there is an obvious connection between the tragic forced migration crises in the contemporary world and the military expenditure. To include politics of disarmament in the main agenda of solving migrant crises is one of the most logical demands. Instead, main trends are going towards improving restrictive migration control, towards the security issues of the most developed countries, conflict analyses is focused on inclusion of migrants in the destination countries, and costs of receiving countries are interpreted exaggeratedly as draining the last resources of the richest countries in the world.

Consequently, the necessity of changing paradigm of migration crises solutions should be included more visibly into the main theoretical and research framework of migration studies.

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Part II
Consequences
2.1. The Impact of Migration on Demographic Processes in the Region of Former Yugoslavia

Vladimir Nikitović

Introduction

The socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1991) was recognized as the country with divergent demographic trends among its constituent units (republics and autonomous provinces) primarily caused by the differential natural growth of the population (Josipović, 2016; Nikitović et al., 2016). Twenty-five years after the dissolution of the country, it is evident that the demographic trends in the region of the former Yugoslavia converge, at least when it comes to the natural components of demographic change. This process is generally understood in the context of the theory of demographic transition (Nikitović, 2016). On the other side, international migration in the region has undergone more complex changes since 1991. After the intensive displacements of autochthonous population within and out of the region, induced by the 1990s wars (Nikitović & Lukić, 2010), the whole region of former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia) is recognized as an emigrational at the beginning of this century (Fassmann et al., 2014). Former high fertility sub-regions, including Kosovo as a European outlier, no longer exist. of former Yugoslavia was among the first in Europe to experience pop-

1 The term 'former Yugoslavia' is now commonly used retrospectively. In the text, we also use the term ex-Yugoslavia as synonym.
population decline (UN, 2015b) mainly due to the long period of below-replacement fertility in its most populous parts, supported by emigration that recently has spread to most of the region. Furthermore, it lacks an attraction for long-term immigration from third countries. It is recently estimated that the region of former Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia, lost about 4 million inhabitants not including about 1 million of former guest-worker population during the 1990–2015 period (Josipović, 2016).

On the other hand, the most recent sudden influx of asylum seekers from West Asia and North Africa, whose final asylum destination represent primarily the EU founding member countries, has its transition route through the region of former Yugoslavia. This, so called, Western Balkan route came as a great surprise for most of public and officials given that the immigration issue, at best, has not been recognized in the public discourse and relevant legislation in the region (Rašević et al, 2014; Župarić-Iljić, 2013). Consequently, it quite directly opened an issue of future migration in the region in terms of both the below-replacement fertility of autochthonous population and the demographic surpluses in politically instable origin societies of immigrants.

Given much higher uncertainty of future migration patterns in comparison to fertility and mortality trends, it might seem reasonable to address a long-term perspective of migration impact on demographic change. The point of such an exercise could be similar to the purpose of hypothetic fertility (instant-replacement) and mortality (constant) scenarios – by examining the current limits of demographic development, we try to achieve two goals at the same time: to assess realistic future outcomes and to warn decision makers on future implications of demographic and migration trends.

As it seems that the successor states of former Yugoslavia could experience common migration trends in the future, the central issues of the Chapter are as follows: Is the transition to the net immigration stage across the whole region possible by the mid-century and what might be the effects of expected international migration patterns on future demographic change in the region?

Since the republics and provinces of former Yugoslavia retained their outer or inter-republic boundaries, there are no obstacles to temporal comparisons – we may use empiric evidence straightforward when making assumptions on future demographic trends.
The theoretical and methodological approach: assumptions, data issues, model

In accordance with the goals of the Chapter, it was of particular importance to choose the methodological approach which would enable long-term assumptions on future population dynamics in the region of former Yugoslavia in context of relevant theoretical and empirical background. The projection model that is used by the Population Division of the UN (hereafter the UN model) for its latest releases of the *World Population Prospects* (2012, 2015) meets the criteria as it is based on the recent theoretical achievements in terms of the demographic transition, while draws its strength from the data on fertility and mortality for all countries of the world (Raftery et al., 2014; UN 2015a). The model has also the technical benefits – it is well documented, fully transparent, implemented in the open-source R software, thus, allowing for easy adjustments and modifications of input parameters. On the other side, most commonly used models of future population dynamics by national statistical offices or institutes, including those by *Eurostat*, are not adequately documented, relying in most aspects of a projection procedure only on subjective opinion of authors, with little or no explanation about the reasoning behind chosen assumptions (Keilman, 2008; Nikitović, 2016).

Given the long-term character of the analysis in the Chapter, a specific aspect refers to the distinction recognized at the time of the first modern projections of population in the region of former Yugoslavia (1970) – for the sake of better fertility hypotheses, the republics and autonomous provinces were classified in relation to the replacement-fertility level, thus, implicitly indicating a stage of the demographic transition in which they were. The ‘Early starters’ sub-region included Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Central Serbia, while the ‘Late starters’ encompassed Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The latter sub-region experienced the decline to the below replacement fertility level two-three decades later than the former (Nikitović, 2016). In terms of net migration, the ‘Early starters’ had mainly positive balance during the last two decades (1970s and 1980s) of former Yugoslavia, while emigration has been prevailing

2 Except for Central Serbia during the 1970s due to intensive emigration of ‘guest workers’. Indeed, the majority of the emigration were almost strictly
since the 1990–95 and 2000–05 in Croatia and Serbia excluding Kosovo, respectively. The 'Late starters' has been typically emigration sub-region. Consequently, the results of the projection simulations in the Chapter were considered from the viewpoint of this distinction, too.

Theoretical reasoning behind the migration assumptions

In the UN model, current levels of net migration across countries of the world were generally kept constant until the mid-century, with the exception of large recent fluctuations. Afterwards, gradual reduction of net migration is assumed in order to reach 50 per cent of the projected mid-century level by 2100. It is considered as a compromise, unlikely to be realized, between the difficulty of predicting the levels of immigration or emigration within each country of the world for such a far horizon, and the recognition that net migration is unlikely to reach zero in individual countries (UN, 2015a: 31). Without disputing the high volatility of future migration, the UN approach could be, also, understood as a coherent with its theoretical background of fertility transition, which assumes global convergence towards (or close) the replacement fertility level by 2100. However, despite the practical considerations that guided the authors of the UN model, the general assumption on constant net migration by 2050 is disputable from the viewpoint of smaller world areas, such as the region of former Yugoslavia, or individual countries. For that reason, we aimed to rely on the theoretical framework which could provide more stable grounds for assumptions on future net migration in the region of former Yugoslavia than the constant hypothesis.

What were the guidelines for making assumptions on net migration in the Chapter? Despite different views regarding the role and significance of the drivers of international migration, there is no doubt that demographic and economic differentials induce the general shape and intensity of migration flows (Bertocci & Strozzi, 2008; Josifidis et

originated from the Northeast of Central Serbia (Penev&Predojević-Despić, 2012). If we exclude this emigration area, migration balance of this territory would not be negative, particularly for the intensive immigration to the City of Belgrade.
It seems that the current strategical goals of all governments in the region are consistent when it comes to the EU accession. Since the basic aim of the Chapter refers to the most probable demographic future from the viewpoint of migration impact, we adopted the official standpoints on the EU future as the pivotal for the long-term assumption on general migration pattern in the region of former Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia became the EU member countries in the recent period – in 2004 and 2013, respectively. In spite of the recent slowdown (‘fatigue’) of the integration process in the Western Balkans, enlargement of the EU towards the area, that was set as a priority of EU expansion at the 2003 European Council summit in Thessaloniki (European Commission, 2003), still represents the official EU strategy. Even the reasons for the previous enlargements towards south and east of the continent are considered more political than economic, in comparison to the initial association of the countries from Western Europe (Bache et al, 2011), certain economic conditions have to be fulfilled if a country aims to join the EU. Thus, joining the EU implies that a member country, apart from required stability of institutions, achieved the existence of a functioning market economy. In practice, realization of these factors in a member country should provide the living standard and quality of life of its citizens that would reduce outflows and increase inflows of migrants in the country on a long run.

Starting from the general principles of labor migration theories such as ‘push and pull’ model, we based our reasoning behind the migration assumptions more specifically on the recently developed ‘model of the migration cycle’ (Fassmann & Reeger, 2012). It assumes that a country adapts to a new demographic and economic conditions by developing a mechanism to handle new or evolving migratory circumstances, which is referred to as a migration cycle. The model is based on evidence from the, so called, old immigration countries in Europe, which experienced the transition from an emigration to an immigration country in conditions of the below-replacement fertility (Fassmann et al, 2014: 151). This heuristic concept seems to be very convenient to explain possible transformation of migration pattern in the region of former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, recent empirical evidence suggest that the model is not only applicable to the Southern European countries, which are becoming typical immigration ones, but that the Eastern European states are heading to the same direction (Fassmann
Czech Republic is the best example, as it turned from a negative migration balance in the 1980s to a positive one in the 1990s and 2000s (Drbohlav et al., 2009).

According to the migration cycle model, during the process of transition from an emigration to an immigration country, former emigration countries go through at least three different stages which constitute the migration cycle: an initial, pre-transition or preliminary stage (emigration is more important than immigration); an intermediate or transition stage (immigration typically outweighs emigration); and a net immigration or post-transformation stage (immigration is acknowledged as a necessary supplement). This very general process involves system stability, disturbances and, finally, the emergence of a new stability (Fassmann & Reeger, 2012: 67–68).

The migration cycle model, used as the theoretical background for the migration hypothesis in this Chapter, implies gradual long-term transition from net emigration to net immigration. During the intermediate or transition stage of the migration cycle, a former emigration country becomes, step by step, a new immigration country. According to the model, it seems that Slovenia, being the first country from the region of former Yugoslavia that joined the EU, is entering the transition stage. Even if Slovenia was an attractive destination for the immigrants from the region, given its constantly higher level of economic development and standard of living, during the period of socialist Yugoslavia, its attractiveness rose particularly after Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 (Kupiszewski et al., 2012). This evidence from the region supports the concept of the migration cycle as a useful framework for defining our migration hypothesis. In that sense, the region, excluding Slovenia, could be considered as stuck in the initial, pre-transition stage, although some of its territories might be candidates for entering the intermediate stage sooner than others. Similar to the concept of demographic transition, the migration cycle model does not imply that the stages of the cycle last for the same amount of time or exhibit identical characteristics in different countries. It is rather general concept of the transition process according to which some countries that are entering the process later could potentially require a shorter period of time to adapt than the states that transitioned earlier (Fassmann & Reeger, 2012: 67).

From the perspective of the 40-year projection horizon (2015–2055) in this Chapter, the stages of the migration transition are inter-
interpreted in relation to the symbolic turning point of the transition process in the region, which is set to the middle of the horizon (2035) implying that the whole region of former Yugoslavia will certainly be part of the EU by the time. Slovenia is considered as the country in the transition stage during the first 20-year period, while it should enter the final, stable net immigration stage in the second half of the projection. The sub-region of ‘Early starters’ excluding Slovenia is supposed to exit the initial or pre-transition stage by the end of the first half of the projection horizon (2035), and to experience the intermediate or transition stage in the second 20-year period of the projection. Indeed, some territories of the sub-region could even progress to the post-transformation stage by the end of the projection according to the model interpretation, but that is beyond the considerations in the Chapter. In any case, during the period between 2035 and 2055, it is assumed that immigration typically outweighs emigration in this sub-region.

In comparison to the ‘Early starters’, the ‘Late starters’ sub-region is assumed to leave the pre-transition stage some 5–10 years later, thus, entering the intermediate stage of the migration transition in the last 10–15 years of the projection horizon. Kosovo is the only territory in the region of former Yugoslavia which is not supposed to undergo fundamental changes of the system needed for entering the intermediate transition stage during the projection period. The slow reductions in net emigration seemed to be the maximum achievement for this area in the next four decades, which is in accordance with current projection assumptions by Kosovo statistics agency (KAS, 2013), and recent study on Kosovar emigration (Gollopeni, 2016).

Data issues and projection model

Demographic and migration statistics in the region of former Yugoslavia suffered a lot in terms of reliability after the dissolution of the country in 1991 (Josipović, 2016; Stanković, 2014). Therefore, the 2015 UN dataset (https://esa.un.org/UN/wpp/) is used as the best available source of demographic inputs in the Chapter. However, several preconditions in terms of input parameters had to be fulfilled before the model could be employed for producing simulations of future population in the
region. The initial population has to be adjusted for known weaknesses of the UN data set as regards Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. In case of the former, the 2013 census results were not available to the UN staff when prepared the estimate on initial population structure but the quite distant 1991 census. As for the latter, apart from the absence of population distribution across the tree constitutive parts of Serbia as defined in this Chapter, adjustments of the UN dataset had to be made for population who boycotted both censuses in 2011 – Albanians in Central Serbia and Serbs in Northern Kosovo, and for significant overestimation of the total population by the census conducted in Serbia excluding Kosovo (for details see: Nikitović, 2016).

In terms of assumptions concerning the main demographic components of population dynamics (fertility, mortality, and migration), approach used in the Chapter implied separate hypothesis for the three constitutive parts of Serbia unlike the UN approach. It was particularly important in the case of Kosovo where fertility transition was notably lagging behind the other territories of former Yugoslavia (Josipović, 2016; Nikitović et al, 2016). Apart from that, this procedure enabled us to get separate projection results for each of the eight territories of the region, as well as for the region as a whole and two of its sub-regions derived for the purpose of the analysis.

From a long-term perspective, changes infertility behavior are decisive for the size and age structure of a given population in the absence of sudden catastrophic events. The UN model, in accordance with the new evidences of recovery of post-transitional fertility (Goldstein et al., 2009), predicts convergence of total fertility rates in the region towards the level of 1.8 by the end of the century. Since the projection horizon in this Chapter ends by 2055, the total fertility rate across the region

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3 Reliability of the UN population estimation for Macedonia is also disputable as it is based on distant population census (2002). Since we have no enough grounds for better estimation, we kept the initial population from the UN dataset.

4 While calculating initial population, we took into account a dispute between the two constitutional entities (Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina) on the final results of the 2013 census relying on the recent literature overview on the topic (Josipović, 2016; Nikitović, 2016).

5 UN data set recognizes only Serbia including disputed territory of Kosovo (it unilaterally proclaimed independence from Serbia in 2008) in accordance with the UNSCR No. 1244/1999.
will experience mild increase, ranging between 1.55 (Bosnia &Herze-
govina and Vojvodina) and 1.84 (Slovenia) in the final year. Details on
the specific adjustments of input parameters (initial population, fertili-
ty, mortality, and migration rates) for the region of former Yugoslavia,
which were used for the projection simulations presented and inter-
preted in this Chapter, are described in: Nikitović (2016).

When transforming previously determined general patterns of
net migration hypothesis to projection numbers, we started from the
revised UN migration dataset. Technically, we modeled net migration
in terms of rates rather than absolute numbers since future net migra-
tion does not relate to the future population and, thus, it may take on
unrealistic values. A hypothesis about future average annual net migra-
tion rate is made for each five-year projection period.6 There are two
reference points in the projection horizon – zero net migration at some
point in the period, and the target rate at the end of the projection (net
migration per thousand of the 2015 initial population), while for Slo-
venia and Kosovo only the target rate is made. The rates are changing
linearly between these reference points.

The benchmarks for the forecast of net migration rates were both
the current population projections by Eurostat (Europop2013) and
national statistical agencies, and recent studies on impact of migra-
tion on demographic change. For the sub-region of ‘Early starters’, we
referred to Europop2013 target levels for the mid-century (Eurostat,
2016). For Slovenia, the target rate is taken from Europop2013, while
for Central Serbia and Vojvodina, it is assumed to be similar to that
of Croatia. Yet, unlike the Europop2013, we account for the strong
post-accession emigration in Central Serbia, Vojvodina, and Croa-
tia due to increased labor mobility associated with slow economic
growth in new EU members by analogy to the evidence from the
Eastern enlargement (Kupiszewski, 2006; Kupiszewski et al, 2012),
and based on the expectations from the future in the EU (Nikitović,
2013; Rašević et al, 2014).

Technically, the projection method is cohort-component, widely
used among demographers, but the approach for obtaining medium or

6 The age and sex distribution of the future net migration were derived ac-
cording to the UN model (UN, 2015a: 30) taking into account specific patterns
for the region (Kupiszewski et al, 2012: 107).
most probable variant, is based on probabilistic projections of future fertility and mortality. We followed the UN approach to use the median of probabilistic distribution of both future paths of total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth as the most probable variant of these components of demographic change (Raftery et al, 2014). For the sake of an insight in ‘theoretical’ limits of future demographic change, we have also calculated the UN traditional high and low variants, which differ from the medium variant (forecast) in total fertility rate by $+/-0.5$ children per woman, respectively. In line with the main goal of the Chapter, we will focus on the medium variant, i.e. the Forecast (we will use this term hereafter) and Zero-migration variant.

Thus, the results of the projection should be considered as the exercise which implemented the concept of migration transition (in the framework of the UN model) across the region of former Yugoslavia in order to assess the impact of such a migration future on population dynamics of the region. It should be noted that the turning point from net emigration to net immigration is determined according to the current prospects of further EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Projection simulations presented in this Chapter were carried out by the means of specific statistical packages within the open-source software R, developed by the team from the University of Washington (Ševčíková et al, 2015a; Ševčíková et al, 2015b; Ševčíková et al, 2016). The packages contain procedures for the execution of the complete population projection according to the methods used for the 2015 Revision of the World population prospects. For details on the method, including transformations of probabilistic distributions of synthetic indicators (total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth) into age and sex specific rates required for projecting future population, see in: Raftery et al.(2014); UN(2015a).

Results of the projection simulations

General facts on the future population dynamics

According to the most likely path (median of distribution) of the UN based forecast simulation, the total population of the countries in the region of ex-Yugoslavia will drop from 21.20 to 17.61
million between 2015 and 2055, a decrease of −16.9 percent over the next forty years. The main driver of this decrease will be the negative natural change, at −3.468 million, which will be much larger, in absolute terms, than the negative net migration, namely −125 thousand. Significant structural changes should be expected, as the share of population aged 65 and above will increase by 75% (from 16.37% to 28.64%) over the forecast period. If we take a look across the former republics and provinces of Yugoslavia (Figure 2.1.1), only Kosovo will not experience decline in total population. However, the population decrease, as to the median of the prediction interval, will not be of high magnitude in Slovenia (−1.5%), Macedonia (−7.8%), and Montenegro (−8.2%). On the other side, a strong decline is expected in Vojvodina (−31.7%), Central Serbia (−27.2%), Bosnia & Herzegovina (−22.0%), and Croatia (−18.9%). If compared to the period before the dissolution of the socialist Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Bosnia & Herzegovina exchanged their positions with regards to the group of population change they belong to. Net migration appeared to be the main reason of the reversal. Furthermore, Figure 2.1.1. suggests that significant chances for maintaining actual population size by the mid-century refer only to Slovenia and particularly to Kosovo. Yet, the decline of Kosovo’s population is expected as of 2035 due to continuing lowering of TFR. For other territories, we can firmly say that the population decline cannot be stopped in the following decades. Most interestingly, the traditional high and low variant in regular UN world population prospects, representing bounds of +/- 0.5 in relation to the TFR of the UN medium variant, are much wider than the 80% prediction interval of the forecast even in the case of Kosovo. It indicates that the role of migration balance could be of greater importance for the region on a long run if compared to the previous periods. It is further discussed in the next sub-chapter as the projection results are decomposed with regards to the impact of net migration.
Figure 2.1.1: Population forecast (median and 80% prediction interval) of the region of former Yugoslavia across its entities, 2015–2055, including traditional UN bounds of the forecast (+/−0.5 TFR).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>80% prediction interval</th>
<th>TFR +/− 0.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lower limit</td>
<td>median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,067,526</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>2,034,417</td>
<td><strong>2,077,694</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>1,942,339</td>
<td><strong>2,036,564</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4,240,317</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>3,671,146</td>
<td><strong>3,822,536</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>3,057,795</td>
<td><strong>3,438,240</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,855,571</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>1,461,097</td>
<td><strong>1,500,021</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>1,187,610</td>
<td><strong>1,268,060</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Serbia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,140,644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>4,153,445</td>
<td><strong>4,279,935</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>3,478,100</td>
<td><strong>3,741,154</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzeg.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3,336,159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>2,910,077</td>
<td><strong>3,036,299</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>2,336,819</td>
<td><strong>2,602,087</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>625,781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>584,989</td>
<td><strong>611,938</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>514,705</td>
<td><strong>574,424</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,855,853</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>1,980,099</td>
<td><strong>2,067,377</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>1,829,773</td>
<td><strong>2,028,908</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,078,453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>2,000,313</td>
<td><strong>2,054,909</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2055</td>
<td>1,778,462</td>
<td><strong>1,917,250</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations

From the policy point of view, a population decrease, especially of the magnitude forecasted for Vojvodina, Central Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia should not go unnoticed. Although the times when the significance of states was defined mainly by their population size may long since be gone, large population decreases could result in regional and sub-regional depopulation, both of which have been observed in the region of former Yugoslavia for a fairly considerable length of time (Nejašmić & Štambuk, 2003; Madzevic et al, 2013; Nikitović et al, 2016). A severe population decrease may lead to deficits in labor supply, which could be a strong limitation factor for already weak economies of the region (Zdravković et al, 2012). To date, except for periods of war, the populations in modern economies have been
growing, so we have little empirical evidence of the economic consequences of population decline. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to curb large population decreases by means of policy measures (Kupiszewski et al, 2012).

Impact of migration: the principal inferences from the projection model

Given the expected negative impact of below replacement fertility on population dynamics in the region of ex-Yugoslavia over the following decades, the migration issue comes to the fore in terms of future demographic development. This section summarizes the key results of forecasted migration impact on population change across the region from the aspect of the assumed stages of the migration transition during the projection. To assess this impact, apart from the Forecast simulation, we prepared the Zero migration simulation based on the assumptions that all the age-specific fertility and mortality rates are as per the Forecast, while the net migration is set to zero. The comparison between the two simulations as regards total population size across the former constitutive parts of Yugoslavia is presented in Figure 2.1.2.

Figure 2.1.2: Total population (000) in Zero migration and Forecast simulation (median), 2015–2055.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Initial population in 2015</th>
<th>Population in 2035</th>
<th>Population in 2055</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zero migration</td>
<td>Forecast</td>
<td>Zero migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,067.5</td>
<td>1,983.9</td>
<td>2,077.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,240.3</td>
<td>3,863.5</td>
<td>3,822.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>1,855.6</td>
<td>1,599.5</td>
<td>1,500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Serbia</td>
<td>5,140.6</td>
<td>4,492.2</td>
<td>4,279.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzeg.</td>
<td>3,336.2</td>
<td>3,084.8</td>
<td>3,036.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1,855.9</td>
<td>2,251.6</td>
<td>2,067.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,078.5</td>
<td>2,072.1</td>
<td>2,054.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia (YU)</td>
<td>21,200.3</td>
<td>19,965.7</td>
<td>19,450.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Earlystarters’</td>
<td>13,304.1</td>
<td>11,939.1</td>
<td>11,680.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Latestartners’</td>
<td>7,896.2</td>
<td>8,026.6</td>
<td>7,770.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations
This impact of migration may be decomposed into a direct and an indirect component. The former consists of the total net migration flows summed over the forecast period, while the latter refers to the births and deaths which the migration either prevented or caused to happen, depending on the overall direction of migration flows, also summed over the forecast period. It should be noted that, in terms of indirect migration impact, no reference is made to the hypothetical demographic events which might have happened to the emigrants had they not emigrated. Figure 2.1.3. shows the calculation of all the migration-related components of population change.

As to the assumptions of the forecast model, the turning point is set to the year of 2035 when it is assumed that large post-accession emigration waves, induced by the EU enlargement towards Western Balkans, will disappear throughout the region (except for Kosovo).

**Figure 2.1.3: Impact of migration on population change – difference between Forecast and Zero migration simulation (median), 2015–2035–2055.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Migration impact 2015–2035 (000)</th>
<th>Migration impact 2035–2055 (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>−40.9</td>
<td>−30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>−99.5</td>
<td>−75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Serbia</td>
<td>−212.3</td>
<td>−160.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzeg.</td>
<td>−48.5</td>
<td>−38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>−6.1</td>
<td>−4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>−184.2</td>
<td>−148.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>−17.2</td>
<td>−13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former YU</td>
<td>−515.0</td>
<td>−384.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Earliestarters’</td>
<td>−258.9</td>
<td>−180.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Latestartners’</td>
<td>−256.1</td>
<td>−203.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations

According to the Forecast, the population in the region of former Yugoslavia in 2035 will be smaller by 515 thousand than it would be if there were no migration. The direct impact of migration on population in the forecast equals −384 thousand. This is the net migration, aggregated over the period from 2015 to 2035. In the case of negative
net migration, the indirect impact of migration consists of both the loss of births owing to the emigration of potential mothers and the loss of the emigrants’ deaths. As Figure 2.1.3 suggests, the effect of the latter is small. The number of births which female emigrants would have delivered had they not emigrated during the first 20-year period of the forecast accounts for 114 thousand. The number of deaths was reduced by 17 thousand by migration; these people might have died anyway, but their death occurred after they emigrated, so it cannot be counted in the figures for ex-Yugoslavia, as they did not number among the population of the region at the time of death. The overall indirect impact of migration is −131 thousand.

Migration induced population decline in the region would be even stronger by 2035 if Slovenia is excluded, with Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Central Serbia as the most prominent emigration area. In relative terms, migration is directly or indirectly responsible for almost 30% of the overall population decline expected in the region over the first 20-year period of the Forecast. In the case of Kosovo, net emigration represents strong counterweight to the very high positive natural change (21% of the initial population), thus reducing expected population increase by almost a half by 2035. During the same period, the population size of Slovenia will not decrease exclusively due to net immigration, as it is expected to fully annul the negative natural change over the period (Figures 2.1.2. and 2.1.3.).

About 25% of the migration induced (direct and indirect) decline of population in the region of former Yugoslavia by 2035 is due to migration-related, potential, but not ‘consumed’, natural change. This share varies between 20% and 35% across the region indicating that for every 3–4 emigrants one more is added on account of prevented natural change (Figure 2.1.3.).

During the second 20-year period of the Forecast, the population decrease in the region of ex-Yugoslavia will be smaller by 116 thousand than it would be if there were no migration. However, this benefit from the net migration surplus is twice as high if we exclude Kosovo, which is the only area with negative net migration over the forecast period. Indeed, almost all of the positive migration impact refers to the ‘Early starters’ sub-region, while Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia will experience only small migration gains. It is worth noting that despite the reversal of the sign of net migration from negative to positive (direct migration impact) after 2035, the indirect migration
Impact of migration: a review of the selected demographic indicators

We quantified the impact of migration on selected demographic indicators by calculating the percentage difference between the value of the indicator for 2035 in the Forecast and the Zero migration simulation, scaled to the latter (Figure 2.1.4.). In the Forecast, the total population in the region of ex-Yugoslavia is smaller by –2.6% as a result of migration. Migration also has a significant impact on the age structure of population. As assumed in the Forecast, it would decrease the share of population aged 0–14 in the region by 2.8% and increase the share of the population aged 65 and above by 3.9% until 2035. It would also increase the old-age dependency ratio by 4.7% (Figure 2.1.4.). The strongest negative impact of migration is expected in Kosovo, while the only territory where migration will induce increase and rejuvenation of population would be Slovenia.

When we compare projected age structures for 2035 and 2055, the main difference refers to the share of young population – the migration impact is no more negative across the region in 2055, except for Kosovo (Figure 2.1.5.). However, unlike the rest of the region, the negative migration impact on the share of old population is almost twice as high at the end of the projection period in Kosovo if compared to 2035. Finally, Slovenia could be singled out as the best example of how continuous positive net migration can have long-term benefits for the age structure of the population in conditions of below-replacement fertility.
Figure 2.1.4: Migration induced changes for selected demographic indicators: percentage difference between Forecast and Zero migration simulation (median), 2035.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Share of young/old age groups in total</th>
<th>Old-age dependency ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Below 15 years</td>
<td>School age (5–24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>−1.06</td>
<td>−1.05</td>
<td>−0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>−6.22</td>
<td>−5.46</td>
<td>−2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Serbia</td>
<td>−4.73</td>
<td>−4.07</td>
<td>−1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzeg.</td>
<td>−1.57</td>
<td>−1.31</td>
<td>−0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>−0.99</td>
<td>−1.77</td>
<td>−1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>−8.18</td>
<td>−6.49</td>
<td>−5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>−0.83</td>
<td>−0.45</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia (YU)</td>
<td>−2.59</td>
<td>−2.82</td>
<td>−1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Earlystarters’</td>
<td>−2.17</td>
<td>−2.17</td>
<td>−0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Latestarters’</td>
<td>−3.19</td>
<td>−3.35</td>
<td>−2.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations

Figure 2.1.5: Migration induced changes for selected demographic indicators: percentage difference between Forecast and Zero migration simulation (median), 2055.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Share of young/old age groups in total</th>
<th>Old-age dependency ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Below 15 years</td>
<td>School age (5–24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>−4.72</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Serbia</td>
<td>−3.65</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzeg.</td>
<td>−1.53</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>−16.15</td>
<td>−8.70</td>
<td>−7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>−0.69</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia (YU)</td>
<td>−2.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Earlystarters’</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YU ‘Latestarters’</td>
<td>−5.86</td>
<td>−3.25</td>
<td>−2.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations
Conclusions

If we accept that Europe is in the process of transformation into an immigration continent, as well as the process generally spreads from the northwest to the southeast, similarly to the widely accepted demographic transition, it was assumed that the region of former Yugoslavia will be soon heading to the same direction despite its currently unfavorable demographic and migration indicators. Given that the transition to net immigration directly depends on economic progress, enlargement of the EU towards the Western Balkans is taken as a prerequisite for the model and empirical considerations in the Chapter. In accordance with the principles of the migration cycle concept, which is used as the theoretical framework for the migration assumptions, and the experiences of new immigration areas in Europe, we assumed a longer period would be needed for societies in the region of former Yugoslavia to adapt to the new reality. Not only the migration cycle model, but also a longer historical perspective of empirical evidence from this region (not explicitly stated in the Chapter), indicate that the region will probably experience new immigration on the long run as it already was the case throughout the history.

Despite the decisive role of natural change, particularly that of fertility, on the decrease and ageing of population in the region of former Yugoslavia by the mid-century, the simulations of future population dynamics based on the theoretical considerations of the post-transitional mild increase of fertility and long-term transition to net immigration suggest that migration component could have important impact on demographic change, especially in terms of moderating the effects of below-replacement fertility on the age structure.

In addition, the notable indirect migration impact on the decline and ageing of population during the net emigration stages highlighted significance of side effects of typically young profile of emigrants (loss of future births). On the other hand, the sooner a country leaves the pre-transitional stage, the faster the country’s age structure will face positive impact of migration. Thus, the transition to stable net immigration will increasingly gain in importance over the next decades given the negative demographic momentum in the region, which will affect even Kosovo – the youngest European population. Furthermore, achieving the long-term post-transformation stage of stable net immi-
igration, as showed in the simulations for Slovenia, should be the ultimate policy goal for the whole region. However, the region of former Yugoslavia is currently being far from both the significant increase of fertility and the attractiveness to immigrants. Thus, the reduction of net emigration should be one of the primary tasks of population and economic policies in the next decades.

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2.2. Who Has Left, and Who Would Return: Differences between Serbian Highly Educated Emigrants in the USA and Canada

Jelena Predojević-Despić

Introduction

A powerful wave of technological development in the mid-1980s, and particularly in the last decade of the twentieth century, affected the developed countries of the world, the so-called North. It consequently led to major changes in their labour markets, primarily related to the increasing mobility of the workforce and a strong growth in demand for skilled and educated workers. Knowledge-based economies, where ‘human capital’ was the primary resource were rapidly developing. Therefore, it is not surprising that there was a strong competition among developed countries to attract highly skilled migrants.

At the same time, in the early 1990s Serbia was in deep political and economic crisis, with the sense of loss of prospects for a huge part of the population, especially for the young people. This had a significant impact on the intensification of emigration from our country, and the 1990s, after the second half of the 1960s, were the period of the most intense emigration from Serbia (Penev & Predojević-Despić, 2012), which also led to the complexity of reasons crucial for making decisions on emigration.
The level of education has a significant role not only in making decisions about emigration and the choice of country of immigration, but also regarding the level of integration in the new environment, and the possibilities of reaction to unfavourable conditions in the labour market. The highly educated (owing to the human and social capital and the possibility for good adjustment to living and working conditions in the new environment) react to these changes quickly and easily. They are significantly more mobile than less educated workforce, which often results in their more pronounced emigration, as well as more frequent migration within the receiving country, going into another country, temporary or permanent return to the country of origin (Poot et al., 2009).

Researching migration determinants has long been focused on the macro aspect, i.e. the impact of structural factors on labour migration, including the highly educated and professionals. However, these approaches have failed to provide satisfactory results in the understanding of the main triggers for migration. In this regard, attention should be focused on the experiences of skilled migrants and professionals, i.e. the view of the very participants in migration. In this way it is possible to gain a better understanding of determinants that influenced the decision to migrate and the choice of destination country (Ozcurumuz & Aker, 2016; Geis et al., 2013; Favel et al., 2006). It is also important to investigate further into micro-forces of adaptation to the new environment, which are inherently subjective (Povrzanovic-Frykman et. al., 2016), but are nonetheless important in terms of understanding further migration intentions and movements.

Therefore, the aim of this Chapter is to point to the similarities and differences in the analysed receiving countries between highly educated immigrants who had acquired high/higher education in Serbia and emigrated in 1991 or later. The analysis is based on the data of a large-scale survey conducted by the author of this Chapter among respondents living in the United States and Canada. Besides analysing the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, the focus of this Chapter is on differences in views about the reasons for emigration, as well as the plans to return at the time of emigration and at the time of the survey.

The main reason for selecting the US and Canada as the receiving countries is that during the 1990s they had relatively simple and fast
procedures for granting immigrant visas for citizens of Serbia, i.e. FR of Yugoslavia, which a significant number of our citizens used after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia (Despić, 2015). At the time of numerous restrictions in the EU, it was one of the main motives for a considerable number of our citizens to decide for these two countries when making decisions about the country of destination. These are also the countries with two different types of immigration policies, which are considered as the essential factor of the decision to migrate (Geis et al., 2013). Therefore, the aim of the Chapter is to, from the perspective of the survey-participants, provide a better understanding of differences in motives for choosing the country of destination among the highly educated migrants who emigrated from Serbia during the same period.

**Theoretical Considerations**

A significant shortcoming of the existing studies on migratory movements is that the causes of migration and their impact on the wider social context have been mainly researched separately (de Haas, 2008). This is one of the key problems, because the migration should not be perceived as a phenomenon different and separate from the broader social relationships and processes. Development and migration are considered two parts of the same process, and being in constant interaction they should be perceived as such (de Haas, 2014; Castles, 2008). Moreover, the comprehension of the complex relationship between the structure and agency is one of the most important research questions concerning international migration, to which an adequate explanation has failed to be provided for decades (de Haas, 2014), although the agency of migrants (and non-migrants) continues to play a central role both in the development of social theory on migration and in shaping the policy responses to migration (Bakewell, 2010, Faist, 2000).

The push-pull theory on international migration is one of the first micro-theoretical models that place the agency at the centre of research and highlights the role of the individual, assessing the positive or the negative sides of moving from one location to another. This theoretical framework assumed that different demographic, eco-
nomic, environmental and other factors had a crucial impact on the
decision to migrate. Critics of the push-pull standpoint believe that its
analytical applicability is in question, saying it is more of a descrip-
tive model that arbitrarily lists various factors with a certain role in
making migration decisions. The set of usually arbitrarily selected
migration determinants mostly has a two-valued character. The push
and pull factors are reflected in each other, representing two sides of
one coin: only together they enable the distinction between ‘here’ and
‘there’ and do not take into account the possibility of selection of mi-
gration participants (de Haas, 2008). This conceptually reduces peo-
ple to objects that lack an own will, perception and are deprived of
social relations (de Haas, 2014, 17). However, although the push and
pull model implies the static research perspective, focuses on external
factors as the main migration triggers and is not capable of com-
prehending migration as part of a wider transformation process it is
nevertheless instrumental in acquiring a broader general insight into
various aspects of international labour migration (Bauer & Zimmer-
mann, 1998), especially from the micro perspective, but also from the
meso and macro level.

Researching migration determinants, as factors or forces existing
at macro, meso and micro levels, affecting decisions to migrate or not
to migrate is considered very important (IMI, 2011). However, their
better and more comprehensive understanding has not brought sig-
nificant progress in the theoretical consideration of migration. Some
of the reasons being the overrepresentation of research on the impacts
of migration on integration and identity (IMI, 2011), as well as analys-
ing the migration processes from the perspective of receiving countries
only, over-emphasising the role of structures and generalisations which
oversimplify global ‘South-North’ migration patterns. Furthermore,
there is the lack of a comprehensive framework of migratory patterns,
which incorporates complex circular trajectories. Therefore, research-
ers point out that the micro level studies should consolidate the meso
and macro-level migration determinants considerations (IMI, 2011)
and ensure new ways for integrating agency and culture into the mi-
gration theory (de Haas, 2011).

In order to capture the complexity of migration dynamics, hav-
ing in mind the analysed period, i.e. the 1990s, when Serbia was af-
fected by the difficult political and economic situation and the wars in
the immediate surroundings, the link between forced and voluntary migration must not be neglected. The concept of mixed migration suggests that all migratory components, such as outward and inward movement, return to home place or further onward movement, even non-movement, involve elements of both coercion and volition (Van Hear et al., 2009), often disregarding the role of human agency in forced migration. Refugees’ legal status is usually defined by their lack of choice to be displaced or lack of freedom to stay where they are (de Haas, 2014). However, in spite of the limited options, they have a certain degree of possibility to make a decision on migration. Therefore, it is emphasised that ‘having choice to stay or to go, and where to go, captures the very essence of agency’ (de Haas, 2011: 18). Furthermore, the role of migrants’ aspirations should be emphasised, which relate to both economic and non-economic factors. This particularly applies to professionals and the highly educated, who, depending on their aspirations and capabilities for further professional investment through complex opportunity structures as structural conditions have the freedom to make decisions to migrate (de Haas, 2011). Therefore, in recent years the views that research should reach beyond the economic effects of migrations have been increasingly present. The focus should also be placed on less researched dimension of migrants’ experiences of well-being in relation to work/non-work issues (work, family, social and private life domains) and its processual character, especially in a transnational context (Povranovic-Frykman et al., 2016). In this regard, there is a need for investigating the individual experiences of highly-skilled migrants on macro, meso and micro forces that frame the migration experience and forces of their adaptation and ‘grounding’ (Povranovic-Frykman et al., 2016; Plöger & Becker, 2015; Reitz et al., 2014).

Methodological Explanations

The goal of the survey was, using the viewpoint of the highly educated migrants themselves, to broaden the existing knowledge about the reasons for emigrating to Canada and the USA, the level of integration into receiving society, as well as possibility of returning to the country of origin. The selected target group comprised of persons who
had completed university or college studies in Serbia, emigrated from
Serbia in 1991 or later, and at the time of the survey resided in Canada
or the United States.

Author of the Chapter conducted the online survey between June
and October 2008. The so-called exponential non-discriminative snow-
ball sampling was used to recruit the total sample size of 430 respond-
ents. The process of finding possible survey participants was conceived
so as to find respondents who belonged to similar networks. It was
carried out in several ways: through professional contacts (scientific-
research institutes in Serbia, alumni groups from various faculties in
Serbia, diaspora associations in Canada and the US, by contacting the
media through which our people living and working in the analysed
receiving countries were informed, etc.) and through private contacts,
including personal and professional contacts of the surveyed partici-
pants themselves.

Therefore, its results cannot be considered as representative and
cannot be used for any generalisations about the overall characteristics
of emigration of highly educated persons from Serbia. It should be also
emphasised that the comparison of the sample with the data of the Ca-
nadian and American immigration statistics (Despić, 2015) show that
the data obtained in this survey, both according to the time and man-
ner of immigration, are in line with the existing data on immigrants
from Serbia, and FR of Yugoslavia.

The questionnaire was composed mainly of close-ended ques-
tions. In addition, in the majority of questions there was a possibil-
ity for the respondents to provide their comments, that is, not only
by choosing answers, but also by descriptively expressing their views.
Such answers were subsequently coded and classified in the existing or
new modalities. Moreover, many comments of the survey participants
were used as an addition to the analysis of results, and / or their de-
scriptive review.

In order to obtain the best possible conclusions, the survey results
were mostly included into the result analysis of the survey data (com-
paring the views and relating the views with social and demographic
characteristics of the respondents) where there was a statistically sig-
nificant association acquired by applying the Chi Square test of Inde-
pendence.
Survey Data Analysis

Who are they and what do they do?

The most important demographic characteristics: The survey encompassed a total of 430 respondents (221 women and 209 men), emigrants from Serbia, 276 living in Canada and 154 in the US. After leaving Serbia, the huge majority of the respondents (383 persons, or 89%) settled in the same countries of immigration in which later the survey was conducted. Respondents living in Canada were slightly older than the respondents in the United States. Difference was least evident among the respondents of the most prevalent age group (40–44 years). The vast majority of the respondents were married: 362 respondents, while five cohabited. There were 42 unmarried, 17 divorced, and four widowed. Differences in the age structure of the respondents by the receiving country had influenced the differences in marital structure. In Canada, there was a slightly higher share of married respondents (89% vs. 75%), while in the US there was a visibly higher share of single respondents (5.4% vs. 17.5%).

Largest number of the survey participants, immediately after leaving Serbia settled in the surveyed countries of immigration. The majority (159 persons) emigrated between 1991 and 1994, i.e. at the time of the largest political and economic crisis in the country and the wars in the former SFRY, followed by those who emigrated between 1995 and 1998 (114 persons), as well as between 1999 and 2002 (94 persons). Similar trends were present in both receiving countries, but Canada had a slightly higher share of the respondents who had emigrated from Serbia between 1991 and 1998 (68%) than it was the case in the US (56%). In addition, a higher share of the respondents who had emigrated in 2003 and later was in the US than in Canada (11% vs. 20%), which contributed to the differences in the age structure of the respondents by the receiving countries.

Survey results also confirmed that mainly entire families emigrated from Serbia to overseas countries. Less than 30% of the respondents said that they had emigrated from Serbia alone, i.e. without other family members. The share of the respondents who had emigrated alone was significantly higher in the US (51%) than in Canada (16%). In Canada, the share of the respondents who had emigrated with their
spouse (31%), as well as with a spouse and a child / children (43%) was significantly higher than in the US (18% vs. 17%).

*Educational characteristics:* 414 respondents had university degree, and 16 had college degree. In addition, in Serbia, prior to emigration, a total of 91 participants had completed postgraduate studies. As many as 80% of the respondents had previous work experience, mainly in the field of their expertise: in Canada as many as 90% and in the United States, about two-thirds of the respondents. Different shares of the respondents in relation to work experience prior to emigration were influenced by differences in the age structure of the respondents in Canada and the US, as well as differences in the length of staying abroad.

In accordance with the labour market needs and possibilities for obtaining scholarships in the receiving countries, the largest number of emigrants belonged to the group of technical and natural sciences university graduates, while the smallest number fell into the group of social sciences, humanities and arts graduates. Certain differences were identified in the receiving countries. In Canada, the most frequent respondents belonged to the group of technical sciences graduates (53% of the total respondents in Canada). Their number was more than twice that of the second largest group, the group of natural sciences and mathematics graduates, which had 63 people (23%), followed by the group of social sciences and humanities graduates, with 53 respondents (19%), and almost all the college degree respondents lived in Canada (15 respondents). In the US, there was almost an equal number of technical and natural sciences graduates (60 and 61 respondents respectively). As in the case of Canada, the smallest number of people was in the group of social sciences and humanities graduates (32 persons).

A more complete picture of the educational structure of our recent diaspora in Canada and the United States could also be obtained on the basis of information on education of partners and spouses of the survey participants. At the time of emigration from Serbia, out of a total of 295 persons who had emigrated with partners or had joined partners abroad, 94% (277 persons) said that their partner or spouse had graduated from university or college prior to emigration from Serbia.

*Characteristics of integration at the labour markets of the receiving countries:* Data on citizenship showed that almost three quarters of
the respondents (312 persons) had citizenship of the country of immigration. However, there were significant differences between Canada and the United States. Canadian citizenship was held by 9 out of 10 respondents (250 persons), while it was the case for only 40% of Serbian emigrants to the United States. These differences were to a lesser extent determined by differences in the age structure of immigrants, the time or reason of immigration. However, the high share of the respondents with Canadian passports was largely due to the measure of the Canadian immigration policy to encourage immigration, especially of highly educated staff and professionals who were able to integrate quickly and easily into the domestic labour market.

The fact that 97% of all the respondents were employed, therefore, was not surprising. When asked whether they worked in the field of their expertise, the overwhelming majority (362 respondents, or 85% of all those employed) of the respondents provided a positive answer. In Canada, the share of this category was slightly lower than in the US (82% vs. 89%). Men were predominately employed in the profession compared to women (91% vs. 79%), and this difference was slightly more noticeable in Canada (90% versus 76%) than in the US (93% vs. 84%). Similar results were obtained when asked whether they needed university degree for the work they did, as a positive answer was provided by 86% of the respondents (84% in Canada and 90% in the US). Broken down by gender, men had slightly higher shares (89% and 83%), mainly as a result of differences in Canada (88% and 81%), while in the US, this difference was minimal (92% and 89%).

Such a high share of the employed having jobs in the profession, or jobs requiring a university degree, were largely the result of a good educational base acquired through university education in Serbia. However, the need for constant improvement of professional skills aimed at keeping up with the new developments in science and technology, promoting profession and career building, as well as easy and quick adjustment to the needs of the labour market, had influenced the decision of the survey participants about additional education in the country of immigration. Thus, 262 respondents (60%) attended some form of additional education and among them 66 obtained their master’s degrees and 58 doctoral degrees. Respondents in the United States had a higher share of further education than those in Canada (53% vs. 75%), and it mainly referred to the group of technical sciences graduates, where quite a difference was identified (39% vs. 85%).
Data on the type of employment were closely linked to the data on educational attainment, either in the country of origin or reception. Slightly more than half of the employed survey participants were employed in commercial companies (234 persons), 123 of them worked at universities and research units, while the smallest number (59 respondents) worked in state institutions, health care or education. In addition, the data on the type of employment noticeably pointed to the differences in the motives of emigration of the survey participants: in Canada, the highest share of the employed was in business companies, while in the US the share was almost equal regarding the employed at universities and in businesses. In the US, there was also double the share recorded of the employed at universities and research units.

Why did they leave? ... How did they manage?

As a starting point for a better understanding of the reasons that significantly affected the highly educated persons in making decisions about emigration from Serbia, the views of the respondents concerning their overall living standards in Serbia before they had emigrated were analysed. Of the total, only 3% of them assessed their living standards as excellent, 119 persons (28%) estimated that before their emigration their living standards in Serbia had been satisfactory, partially satisfactory was assessed by 129 respondents, while the largest number (162 respondents) expressed dissatisfaction with the living-standards. With respect to the receiving countries, there were no significant differences in the obtained results. Changed deterministic basis of emigration from Serbia during the 1990s reveals that the dominant reasons for emigration (respondents have chosen the three most important reasons from the list) were the motives related to the economic and political situation in Serbia. Four most frequently stated reasons from the list of given answers were: uncertainty of the future, poor prospects for the future of children, low living standards and wars.

'I went through inflation and the first salary as an engineer of 3 German Marks, and I quickly ran to exchange Dinars for Marks... inflation was high and times were tough. I lived with my in-laws because neither my husband nor I could do anything by ourselves in the time of great crisis and inflation (without the sup-
port of our families). Those were very difficult times in Serbia …’ (1967, female, IT architect, emigrated to Canada in 1995).

‘My wife worked at the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine. She could not advance professionally although she had received several international scholarships (US, Japan), although she completed her doctorate on time and had her papers published in international journals …’ (1971 male, physicist– university professor, emigrated to the USA in 1996).

‘The main reason is the lack of motivation – low salaries, big responsibility. I worked for foreign organisations and had a good salary, but there were no benefits, pension insurance, great uncertainty …’ (1967, female, financial manager, emigrated to Canada in 1994).

‘What was already clear back in 1991 was the hopelessness that lay ahead; the years dominated by crooks and gangsters alike. Intellectuals were an undesirable category … What was left behind us were only our weeping parents and friends’ (1956, female, IT specialist, emigrated to Canada in 1991).

‘Our changing morals, certain values are valid today, some others tomorrow’ (1955, female, musician – university professor, emigrated to Canada in 1996).

‘War, uncertainty and the obviously wrong, destructive policy of the then-President Milošević. We were all in our early thirties. These are the years when one learns and creates the most and builds the future for themselves and their children’ (1955, male, IT manager, emigrated to Canada in 1992).

‘My son was to be recruited!’ (1956, female, telecommunications engineer, emigrated to Canada in 1997).

While for people in Canada the four listed reasons were the most important, in the United States, especially among the younger ones and those who had emigrated alone, poor working conditions and career advancement were among the most important. This was the result of the already mentioned differences in the characteristics of the respondents by age, marital status at the time of emigration (in the United States, the respondents had largely emigrated alone, i.e. without other family members), previous work experience in Serbia, as well as the length of stay abroad and the year of emigration from Serbia.
Order of the selected ‘pull’ motives contained significant differences between the respondents who had emigrated alone and with family. Unlike Canada – where there were no visible differences among the different categories of respondents and as the majority of the selected reasons were considerably conditioned by economic factors, in the US, especially with the respondents who had emigrated alone, the most important reasons were related to the desire to improve the opportunities for professional advancement.

‘The only country that could import us quickly – within four months of filing the application’ (1959, male, anthropologist, emigrated to Canada in 1994).

‘We did not have much choice. Canada was one of the few countries that accepted emigrants from Serbia (besides Australia and New Zealand). Also, we wanted to go to the English-speaking counties to avoid losing too much time on learning the language. European countries were all closed to immigrants from Serbia’ (1969, female, architect, emigrated to Canada in 2002).

‘Immunoglobulin was free of charge’ (1965 male, dentist, emigrated to Canada in 1993).

‘I agreed with my husband’s choice, his brother had already been here’ (1968, female, chemist – university staff, emigrated to Canada in 1995).

Basically for all the respondents in the US who stated the reasons for selecting the destination country, graduate studies and business opportunities were important for the decision:

‘Much shorter the time required for obtaining the doctorate’ (1975, female, electronics engineer – university staff, emigrated to the USA in 2006).

‘The easiest thing was to get a scholarship at a university in the USA’ (1972, male, mechanical engineer, emigrated to the USA in 2002).

‘My ex-wife received an offer to work for 3 years at the University of Texas in Houston’ (1944 male, chemical physicist – university professor, emigrated to the USA in 1992).

What was common for both countries was that the respondents, in choosing the destination country, relied on the previous immigrant experience of friends, relatives and colleagues about the possibilities of obtaining immigrant visas, conditions for starting 'life from the beginning’ or favourable conditions for obtaining scholarships for postgraduate studies or employment. Upon arrival in the destination country the majority was referred to their compatriots, not only in terms of maintaining friendly and collegial relations, but also in terms of developing local networks of solidarity and help. This particularly applied to those living in Canada, with children, who largely maintained contacts and often saw their compatriots in Serbia (Despić, 2015).

‘We are connected in every way, whenever you need something there’s a compatriot to help, a plumber, carpenter, whatever .... Not to mention friends, going out, patron saint days, birthdays .... and basketball ... it is something special!’ (1965, male, IT engineer, emigrated to Canada in 1992).

‘We are connected in every way – in Toronto there’s Belgrade outside Belgrade’ (1963, female, real estate agent, emigrated to Canada in 1993).

‘The professor I work for is from Serbia, and I work with two people from Serbia in the office (who came on my recommendation). There are a lot of students from Serbia at my University...’ (1975, female, electronics engineer – university staff, emigrated to the USA in 2006).

Level of satisfaction with the living standards before emigration could be supplemented with the views on the degree of job satisfaction of the survey participants before they moved to Canada or the United States. Of the total of 343 respondents with the previous work experience in Serbia, nearly half were very satisfied or satisfied with their previous jobs. There were no significant differences between the receiving countries: among the emigrants to US, we registered a slightly lower share of those who had been very satisfied with the job in Serbia (16% vs. 19%) and a slightly higher share of those who had been dissatisfied with the job (20% and 18% respectively).

Larger differences were recorded when asked how long they had planned to stay abroad and also about their plans to return, at the time of emigration. Of the entire sample less than a quarter of the
respondents had planned to return to Serbia, almost a third had intended to permanently settle abroad and almost half (47%) had been undecided. Respondents in Canada in a significantly higher percentage had a negative attitude towards return or were undecided (86% vs. 65%). Moreover, while in Canada there was no noticeable difference regarding the completed university, in the United States a higher share of those who intended to return to Serbia was registered among the natural sciences graduates.

In addition, by comparing satisfaction of the respondents with the job they had done in Serbia with their plans for return to Serbia at the time of emigration, there were different results observed by the countries of destination. Among the respondents in Canada there was a significantly higher share of the respondents who believed they would permanently settle abroad upon leaving Serbia, or that they would come to the decision after some time spent in emigration. Only 8% of the total of 124 respondents in Canada who were very satisfied or satisfied with the job they had done in Serbia before emigration had the intention to return to Serbia. In the US, this was the case with 42% of the respondents (19 out of 45 persons). Similar results were obtained when plans on the length of stay abroad were compared with the respondents' views on the overall standard of living they had had in Serbia. Only 14% of respondents in Canada, who had had excellent or satisfactory living standards in Serbia, had the intention to return to Serbia prior to emigration. On the other hand, in the US, 41% of respondents from this group wanted to return to Serbia after some time spent abroad, prior to emigration. Given that for the majority of respondents a lot of time had passed between the period of emigration and the survey implementation, their answers to some of the questions, especially regarding their plans for return, represented the retrospective cognitive models rather than the process of transformation of their attitudes.

Presented analysis confirms a certain difference in the motives for emigration by the countries of destination, in a slightly more pronounced orientation of the respondents in the United States towards building a career, professional and scientific advancement. This conclusion is also suggested by the differences in the views about the satisfaction with the achieved living standards observed by the receiving countries. Although the vast majority was very satisfied or satisfied
with the standards at the time of the survey, the respondents in Canada showed statistically significant association between the living standards satisfaction and the self-realisation within family (Despić, 2015). On the other hand, in the US there were significant associations identified between the views about the living standards and professional life goals. More respondents from the US employed in commercial companies believed that their standards of living were excellent than it was the case with the employed at universities or in the public sector and administration (Despić, 2015).

However, with the respondents both in Canada and the US, the events on the political scene and economic instability in Serbia – the country of origin, could influence not only the extent of emigration, but also formulate plans on the length of stay abroad and return to the country of origin (Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2013; Cohen-Goldner & Weiss, 2011). This was also evident while comparing plans of the survey participants about returning to Serbia, which they had made just before emigration, with consideration to the respective years of going abroad. The rise in the shares of the respondents who were not sure about their plans for return or who intended to stay permanently abroad, was most prominent during the years of the biggest political and economic crisis in the country, in 1992 and 1993, but also at the time of the bombing threats in 1998 and the bombing of Serbia in 1999, and slightly less pronounced in 2003, the year of the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić. In contrast, after the enthusiasm at the beginning of the observed period (1991), the share of the respondents who wanted to return to Serbia was the lowest exactly during the biggest crisis in the country, as well as in the aftermath of the bombing of Serbia in 1999. Immediately after the change of government in late 2000, there was a short-term increase in the share of persons who had a desire to, after some time, return to Serbia.

Analysis of the results regarding the reasons for going abroad confirms that the structural factors, political circumstances in the country, as well as economic factors significantly influenced decisions of the survey participants to move out of Serbia. Similar results were obtained in studies conducted in Serbia during the 1990s about the emigration intentions of highly qualified people and scientists (Bolčić, 2002; Grečić et al, 1996).
Do they think about returning... Who would return?

Data on satisfaction with life achievements and working conditions, as well as ties maintained with the community of origin, appear as important elements for obtaining a more detailed picture of the climate of our intellectual diaspora when it comes to plans for a possible return to Serbia as the country of origin, as well as whether they express desire and willingness to cooperate with its institutions (Kõu et al., 2015; Phan, M et al., 2015). It should be noted that at the time of the survey, the largest number of respondents felt that the political and economic situation in Serbia – as an essential precondition for the establishment and development of such bridges, was unfavourable. Every third respondent felt that the changes were insignificant in scope and unsatisfactory, while more than 40% believed the changes were significant, but that it was far from a satisfactory pace of development. Observed by the receiving countries, there were no noticeable differences: in Canada a slightly higher proportion of the respondents believed that changes were greatly or significantly better than at the time of their emigration. However, one reason may be that the respondents in Canada, on average, stayed longer abroad than their counterparts in the US, and the majority left Serbia at the time of the greatest crisis in the country during the 1990s. In both countries, there was a significant association between the views on the information received about the situation in Serbia and the views about changes in the political and economic scene in the country of origin. Respondents who considered themselves very well informed about the political and socio-economic situation in Serbia, in the greater proportion opted for answers expressing positive views about the changes in Serbia or answers emphasising significant changes that occurred, but it was still far from the satisfactory pace of development (55% in the group of very well informed compared to 45% in the group of partly informed). While in Canada there were no noticeable differences in the view of the respondents by the type of employment, the respondents in the United States employed at universities evaluated the political and economic situation in Serbia as significantly better than those employed in business companies. Even 60% of the employed at universities believed the changes were largely on track or
were significant, while it was the view of only 33% of the employed in business companies.

Based on the provided answers and comments, it can be concluded that the respondents expected more from the economic and political progress after the fall of the Milošević regime. In the comments, they provided critical reviews about the poor functioning of certain institutions in Serbia, such as the judiciary, public administration, health care system, where, in their opinion, the poor way of managing and functioning still prevailed, including widespread corruption and dominance of personal benefit at the expense of the common welfare of all citizens and the country.

‘... Too much organised crime, the remaining state/public property has been sold for personal profit, the lack of noncriminal capital the economy can be based upon’ (1972, female, IT engineer – researcher, emigrated to the USA in 1995).

‘If the crime and corruption were eradicated, and if the safety of investments was higher, normal people would move forward and pull Serbia with them, but the way it is now ... not much to hope for. No one there (in Serbia – author’s remark) thinks about the country ... First of all I think of those who are paid to fight for that country, not to undermine it and sell it out. If Serbia was a normal country, few Serbs would stay in Canada, I know that for sure’ (1957, male, mechanical engineer, emigrated to Canada in 1998).

‘...complicated administration regarding every area of life’ (1956, female, seamstress, emigrated to the USA in 2003).

‘... the system should ensure not the social but the private benefit and above all the initiative. These countries operate in that way (Canada, USA, Australia – author’s remark). They do everything for you to succeed so that you have to pay taxes! It’s as simple as that ... I completed my doctorate in Australia, but I could not even validate my diploma at the University I graduated from (in Serbia – author’s remark)!’ (1964, male, mechanical engineer, emigrated to Canada in 1991).

The unfavourably assessed situation in the country reflected in the views on return to Serbia of the most educated emigrants in Canada and the United States. Although plans cannot be considered
a final decision on return, the survey results showed that most respondents believed that the chances were very small or even non-existent. However, the attitudes of highly educated emigrants from Serbia who had settled and successfully integrated into the economically developed countries, primarily in the US, did not differ from those of their colleagues from other countries of origin. Not only did the vast majority of highly educated emigrants from economically less developed countries want to remain and live and work in the United States, but it was also the case with emigrants from economically developed countries of Europe, especially among the employed in the field of science and research activities (Khoo et al., 2008; Laudel, 2005; Balaz et al., 2004). Almost a quarter believed they would certainly not return, while about 40% were not sure whether they would return, except in case the situation in Serbia significantly improved compared to the conditions at the time the survey was conducted. The small probability that our recent overseas emigrants would in due course decide to return to Serbia to live and work might also be illustrated by the finding that every fifth participant in the survey did not know whether they wanted to return to Serbia permanently. Only 10% of the total number said they would certainly return to Serbia to live, out of which most respondents neither knew when this would happen nor were making plans for a possible return to the country. With regard to the receiving countries, there were no noticeable differences in the observed shares. However, when the results were analysed by the scientific profiles of the respondents’ university majors, certain differences could be identified. In Canada, the share of technical and natural sciences graduates who claimed to be definitely or probably returning was similar (22% and 18%) and the share of respondents from humanities or artistic professions was significantly higher (31%). Similar associations between the groups of faculties and plans to return were obtained in the US, only their difference was visibly pronounced. Technical sciences graduates had the lowest shares of the respondents that would definitely or probably return. Compared to natural sciences and mathematics graduates their share was almost twice lower (21%) and almost three times lower than the share of the respondents from humanities or artistic professions (35%). Analysis of the results also showed a significant association between the plans for return and views towards integration in the receiving soci-
ety, which significantly demonstrated to what extent the process of adaptation and ‘grounding’ (Plöger & Becker, 2015) was important for making decisions on subsequent migration. In both countries, the respondents who felt fully integrated into receiving society accounted for the lowest share in the group of persons who certainly intended to return to Serbia (33% in Canada and 39% in the US). Their share was rising in proportion to how the views about return were becoming less determined, and the highest share was among the respondents who said they would certainly not return (76% in Canada and 86% in the US). In addition, plans to return were in a significant statistical association with the respondents’ views on preserving the cultural identity of the nation they came from (Despić, 2015). Respondents from the two receiving countries who thought they would certainly or likely return to Serbia to a greater extent than in other observed groups believed that the cultural identity of the country of origin should be fully preserved (94% in Canada and 84% in the US).

Views of the respondents point to the lack of real opportunities for the return from overseas countries, clearly indicating that the way to establish contacts and build bridges with our intellectual diaspora should be primarily developed through finding appropriate ways of exchange and circulation of knowledge and cooperation ‘at a distance’ (Despić, 2015; Predojević-Despić, 2010). As one mechanical engineer from Canada concluded:

‘The state must be a service for citizens and economy by having a legal framework that works... Now the state is primarily a service for political parties that make their influence with their unprofessional staff. As time goes fewer of us will return because our children are growing, and they are not emotionally attached to Serbia and are fully integrated in this society, while the ties with Serbia are slowly breaking. Our potential for the economy of such a small and poor country is huge, because we are in our prime ages, with extensive professional and life experience that people in Serbia do not have. ... If the state is counting on nostalgia to attract people, they are so wrong. It should create conditions, help in organising and those who want will find their interest in developing businesses’ (1967, male, mechanical engineer, emigrated to Canada in 1996).
Conclusion

The analysis of individual motives of highly educated emigrants from Serbia who live and work in Canada and the United States confirms that their decisions on migration in the last decade of the 20th century and later on was strongly influenced by structural factors: uncertainty of the future, poor prospects for the future of children, low living standards and wars. However, the survey results confirm that the human agency, although influenced by severe political and socio-economic conditions in the country, contributed to the making of a decision to emigrate. This can be also seen while analysing socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents and their views observed by the receiving countries. Graduates, mostly in technical disciplines, emigrated to Canada, mainly with the previous work experience in the profession. They left Serbia mostly with other family members, in the 1990s, and especially during the biggest crisis in Serbia. On the other hand, technical and natural sciences graduates equally emigrated to the United States, with no previous work experience. They moved to the US mainly on their own. In addition, the respondents in the United States significantly more opted for further education after immigration. The analysis of the motives emphasised as the most important for choosing the immigration country also highlighted the difference between professional immigrants in the analysed countries. While in Canada the respondents mostly chose economic reasons, in the US the most important reasons were related to the desire for professional advancement.

The difference between the respondents can also be seen in the data on integration into the society of the receiving country, particularly in the views about the satisfaction with life achievements. In both countries, after the initial period of adjustment, the respondents were mostly satisfied or even very satisfied with their degree of integration, both in the labour market and in receiving society in a broader sense. However, among the respondents in Canada, unlike the US, there was a statistically significant association between the standards of living satisfaction and the self-realisation within family, whereas in the US there was a significant statistical association between the views about standards and achievements in the professional sense.
Although of similar economic development and with good working conditions and opportunities for career advancement of highly educated immigrants, as well as of the achievement of a satisfactory living standards, the analysed receiving countries differ in terms of attracting highly educated professionals of somewhat different characteristics. All the respondents settled in about the same time leaving the country affected by deep crisis, but to some extent they differ according to certain socio-demographic characteristics, reasons for emigration, ambitions towards business accomplishments and life goals. This shows that immigration policy and measures of integration into receiving society can have a significant impact on attracting talents and professionals, i.e. the desired profile of immigrants. They can also be an important structural factor in decision-making about migration, but also on subsequent migration or return to the country of origin.

As the country of origin, Serbia should be oriented towards exploring possibilities to incorporate these incentives into measures of migration policy for attracting and cooperating with professional diaspora that would allow the use of knowledge, experience and creative capabilities of heterogeneous structures of our professionals abroad. The survey has shown that the possibility for return would be more certain for the respondents in both countries employed at universities and research centres, as well as for social sciences graduates, and for emigrants in the US who involved in the natural sciences or mathematics. An important conclusion is that graduates in technical sciences in both the receiving countries show the least interest in the possibility to return.

The survey also confirms that for respondents in both Canada and the US it is important to maintain ties with compatriots in the receiving country, as well as with family, friends and colleagues in Serbia. Almost all the survey participants emphasise the importance of being well informed about the situation in Serbia, even after a long time spent abroad. Furthermore, there is a significant statistical association between the plans to return and the need of the respondents to preserve the cultural identity of the nation they come from.

On the other hand, views of the respondents also point to the lack of real opportunities for the massive return of our professionals living in overseas countries. However, the results confirm that the ties with compatriots and the country of origin are intense, and the need for
being well informed about the situation in Serbia is quite strong. This suggests that there are good preconditions for establishing contacts and stronger ties with our overseas intellectual diaspora, as well as for developing adequate ways for exchange and circulation of knowledge and cooperation ‘at a distance’. Strengthening ties along with creation and continuous networking of different structures of our intellectual diaspora as potential carriers of new knowledge and modern technologies that are nowadays developing in a galloping pace and Serbia, to which they are still related, could produce a significant boost to changes not only in the economic, but also in wider social context. However, besides economic development in the country, the main precondition for development of any form of cooperation and networking is that the state measures are directed towards policies, encouraging a positive climate for scientific research, innovation and business cooperation.

References


2.3. Some Aspects of Youth Attitudes Towards (E)migration: Case of Republic of Macedonia

Anica Dragović
Marija Drakulovska-Chukalevska
Ivana Dragović

Introduction

Republic of Macedonia, like other countries in the region is faced with three critical but interrelated demographic challenges. Firstly, there is an increasing number of Macedonians who are delaying marriage and/or decide to have fewer children. Secondly, it is stark ageing of the population, and thirdly, the great intensity of international migration.

As to the first, available data illustrate that the number of marriages are declining. For example, the crude marriage rate was 6.8 marriages per thousand population in 2015, thus lower than in 2008 (7.2 marriages per thousand population) and 1994 (8.1 marriages per thousand population). Further, the age of entering into marital union has also been increasing. Also, Macedonia has experienced a substantive decline in fertility since the onset of the socioeconomic transition. In slightly more than one decade, the total fertility rate declined from 2.2 in 1994 to 1.59 in 2002, averaging 1.47 children per woman in 2008. It slightly increased by 1.49 in 2015. These numbers highlight that
Macedonia is posited in the group of countries where fertility is below replacement (Dragovic, 2011: 14–35).

Simultaneously, Macedonian population is becoming older. Throughout the period 2005–2015, the participation of young population (0–14 years) decreased from 19.4% to 16.7%, while the share of old age one (65 and more) increased from 11.1% to 13.0% (ДЗС, 2016: 12). Also, age dependency ratio decreased from 50.1 in 1994 to 46.3 in 2002 and 42.0 in 2015 (UNDP, 2004; SSO, 2016: 15).

When it comes to migration, both internal and international, it can be said that it is a phenomenon that shapes the country history and is going to shape its future development as well. Based on the existing literature, within migration’ history of Macedonia we can identify four periods. First one starts from the second half of the nineteenth century, when migration flows were directed toward Western Europe and overseas destinations. Poor living conditions were pushing factor for mainly young, unskilled men to try to earn additional income. Second period was on the turn of the XX century, when the last destinations for Macedonians were overseas countries, such as the United States, Australia and Canada. During this period, a significant number of the Macedonian population (according to estimation, around 30,000), also left the country and settled in Sofia in Bulgaria. In first two decades of the XX century, a sizeable Macedonian immigrant group was established in Canada, since the admission regulations and employment opportunities were most favorable there (van Selm 2007). Third period was initiated after the Second World War and in the second half of the XX century, when the Macedonian population was mostly emigrating to Western Europe (Switzerland, Germany and Austria), but also, to Australia and Turkey as well (CRPM 2007: 8; Uzunov, 2011: 2–5). Following Macedonia’s independence, after 1991, emigration had not stopped. Moreover, it continued with even more strength, as the economic crisis increased, with rising unemployment rate (particularly among youth) and poverty rate, leading to bleak future perspectives of the country. Thus, analysis showed that fifteen percent of tertiary educated Macedonian resides outside the country in 2002 (Janevska, 2003). On the other hand, labour market data in Macedonia showed shortage of highly educated people (CRPM 2007: 8).

Considering the fact that Macedonia is traditionally an emigration country, and because of the unfavorable economic and social con-
ditions, emigration can be spelled out as one of the greatest challenges for the state, for the researchers and policy makers. Brain drain is particularly expected to prevail in the future (Dietz, 2010: 22, Dragovic, 2013). Having also in mind a significant (direct and indirect) impact of migration on almost all areas of society and life, as well as that high proportion of youth involvement in migration, this Chapter aims exactly at discussing (e)migration intentions of youth. It is expected that the results obtained from such research would be conducive for a more comprehensive future researches, in order to understand and closely monitor intentions of future migration flows in the country.

**Methodological approach**

The main aim of this Chapter is to present some empirical findings about the attitudes of the young population of Macedonia towards emigration in particular. Study itself does not focus on the actual or potential migration from Macedonia in a certain time period, as the empirical data refer to the individual attitudes concerning the likelihood of cross-border mobility and not the actual implementation of their intentions. Intentions precede migration, but not always lead to it, because it is much easier to declare migration intentions than actually to realize them in practice.

Relevant theories related to the explanation of the determinants towards emigration are diverse. From that point, we will start with Ernst Georg Ravenstein. Ravenstein outlined the first macro theory of migration and formulated a series of *laws of migration* (1876, 1885 and 1889). According to Ravenstein, type of settlement, gender, age, family status influence migration behavior. Ravenstein’s *laws of migration* were revised by Everett Lee, who introduced the new macro theoretical framework, known as the push-pull model. Lee emphasizes the four types of factors that have an influence on migration process: the area of origin, area of destination, intervention and personal factors (Lee, 1966). Lee’s model was extended by Phillip Neal Ritchey. Ritchey include in model community and family components. Granting him the large family the social contact with friends, the marriage and the children increase one’s ties to the community and hence deter migration (Ritchey, 1976).
Further, neo-classical economic theory, developed by Gary Becker in 1964, stresses the human capital investment as a part of the capital movement. Explanation concentrates on the expenditure on education and training, on acquiring information about the economic, political or social system and on the improvement of the emotional and physical health that in sum become seen as an investment. As it is aimed to increase the personal income in the future – by providing the workers with useful skills and physical abilities which will raise their productivity, these altogether appear as the push factors for emigration. In that context, income and income differences between area of origin and area of destination, as well as on differences between labor demand and labor supply are considered as a crucial factor in the final decision to emigrate.

On the macro level, this explanation as the main cause distinguishes the disparity existing between the low wage countries that have a labor surplus relative to capital, and high wage countries, which have a capital surplus relative to labor, which appears as suffice for migration. Thus, differences in wages, as well as differences in benefit, are the main push factor for the rational actors to emigrate. On the micro-level, concentrated on explaining the migration behavior, assumption is that the people are willing to migrate in order to maximize their productivity and thus gain the highest possible wages (Becker, 1964; Sjaastad, 1962; Castles and Miller, 2009: 21).

Human capital theory incorporates the social-demographic characteristics of the individual as an important determinant of migration at the micro-level. Depending on the specific type of labour demand in migrant receiving countries, migrants will be selected depending on their personal characteristics. For instance, young people are more likely to migrate than the elder, married migrants are required to migrate less than unmarried, as well as the people with migration experiences from rural areas who will be very likely to migrate again. In fact, the personal experience abroad is also a case of human capital, which, according to the theory, increases the chance for renewed migration (Massey et al., 1993: 435).

The raw political economy of labor migration theory distinguishes the low household or family income as the primary determinant of labor migration. According to this theory, even if the absence of wage differentials between the origin and destination country exists,
the risk-sharing motive is sufficient cause for the migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985: 174). In the context of the new economics of labor migration, it can be expected that in order to minimize the risk, the family will send abroad the household member with migration experience, if there is one. Households and families attempt to diversify their risk and income sources by sending one or more family members to work in foreign labor market, which is ‘negatively or weakly correlated’ with the local one (Massey et al., 1993: 36). In this case, if the economy of the origin country worsens and the income of the household decreases, it can rely on the family member abroad for financial support, which will help the family in the source country to cope with the problems.

When many people of the same nationality migrate to a particular destination, they usually form a migrant network there. The network consists of sets of interpersonal ties that connect the migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the origin and destination areas through the bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey et al., 1993: 448). In case of migrant network in the country of destination, the risk-sharing motive is sufficient reason for migration. Youth is most likely to benefit from such social networks, because they tend to have more acquaintances with other young people, which are recognized by the other theories as the most mobile age group (McKenzie, 2006: 6). According to its essentials, the probability for cross-border mobility grows higher when the nationals have relatives and friends abroad, since these social networks reduce the migration expenses and risks, and increase the expected net gains (Stark, 1991).

Based on this theoretical review, we expect that the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents could have influence on their emigration decision. As a dependent variable we have selected the migration intention, while the gender, age, place of residence, family size and migration experience are considered as independent and exploratory variables (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999; Drinkwater, 2002). Each of the exploratory variables give the opportunity to estimate the differences between expressing attitudes towards (e)migration, and to get a closer understanding of emigration intention.

On the basis of relevant literature potential emigrants were divided into the following groups: potential settlers (permanent emigrants), potential long term emigrants, potential short-term emigrants, and non-emigrants (Mintchev, Boshnakov, Kaltchev and Goev, 2004). In
addition, Fassmann and Munz also distinguish two types of emigrants’ attitudes: permanent and temporary. Temporary could be long, short-term and commuting (Fassmann and Munz, 2002). Respondents were separated in accordance with the above typology.

Attitudes toward migration are operationalized through family emigration experience, personal migration experience, migration incentives and intentions. Analysis is itself based on the primary data collected through the anonymous questionnaire distributed to the students in their first and second year of the undergraduate studies at the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje, from several departments within the faculty. Survey was conducted during the academic year 2014/2015. During the students’ classes the questionnaire was self-completed by all students who were present in the lecture room during the lecture time at the time of conduct survey. In order to have an idea about the structure of respondents by selected socio-demographic characteristics, Figure 2.3.1. presents the percentage distributions of respondents according to certain background characteristics.

**Figure 2.3.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by certain background characteristics.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backgrounds characteristics</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
<th>Number (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skopje</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–19</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–21</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22–23</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24+</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of family members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Survey data*
From the Figure 2.3.1 it can be seen that the total number of respondents is living in urban areas – 42.6%, 43.0% in Skopje (capital of R. Macedonia), while the other respondents (14.4%) live in the rural areas. According to gender structure, the majority or 47.7% of respondents were male, and the remaining 52.3 percent were female. In terms of age, age group 18–19 consists 15.7% of the sample, age group 20–21 were 26.4%, next age group 22–23 shows the highest participation in a sample that is 34.7%, and age group 24+ were 23.1%. The majority of respondents’ lives in family with 4 members (47.2%). Slightly more than one third of respondents (34.3%) live in family up to 3 members, and 18.4% percent live in family with 5+ members.

Data analysis is conducted by analyzing the variable or with an univariate analysis, using the percent distribution. In order to precisely register whether the respondents have an impact on the answers, we have used the Bivariate analysis or contingency tables. Data processing is done using the Statistical Program for Social Science (SPSS).

Due to the fact that the sample is categorized as a non-probability purposive one, analysis and conclusion will refer only to students who were part of the survey. Nevertheless, the analysis of attitudes to (e) migration allows identifying some important aspects of emigration intention of youth in Macedonia. Results are based on categorical data for which dichotomous, nominal and ordinal data are used. Obtained data are analyzed at the level of the univariate, and bivariate analyses. For that purpose percentage and cross tabulation is used. Application of the binary logistic model is to determine the net effect of the factor variables mentioned above in shaping attitudes among respondents.

Analysis of the results

This part of the Chapter is devoted to the analysis of empirical findings that refer to general attitudes towards emigration, migration experience, intentions, information and eagerness to leave the home country. Based on the assumption drawn from the network theory, we might assume that the people who have already been abroad will be more likely to migrate than those who have not. In order to depict the previous migration experience of respondents – either their own or from some of the family members, students were asked two questions. First question was: Is someone in your family was abroad on any grounds?
The majority of the respondents (60.2%) reported that someone from their family experience with migration. On the contrary, their personal experience of living out of the country, either for study visit or to work is less. Namely, one out of three (28.7%) replied positively to the question: *Were you personally abroad for the sake of study or of work?* Those who were abroad, most often had been in Germany and stayed for several months. Importance of those questions is based on the assumption that the personal knowledge of international environment, i.e. previous stay abroad, could be considered as an important aspect of building social networks, migrant networks, and as it is could increase potential emigration (Makni, 2011: 192–193).

When the data on family and personal experience were controlled for by certain background characteristics, such as age, gender and family size, no significant differences were found. Again, it should be emphasized that the sample used in the Chapter is non-probability one and thus, the data analysis itself refers only to the sample, and could not be generalized. Nevertheless, data show that there are no statistical differences in the answers, even when they are being controlled by certain background characteristics of respondents in this particular study.

On the other hand, on the basis of several questions in the questionnaire, emigration intentions of surveyed students were identified as follows. Firstly, they were given the chance to select one among the three proposed options: a) *I prefer to live and work in Macedonia*; b) *I would like to live and work abroad* and c) *I would like to work abroad for some time, but again to get back in Macedonia*. The majority of respondents indicated the willingness to leave the country, reaching up to 38.9%. These are students who would like to live and work abroad for some time, but would eventually return to Macedonia. Close to them are those (35.2 %) who would like to live and work abroad. The lowest proportion, or more precisely one quarter, are the students who prefer to stay in Macedonia.

Following the classification available in the relevant literature and based both on the methodology used in survey and research results, our respondents could be divided into two groups. One consists of potential emigrants and second one from non-emigrants. First group might further be divided into potential settlers (38.9%) and long or short term mobiles (35.2%), while the rest is comprised of non-emigrants who do not consider moving abroad as a likely perspective.
Analysis below illustrated in Figure 2.3.2. refers to distribution of migration attitudes according to gender, age, place of residence and family size. As being said, these variables are not related to the respondents’ opinions in an equal way. However, it must be pointed out that female student respondents from the youngest age group, students from Skopje, as well as those from bigger families are more prone to leaving the country with no intention to return.

**Figure 2.3.2: Respondents’ structure regarding general migration attitudes, distributed according to gender, age, place of residence and family size.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responders characteristics</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I prefer to live and work in Macedonia</td>
<td>I would like to live and work abroad</td>
<td>I would like to work abroad for some time, but again to get back in Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–19</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–21</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22–23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24+</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of residence</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>44.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skopje</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family size</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(no of members)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey data

Similar trends are demonstrated in another survey from 2016, where the target group was unemployed persons in Macedonia. When asked whether they think of resettlement to another country, as many as 80% of respondents declared they had been reflecting on doing it,
out of whom 31% were seriously considering this option. Age and place of residence had no major effect on that (Латковиќ, Поповска, Старова, 2016: 27).

In the next survey question, respondents were asked to select how much do they adhere to the statement, ‘I would like to go abroad for more than one month’ on the scale from 1 to 4. Based on the obtained answers, almost two thirds (59.3%) endorsed this idea, 19.4 %, supported it partially, 13.4% opposed it, and 7.9% opposed it completely (see Figure 2.3.3.). Following respondents’ answers an impression can be created that at least three quarters of students could be classified as short-term emigrants.

**Figure 2.3.3: Respondents’ structure according to emigration attitudes towards statement to stay abroad more than one month.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>In percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost like</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not like</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not like at all</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Survey data*

It can be concluded that the empirical results of present survey, as well as secondary analysis, fit into the general trends of migration in Macedonia. Namely, analyses of processed migration in Macedonia indicate that in recent years, there is an increasing number of people who stay temporarily abroad, for the reasons of employment, family matters, education, etc. On the basis of statistical data from the last Census held in 2002, 35.123 people have been residing abroad for a period of more than 1 year, while out of whom 65.5% were employed or stayed as a family member, while 34.5% resided abroad for some other reasons (SSO, 2004: 22). Due to absence of more recent Census data, estimations from other sources claim that this number is probably much higher. For illustration, Macedonian citizens in European Union receiving countries amount to more than 10,000 persons per year for the period 2002–2009 (Bornarova & Janeska, 2012: 6).
When asked to choose the duration of stay abroad, students in our survey answered in the manner that could be classified in following way: up to 6 months (21.8%), 7–12 months (19.0%), 1–5 years (17.6%) and 5+ years (17.1%), with a significant part of those who were indecisive (18.5%).

**Figure 2.3.4: Respondents’ structure of emigration attitudes towards duration of staying abroad.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>In percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 6 months</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – 12 months</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 –5 year</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+ year</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Survey data*

Majority of answers (40.8%) belong to the group of short-term emigrants, thus, to those who wish to spend less than one year or so abroad, while 34.7% could be treated as medium-term ones since they opt for more than one year of residing abroad (Fassmann and Munz, 2002).

It could be inferred that the low proportion of students who have stated that have had any kind of emigration-experience (28.7%), has an impact on their readiness to stay abroad more than a year. Our respondents (slightly more than one out of ten) demonstrated their readiness to fulfill their intentions during the current year. Majority is ready to do that in one year or more. It is important to mention that one quarter of respondents have such an idea, but they do not know exactly when they are going to realize it. Nevertheless, despite the low level of emigration experience, a relatively large number of respondents classified in the group of those who stayed abroad more than one year, refers to the existence of push factors in the country. Those push factors are defined as less opportunity for job or lack of other opportunities, such as education, better quality of life, career, etc. In the same time, age structure could not be neglected, as it has to be considered as the most influential variable in emigration selection.

No doubts that the shortage of work opportunities in the country is the main push factor to take on decision to leave Macedonia. Half
of the potential migrants – 50.6%, indicate work as a main reason for their readiness to leave the country and live outside Macedonia. Another half claims other reasons to go abroad, like holidays, family visit, study, training or better education. However, it is interesting to mention that only few students have chosen to live in the country continuously.

Similar to the above, are the results of a research conducted in 2016 by the research team of the Foundation Friedrich Ebert in Skopje. Target population were young unemployed persons, aged 15–29 years, with a probability quota sample, sized 1009 respondents (Latkovik, Popovska, Starova, 2016: 11–13). Based on the survey data, the primary reason for leaving cited, was a wish to improve living conditions by going abroad (60.40%). In addition, reasons related to employment, such as improved working conditions (37.40%), getting a job (32.90%), higher income (28.10%) and career advancement (13.50%), also were stated (ibid: 28).

As we can see, the primary motive for leaving the country is connected to the real economic and social conditions at home. Gross Domestic Product in Macedonia is lower in comparison to other countries, thus appearing as the key push factor, as stated in the neoclassical theory (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Castles and Miller, 2009). Inequality of income distribution (Gini-coefficient) published in 2015 (covering the year of 2013), was 37 per cent (a decrease from 38.8 per cent in the previous year). However, according to some social analysts, the richest 1 per cent of the population received 12 per cent of the total national income (in 1990 it was 4.5 per cent), which puts Macedonia at the third highest position in Europe when it comes to inequality of wealth distribution (Anceva, 2017: 3). Unemployment rate also is still very high, although slowly decreasing in recent years, from 28.0% in 2014, to 26.8 % by the end of 2015 (Anceva, 2017: 3). Despite the fact that the risk-of-poverty rate – according to the State Statistical Office, is slightly decreasing to 24.2 per cent of the population, with the poverty threshold defined as 60 per cent of median equivalent income, the risk of-poverty rate in 2015 still was 21.5 per cent. Furthermore, in 2015 the average gross wage in the country is around 520 euros. Nonetheless, over 70 per cent of all employees earn less than the average (Anceva, 2017).

Still, the decision to leave the country is very complex and a difficult one. In order to take final decision people take in consideration
benefits and costs from both receiving and sending countries. It is a long and thoughtful decision, based on the reflection on a context in which a person lives, availability of information and the environment where they want to go.

In order to check the real intention to leave a country, respondents were asked to state the source of information related to the life outside Macedonia. Largest number of students replied that vast information about the life and opportunities for living and working abroad had been received from their relatives and friends who already live abroad. This applies for slightly less than one third (31.5%) of respondents who were identified as potential emigrants. The second source of information was internet, which was chosen by 27.8%, followed by 25.3% who are informed from relatives and friends living in Macedonia.

Desirable destinations were Germany (16.7%), USA (14.8) and Italy (9.9%). These are countries belonging to the traditional emigrants’ areas of Macedonia. According to another research, Macedonian emigrants point out that most desirable destination is Italy, USA, Switzerland and Germany (Uzunov, 2011: 8). Above presented findings correspond to a network theory of migration, as having friends and relatives abroad brings about higher probability for a cross border mobility (Stark, 1991; Faist 2000; Vertovec 2002; Pries 2004; Dustmann and Glitz 2005; Haug, 2008). Our data partly confirms this theoretical explanation, as the social network reduces the migration expenses and various risks, while increasing expected net gains – resulting exactly in migration (Makni, 2011: 194).

Binary logistic regression is further applied in this Chapter in order to predict the potential immigrants based on giving a set of indicators, at the same also demonstrating the relative importance of each of the predictors. Dependent variables that indicate the potential migration are expressed by respondents’ preferences among following three statements: I prefer to live and work in Macedonia; I would like to live and work abroad and I would like to work abroad for some time, but again to get back in Macedonia. For the purpose of our analysis, respondents who preferred second and third statements have been identified as potential emigrants (Makni, 2011: 15; Mintchev, Boshnakov, Kaltchev, Goev, 2004). A dichotomous variable has been created. In order to construct the model, six (independent) factor variables has been included in the analysis, whose (quantitative) effect of the change in the dependent variable have been examined – i.e. gender, age, place of
residence, family size, the existence of a member of a household living abroad and personal migration experience (see: Figure 2.3.5.).

**Figure 2.3.5: Description of the independent variables and references (base) group.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>24+ (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of residence</td>
<td>Rural (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family size</td>
<td>5+ (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience to stay abroad</td>
<td>Never be abroad (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were abroad for some reason (study or work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration to stay</td>
<td>Less than 1 year (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The formal logistic model adopts the following form:

- $P(x)$ is the probability of classifying the respondent as a potential emigrant,
- $N$ is the number of dependent variables included in the model ($N=6$).
- For each independent variable (i) a set of $(K_i - 1)$ number of dichotomous indicator variables $X_{ij}$ is created, where $K_i$ is the number of possible answers to the given question.
- $\beta_{ij}$ coefficients evaluate the net factor effects of the indicator variables on the formation of emigration attitudes (Minchev and Boshnakov, 2007; Peng, Lee, Ingersoll, 2014; Wuench, 2014).

The marginal effects for all variables in the model by means of formula are as following:

$$Po = \frac{\exp(\beta_0)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0)} \text{ and } \Delta P_j = \beta_j Po(1-Po).$$
– Po gives the probability to develop emigration intentions of a respondent from the reference (base) group, evaluated using the model’s constant, while
– ΔPj measures the net change in the probability that the respondent will develop migration intentions under the indicator variable Xij.

Firstly, the probability of the base group to form the emigration intention also was calculated by defining it as an emigration potential. After applying a formula to convert odds to probability, it comes out that the model predicts that 79.92% of respondents are going to be potential emigrants. In other words, probability to develop an emigration intensity is Po = 0.799. In applying the next formula: ΔPj = βj*Po*(1-Po), the independent variable's net effect is identified. Results are presented in Figure 2.3.6.

**Figure 2.3.6: Results of binary logistic regression.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>ΔPj</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>3.980</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of residence</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family size</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience to stay abroad</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>1.321</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference duration to migration</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>1.375</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( B \) – Regression coefficient. Sig. level of significance. Exp (B) odds ΔPj net change of probability.

This model predicts that the odds of emigration are 1.162 times higher for male students than for female students. According to age structure, odds of deciding to emigrate are 0.962 times higher for students younger than 24. When it comes to places of residence, odds of emigration from urban areas and Skopje are 0.962 times greater in comparison to respondents from rural areas. The model predicts that the odds for emigration are 0.381 times higher for a family with less than 5 members. The odds to decide to emigrate are 1.321 times higher for students who have some experience living abroad. In addition, the

\[ Po = \frac{3.980}{1 + 3.980} \]
odds for potential emigration are 1.375 times higher for respondents who express willingness to stay abroad more than one year.

The evaluated logit model confirms that family size, age, emigration experience and readiness to move from country for a longer period increase the readiness to emigrate from Macedonia. According to data, no other variable has a crucial role in formation of the decision to move. Priority factor is family size, which increases the likelihood of emigration intensity by 15 percentage points. Age, migration experience and intention to stay abroad for more than 1 year increase the probability for forming the migration decision by around 5 percentage points.

Current survey data that refer to migration potential are not controlled by household economic approach. Of course, if economic variables such as household assets and specific income sources were part of questionnaire and consequently were introduced into the model of explanation, they could give deeper understanding about potential migration of students. Namely, motivation for emigration, above all in poor family conditions is based on the motivation to move for individual, personal goals but also for the survival of the household. In fact by sending member of family abroad guarantees family income and reduce risks incurred due to many reasons.

Although the determinants of migration have been already studied extensively, far less is known about the role of family size on migration, as well as the structure of household of origin. Empirical data prove that the household or family appear as main unit for migration choice, having in mind the economic role of migrants’ remittances, particularly in developing context. Namely, family aim is to maximize household income, and emigration is seen as one of the sources of insurance or financial enhancement. Actually, it is the family security strategy that exists in developing countries in order to increase family income, help another member in the family, enhance the quality of life or opportunity for education, as well as to provide financial contributions for health-caring of their parents (parental care) (Stark 1991; Rath et al, 2011; Stöhr, 2015). Taking in consideration the above given explanation, and the fact that Macedonia is a traditional emigration area, as well as the developing country, the role of family or family background (such as household characteristics, size, number of siblings), seems as a relevant factor that has an impact on the on students’ potential decision to emigrate.
In fact, migration is characterized by a certain degree of selectivity, where individuals in a differentiated manner, response to the sending and to the receiving country (Lee, 1966). Lee emphasized the importance of the individual factors – where the age is one of them, because they are supposed to be related to differences in the migration behavior. In general, age of the migrants is of great importance for migration behavior, where the younger adults are more likely to emigrate in comparison to older ones. Data explored in this chapter proves the importance of age for increasing potential emigration from the country. Young people are more likely to migrate than the elder, because they have more prolonged possibilities to establish the working career and their costs of moving are lower. Also, fact that the majority of them are single and do not have a children reduces the cost for travelling, increases mobility, overall making the decision to emigrate to become stronger.

Emigrant experience, especially when linked with the readiness for a long-term stay abroad, appears as factor that has an important impact on potential emigrants’ decision. As those two aspects are the part of migration network theory, this conclusion supports one of its hypotheses: at some point, experiences can prevail over economic determinants of cross-border mobility, thus being a strong attracting pull-effect, from the perspective of the host country. Therefore, the people with migration experience in a certain country will be very likely to migrate there again, because they have already paid some of the costs of migration, such as learning the language and the culture, leading to a number of obstacles for emigration to be overcome. In addition, the personal experience abroad is also a type of human capital, which, according to the theory, increases the return of migrating.

**Concluding remarks**

In sum, in this Chapter we have outlined some major trends in attitudes toward emigration, as well as some aspects of readiness to move out from the country. According to our empirical findings, students appear to be particularly keen on mobility, irrespective of some of their specific socio-demographic characteristics. The majority of respondents belong to a group of potentially permanent migrants, being ready to move within one year, when faced with an opportunity. No doubts
that shortage of work opportunity in the country is the main push factor to take on future decision to emigrate from Macedonia.

Intention of young people to move out of the country of their residence is related to their optimism concerning the expectations and hope that somewhere else there are better life chances, compared to their home country. The main source of information about the living and work circumstances abroad have been received from their relatives and friends who already live across the border. They consider countries with more stable economies as the ones that could offer social security and plenty of choices in terms of working conditions, professional career, and life options. While the intensity of leaving the country permanently increases, present analysis could be conducive for a more comprehensive study, given the fact that many documents (such as policy documents, strategies, action plans and programs) related to migration are already adopted and need to be further implemented in practice.

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Part III
Policies
3.1. Serbia: The Migration Issue in Key National Strategies

Mirjana Rašević

Introduction

Migration movements represent one of the important qualities of the history of the people in this area (Cvijić, 1966: 144). Serbia is traditionally a country of emigration (Institute of Social Sciences, 2013: 12–13). It still records a clear negative migration balance (Nikitović, Predojević Despić & Marinković, 2015: 101). However, there are demographic assumptions for the change of migration flows from emigration towards immigration. Childbearing crisis and its effects related to population ageing and depopulation will not only continue but exacerbate in the time that comes (Rašević & Šedlecki, 2011: 271). The existing reach of socioeconomic development in Serbia does not support these changes.

The socioeconomic momentum of Serbia is well illustrated by using the United Nations Common Country Assessment for the Republic of Serbia from 2015.¹ This analytical document provides a synthesis of the situation in the economic sphere. It says that Serbia is currently facing problems of economic growth, underdevelopment of rural areas and regional disparities, high presence of environmental polluters, few

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¹ CCA Serbia document was acquired owing to the kindness of the staff in the United Nations Population Fund in Serbia. It will soon be published at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/venice/undafcca/
high unemployment rate, low level of investment, low level of competitiveness of the private sector, overburdened public sector and increased public debt. Human Development Index (HDI) also presents the achieved socioeconomic development of Serbian society. On the HDI list for 2014\(^2\), with the value of this indicator being at 0.771, Serbia ranked 66 out of 188 countries and territories by HDI.

The main limitation when considering the effects of external migration, primarily emigration from Serbia, is that it has not been studied enough. Even so, we can conclude that emigration must have had an impact on the reduced number of permanent residents in Serbia. Emigration did not have only a direct impact on the population size. The impact was also indirect. Serbia directly lost the people who emigrated, but also indirectly their children when they left together and/or those born in a different, foreign country.

Particularly the large-scale leaving to work/stay abroad from specific parts of Serbia, the three so-called hot emigration zones (Penev & Predojević– Despić, 2012: 50), had to leave serious effects on their demographic development. Simultaneously, in addition to the personal and economic gain of the family, the reduced pressure on the labour market in circumstances of high unemployment and consequently reduced social tensions are the potential macro benefits in the local environments from the mentioned emigration zones.

Special issues are the effects of emigration of a large number of highly educated and highly skilled individuals, or experts, researchers and talents from Serbia (Stanković, 2014: 73). We still cannot speak of labour market disturbances caused by emigration from the country of large numbers of individuals of certain professional profiles, including the emigration of health-care professionals (Rašević, 2016: 40). However, the mitigation of circumstances on the national and societal levels that determined the decision of not few of the most educated individuals to leave abroad, requires precisely the engagement of the most educated Serbian citizens in the fields of economy, culture, science, and politics in development in Serbia. Simultaneously, by leaving the country experts in general preserve their professional capital and build on it in more developed environments. This is a potentially positive

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side of emigration of highly educated and highly skilled individuals in terms of the opportunity for return of this population to the country or circular migration or different forms of transnational networking and activities.

In addition to potential benefits related to social remittances, cash remittances coming from emigrants to their connections in Serbia are particularly important. Estimated amount of cash remittances is significant both in absolute and relative terms (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2015: 72–73). The amount of remittances is estimated because a considerable share of this financial transfer arrives into Serbia through informal channels. In addition to this finding, the results of representative research conducted by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS, 2015: 6–7) demonstrated that remittances are by far used largely to meet the costs of living and basic needs with regards to investing in the education of recipients, their health, better living space or for starting business which is simultaneously investment in the future of both the individual and their family, and the investment in the human capital and the country’s development. However, even when recipients spend remittances for everyday needs, this has wider economic effects in the local community.

Methodology

International migration is a growing phenomenon, both by scope and complexity, pervading nearly all the countries in the world: The relation between migration and development is complex. In recent years, in addition to the topics such as viewing emigration as an error in a population’s development, considering the leaving of highly educated and highly skilled individuals as a loss to the country of origin and a gain for the receiving country and stressing the importance of the influx of cash remittances from abroad, migration is more and more often analysed in the function of socioeconomic development, both for developed and developing countries. Impetus for the new paradigm comes from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon of migration and development, findings of conducted empirical research in various populations, as well as in political circles.

The United Nations (UN) has an important role in the formulation and implementation of a broader perspective on the mutual impact
of migration and development. UN first indirectly included migration in the Millennium Development Goal 8 for the 21st century, which was defined as Develop a Global Partnership for Development. In addition, UN directly supported this concept by establishing the Global Commission on International Migration in 2003, organizing the First and Second Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006 and 2013 and by establishing a Global Forum on Migration and Development in 2007 (Bobić, 2013: 122). A broader concept of interdependencies between migration and development is also an integral part of the new UN development agenda *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* and the majority of its goals.

Recognizing migration as an instrument of development has led to a consensus on the need to include the phenomenon of migration in the development agendas, strategies and plans on global, regional, national and local levels. Mainstreaming migration in major economic growth documents and development initiatives is necessary both in the developing and developed worlds, that is to say it is important both for the countries of origin and receiving countries. Balanced mainstreaming of the phenomenon of migration in strategic documents of a country includes the existing reciprocities between migration and development. Simultaneously it represents a tool for coherent policies (IOM, 2015: 1) on migration and development in the broadest sense.

In this Chapter, we will analyze the mainstreaming of the phenomenon of migration in the development and sector strategic documents of the Serbian Government adopted since 2001 to date. It will discuss the (lack of) inclusion of the phenomena of emigration/immigration and mobility in the key current national documents in the area of development, economy, employment, social policy, health, education, science and youth policy. That is, it will provide a critical overview of the method and content of migration mainstreaming in these documents and its possible impact on the country’s development goals. Several strategic documents were also adopted in Serbia related to migration management focusing on addressing particular issues such as refugees and internally displaced persons, reintegration of returnees, suppression of illegal migration, human trafficking or relationship between homeland and diaspora. They will not, however, be the subjects

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of analysis. The challenges related to migration must be addressed in a context broader than an isolated approach.

Results

The National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) was adopted in 2008. This Strategy is a real umbrella document. Namely, the aim of the NSDS, as highlighted in the Introduction, is to balance and bring together the three key sustainable development pillars: sustainable development of the economy, trade and technology, sustainable development of society based on social balance and environmental protection with rational use of natural resources. The Strategy defines sustainable development in the broadest possible sense as a goal-oriented, long-term, continuous, comprehensive and synergetic process, influencing all aspects of life (economic, social, environmental and institutional) on all levels.

Among the commitments defined in the Strategy, some are related more and some less to the topic presented here. The commitments presented in the NSDS related to industrial development, development of small and medium enterprises, entrepreneurship, foreign investments, employment, social security, public health, education, science and technology policy, equal opportunity policy, population policy, etc. are in accordance with the topic. Having this in mind, these commitments shall be further discussed in relation to relevant strategic documents. Especially because the majority of them were created having in mind the principles and priorities of this Strategy.

The phenomenon of migration has been directly included in the Strategy in several places. The third key national priority, related to human resource development, highlights the need to prevent emigration of experts by creating better working conditions. Then in the SWOT analysis, listing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for sustainable development in Serbia, the continued brain drain after 2001 is listed as internal weakness. Consistently, one of the aims of the population policy of the country is set as eliminating the factors influencing brain drain and creating favorable conditions for the return and/or investment of diaspora in Serbia (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2008: 50). It should be highlighted that the prevention of emigration of
highly educated individuals and eliminating the factors that influence this is not a realistically set priority of the Strategy, nor population policy goal. However, it is also important that emigration is recognized as a phenomenon that should be mitigated in the aim to achieve sustainable development in Serbia.

NSDS highlights the integration of national minorities as an important factor for the development of the country. The explanation makes it clear that the integration relates to autochthonous rather than new national minorities, or immigrants. Ethnocentrism is also recognized as an issue, and it is stressed that it is important to place the creation and nurturing of the concept of cultural diversity understood as the component of European identity in the centre of the affirmation of cultural identity in Serbia, which starting from local and regional, includes the national, but is not limited to it.

The Strategy and Policy of the Industrial Development of the Republic of Serbia for the period 2011–2020 was adopted in 2011. It is a development document, because it presents the ways to achieve the main goal defined as the creation of new competitive sustainable industrial structures in Serbia, not only in industry and economy, but also science, education, employment and social policy. It is simultaneously a reform document, because it advocates for implementing in-depth changes that are to develop in three phases:

1. Revitalization and regeneration,
2. Restructuring and reengineering, including technological modernization of export areas, and
3. Development and competitiveness, the change of industrial technological profile, that is, the change of focus of industrial production from predominantly low technological sphere to the sphere of high technologies (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011: 2).

The importance of protecting the environment in this process is particularly emphasized through the promotion of cleaner production and reduced pollution and environmental pressures. This is mentioned because the developed environmental awareness in a country makes it better to life in, and it is an increasingly important factor in making migration-related decisions.
The implementation of the Strategy, including the implementation of one of the most important specific objectives, related to the new, good quality and well-paid production jobs, would contribute to fast-tracked socioeconomic development of the country and social cohesion and consequently would have an impact on reducing emigration from and increasing immigration in Serbia. In addition, the phenomenon of migration is also directly integrated in the Strategy. First, the SWOT analysis of the industrial situation in Serbia recognizes the potential for influx of remittances from the diaspora as one of the external opportunities, chances. Next, around ten ways are listed for strengthening of the national innovation system under the considerations of innovations as drivers of industrial development of Serbia. Higher international mobility of researchers and improved cooperation with the scientific diaspora are listed as important ways of creating discoveries that would then turn into successful commercial products. Also, intensified cooperation, through special programmes with our researchers in the diaspora – especially those who have built successful careers in industrial production companies, is highlighted as an important mechanism for successful transfer and dissemination of knowledge. Or, in other words, the Strategy acknowledges some of the potentials of Serbian diaspora, which can contribute to the development of industry in Serbia. In addition, authors single out the strong drain of young researchers abroad, because of better circumstances for research and personal development, as a threat to innovative policy in Serbia (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011: 81).

*The Strategy for Supporting the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises, Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness for the period 2015–2020* was adopted in 2015. The strategic vision expressed as development of entrepreneurship and competitiveness, based on private entrepreneurship initiative, knowledge in innovation, with the aim to strengthen domestic micro, small and medium enterprises and entrepreneurs sufficiently to be able to respond to the pressure of the competition on the joint EU market and contribute to improving the standard of living in Serbia.

In order to attain the vision, six strategic goals are defined: the improvement of business environment; the improvement of access to sources of funding; continuing development of human resources; strengthening sustainability and competitiveness of enterprises and
entrepreneurs; promoting access to new markets; and developing and promoting the entrepreneurial spirit and encouraging the entrepreneurship of women, youth and social entrepreneurship.

The phenomenon of migration is not included in this document. It was selected for analysis believing that it should at minimum include the transnational forms of economic activities of migrants, foreigners or returnees to Serbia, as well as emigrants from Serbia doing business with the country of origin. Transnational entrepreneurship is a concept that needs to be promoted and supported, because it represents an important resource for the country’s development.

*The Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Serbia in the period 2014–2024* was adopted in 2014. The document aims to establish the basis of new policy for the development of agriculture and activate developmental potentials of rural areas. The Strategy starts with a situation analysis and presentation of the challenges in this sector. In the part related to human resources, it is highlighted that rural economic development is hindered by low quality of labour force without entrepreneurial skills and consequently low foreign investments, which in turn causes the population to leave, especially more educated individuals, and so resources are diminished and chances for development reduced.

Hence the improvement of the quality of life in rural areas is set out as one of the five strategic development goals. In its explanation, it is highlighted that it is necessary to create favourable living and working conditions for youth and keep them in rural areas. The achievement of the objectives set by the Strategy includes the implementation of a number of different listed interventions, including those related to the strengthening of rural social capital. The following activities among them seem particularly important:

- Increase accessibility of social services to the rural population
- Improve the social status of agricultural workforce
- Reduce rural poverty and improve the position of deprived rural populations
- Include small farm households in support systems
- Promote women and youth entrepreneurship in rural areas (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2014: 78).
The achievement of the discussed goal and other Strategy goals would certainly contribute to the development of agriculture and rural areas of Serbia. Consequently, internal and external migration of youth from rural areas would be reduced, which would also have positive return effects on development. Strategy developers insist on keeping youth in rural areas, not opening the issue of return of those who left to work/stay in bigger places in the country or abroad, or integration of foreigners in the function of rural development and development of agriculture in Serbia. The Strategy does not mention circular or seasonal migration.

The *Strategy on Promotion and Development of Foreign Investment* was adopted in 2006, as a mean to create a favorable climate and framework to attract, keep and expand export oriented new direct foreign investments in the Serbian economy. The Strategy focuses on progress in four areas. The pillars of the Strategy are 1) regulation reform 2) strengthening institutional capacities and developing cooperation on government and municipal levels in order to facilitate business development 3) activities and initiatives on promoting competitiveness; 4) developing campaigns in the country for better understanding of the importance of foreign investments and oriented international marketing programmes. Although it seeks for in-depth changes, that is, wider economic reform, this document lists several key advantages making Serbia unattractive destination for foreign investments. Advantages include the geographic position, natural resources, good education system, experience in engineering/production and low cost of labour. A high number of highly educated individuals, experts and talents that have left Serbia to work/stay abroad, are not recognized as the country’s advantage in this sphere.

Serbian diaspora is mentioned in the document only on page 72 (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2006), in relation to the institutional framework for the implementation of the Strategy, and efforts to establish a one-stop-shop for investors where they could get the required permits and resolve requirements related to regulations on the foundation and operation of their companies. Namely, in the explanation for forming such an organizational unit, it is highlighted that this is a need of both foreign investors and Serbian entrepreneurs from diaspora. Further on, completely misplaced in the Strategy and therefore matter-of-fact and
artificially, it is highlighted that entrepreneurs from diaspora can in addition to investing in the country’s economy help to promote economic cooperation with Serbia, among the people of Serbian origin and their business partners in the countries in which they live and work.

The National Employment Strategy for the period 2011–2020 was adopted in 2005. Active employment policy is important in any population, especially in Serbia, fighting serious unemployment for a long time and being traditionally a country of emigration. An important reason for leaving the country for many individuals is finding any employment, followed by finding better paid employment abroad, with better working conditions and possibility for faster professional advancement (Baird & Klekowski von Koppenfels, 2010: 31). Therefore, it is important that the Strategy goal was defined as providing support to employment and reducing the gap between the labour market indicators in Serbia and the European Union, by using the Agenda for new skills and jobs, an important instrument of the Europe 2020 document.

The phenomenon of migration is directly integrated in the Strategy first within the demographic challenges. Namely, it is underlined that Serbia is facing all types of migration: external and internal, forced and voluntary, legal and illegal, migration of highly skilled and unskilled workers, immigration and emigration. However, priority was given to the problem of emigration as one of the causes of depopulation, reducing the scope of the working contingent of the population and population ageing. The danger of increased emigration of young educated professionals and skilled workers to EU countries for economic reasons is specifically underlined. The gaps in labour market supply and demand in Serbia, that is, the lack of skilled labour force with developed competencies and skills that would match the demands of the employers, particularly is stressed under educational challenges in the Strategy.

Through consistently presented demographic and educational challenges, the phenomenon of migration is also included in the first strategic goal of the Strategy, related to employment policy. In the explanation of this goal, the importance of migration management in Serbia is highlighted, in accordance with the long-term needs of economic development and labour market flows. In this respect it is underlined that new solutions are necessary, which can include promoting immigration of younger and educated workers, primarily from neighboring countries (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2005: 24).
The phenomenon of migration is also included in the third strategic goal defined as improving institutions and developing the labour market. It initiates the legal solution related to employment of foreigners and broadening the network of migration service centres, which are to provide information, advice and guidance to migrants and potential migrants, in order to reduce the risk of illegal migration as well as to promote the Fund for employment of marginalized youth (including, among others, returnees in the process of readmission and refugees). All three ideas listed have already been implemented.

Social Protection Development Strategy was adopted in 2015. Efficient social protection system was defined as a system supporting vulnerable and marginalized individuals and groups, who need organized assistance from the community and the state, as well as citizens who are not able to secure their existence through economic activity. The development of integral social protection is consistently set as the main aim of social protection system reform, in which social actors in the most efficient way use the existing and develop new resources through available, good quality and diverse services, in order to preserve and improve the quality of life of vulnerable and marginalized individuals and groups, enable them a productive life in the community and prevent dependence on social services. The set goal and its achievement through special and individual reform objectives also includes the support to certain sensitive groups of migrants or individuals that have come to Serbia, by determining their needs and providing a good quality and efficient programmatic response within the integrated social protection system.

It is important to note that the implementation of the Strategy, that is, the full implementation of a number of defined measures, activities and mechanisms related to a more efficient system of cash assistance, developing networks of available services in the community and introducing the quality assurance system in social protection, would contribute to a clear step forward in the improvement of the social status of citizens in Serbia. We believe this would reduce emigration flows from and increase immigration flows into Serbia, because social benefits and the degree of social protection and security in the country of origin in relation to the country of potential destination or in the receiving country in relation to the country of origin, together with a number of other elements, have an impact on making the individual
decision on external migration. Health and health care policy is also an important push or pull factor, when an individual is assessing the quality of life in a place. Rodolfo de la Garza (2008: 194) specifically underlines the importance of having developed comprehensive social services for migration management.

*Republic of Serbia Public Health Strategy* was adopted in 2009. The Strategy is related to a number of activities, some of which are particularly important for the issue of migration. Primarily, this is support in providing equal access to the necessary health care and development and training of human resources in public health.

The principle of equal access to health, prevention of disease and health assistance for migrants and their families without discrimination is set out in a number of documents. The most important are the World Health Organization Resolution on the health of migrants in 2008 and World Health Organization, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and International Organization for Migration study *International Migration, Health and Human Rights* in 2013. Highlighting this requirement was based on evidence that insufficiently educated migrants, as well as migrants without documents were facing a series of barriers related to access to health protection, especially good quality health protection (IOM, 2013: 30).

In the Republic of Serbia Public Health Strategy, the promotion, development and support to actions for the improvement of health status of socially vulnerable groups of population is defined as a special strategic goal. It sets out the following two specific objectives: increase access and availability to health services for socially vulnerable groups of the population and develop actions directed at socially vulnerable groups to overcome barriers (cultural, linguistic, material, physical) for accessing health and other types of assistance. Certain categories of migrants certainly fall under an especially vulnerable group. However, they are not, and neither are other groups from this circle, listed as a population group that this strategic goal refers to.

Another strategic goal in the Strategy, development and education of human resources in the area of public health, indirectly refers to the issue of migration. It defines several specific objectives, such as education, licensing, continued education and development of health workers’ skills necessary for multidisciplinary and multi-ethnic work in public health. This strategic goal is underlined, because the results
of the latest research have shown that doctors rank high the lack of opportunity for continued education as reason for potential emigration from Serbia (Krstić & Ljubičić, 2015: 27). Therefore, it is important that there is strategic commitment of the government to strengthen the professional competencies of medical doctors.

The Strategy for the Development of Education in Serbia by 2020 was adopted in 2012. The Strategy underlines that the increase of coverage, quality, relevance and efficiency of the educational system is a condition for Serbia’s development and the resulting decrease of emigration, especially the emigration of highly educated individuals from the country.

The Strategy starts with mobility as an important challenge for the Serbian educational system. Mobility is according to this document also an important lever, in addition to including research, innovation and entrepreneurship, for the development of higher education here, because it contributes to its quality, increases the competencies of teachers and students and offers them better opportunities for employment. Mobility is insisted on all levels of higher education and for each of them a number of activities contributing to mobility are defined.

Within actions and measures related to mobility during academic studies, it was specified that students’ leaving Serbia to go study in the countries of the European higher education area should be supported, in the duration from one semester up to one year (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2012: 110). It is highlighted that there should be a tendency to include at least 10% of foreign students in basic and master academic studies. PhD studies, however, should be developed with the aim to share at least 10% of study programmes with foreign universities and at least 10% of study programmes in English or other foreign language and that one in five students should participate in the mobility programme (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2012: 116).

Two solutions are also presented in the Strategy, which could support reduced emigration, or increase the immigration of highly educated individuals, professionals and talents into Serbia. This is the government support in 1) establishing business incubators in higher education institutions in order to commercialize the ideas of teachers and students and 2) form centres of research/educational/economic excellence (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2012: 93–94).
The Strategy on Scientific and Technical Development of the Republic of Serbia for the period 2016–2020 – Research for Innovation was adopted in 2016. The mission of this Strategy is to establish an effective national research system integrated in the European Research Area. The achievement of the defined objective entails that researches live and work in a dramatically different environment than it is in Serbia today. Or in other words, scientists work in a country in which science is promoted, valued socially and financially supported. Under such circumstances, fewer researchers would leave Serbia to work abroad. Simultaneously Serbia would become attractive for returnees from foreign countries and foreign researchers.

The phenomenon of migration is also directly included in the Strategy. First, in the part related to the analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats within the existing scientific and innovation system of Serbia. Namely, the emigration of highly educated people from the country was listed as the first of five presented threats (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2016: 33).

Second, in the part related to support to businesses (technology and business incubators, spin-off companies, and science technology parks) and support to innovation, it is underlined that this is the way to create a great number of new jobs and keep the youth in the country (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2016: 10–11).

Third, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development will encourage the return of young researchers that completed PhD studies in foreign universities and give them priority access to projects of general interest or let them manage small-scale projects (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2016: 14–15).

Strengthening cooperation with the diaspora is singled out. The Ministry will undertake special measures to include renowned scientists from the diaspora in the education and science system, through their participation in doctoral studies, then the undergraduate studies, their involvement in advisory bodies and committees, as well as in the process of the review of national projects, and if they want to come back and continue their scientific career in the Republic of Serbia, participation in national projects from the programme of general interest and the management of those projects. In parallel, the Strategy presents a commitment to a completely open research space in Serbia, based on researcher excellence, which would include the engagement of foreign-
ers at universities and institutes through international public calls. Simultaneously, it has been recognized that doctoral schools should be formed in areas with excellent research environment with the aim to attract students from the region and other students from abroad.

The Employment and Social Reform Programme in the Process of Accession to the European Union\textsuperscript{4} was adopted in 2016. The first part of this strategic document provides the analysis of a number of key challenges faced in the area of labour market, human capital and skills, social and child protection, health care and health system and the pension system. These also present some issues related to migration. Thus in the area of labour market the effects of insufficient childbearing and negative migration balance (the negative impacts of reduced participation of working population in the total population in the next thirty years on economic growth, increased pressure on the country’s social systems due to continued population ageing process), unregistered money transfers from abroad as one of the causes of grey economy, but also high unemployment and structural unemployment as important push and pull factors for emigration/immigration of the population from/in Serbia. In the area of human capital and skills, it is underlined that there are no effective mechanisms to ensure student mobility and that the process of recognition of diplomas from outside of Serbia is complicated, expensive and formal (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2016: 23). In the health sphere, the hyper production of health professionals is mentioned due to inappropriate enrolment policy in health schools and universities, and consequentially high unemployment of youth with this background. Emigration of health-care professionals from Serbia is not emphasized. Simultaneously, the measures for mitigating the challenges presented because of the links to migration are listed in the second part of the document. However, it should be pointed out that for the highlighted negative effects of depopulation and ageing, there are no measures sought that would relate to increased immigration in Serbia, nor are the potentials of Serbian diaspora recognized in the function of higher employment or better education in the country. Certainly the implementation of the proposed reforms in the employment, education, social and health policy would contribute, if not to the establishment of a different migration model in Serbia,

then certainly to decreasing emigration and increasing the return of Serbian citizens working/temporarily staying abroad.

The National Youth Strategy for the period 2015–2025, adopted in 2015, lays down, as underlined in the introduction, the activities of all youth policy actors towards the improvement of social position of young people and the creation of conditions for full achievement of their rights and interests in all areas. The document defines nine strategic goals. Each strategic goal is preceded by a situation analysis in the country, documenting the need to define it. Only the situation analysis in the country in relation to the second strategic goal: quality and opportunities for acquiring qualifications and development of competencies and innovation of young people, includes the issue of migration. Namely, it highlights that a large number of highly educated young people have left or wish to live the country, and that for this reason the task of the Strategy is to find a way to ‘to motivate young people to develop professionally and personally and invest their knowledge and skills in social, economic and cultural progress of the country’ (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2015: 16). Specific goals and measures under this strategic goal relate primarily to the educational process itself, that is, to the content adequate for the needs and demands of both the individuals and the society, equal access, inclusion of vulnerable groups and support to talented and gifted youth.

Several representative or in-depth studies have shown the manifest or latent preparedness of youth to live outside of Serbia (Pavlov, 2009: 57; Baćević et al., 2011: 108; Bobić, Vesković-Andelković & Kokotović-Kanazir, 2016: 37). Some of them have also emigrated from the country. Hence the issue of emigration and return of young people from abroad, should be an integral part of the explanation and for the first strategic goal related to improved employment of youth as well as the third goal in relation to the response to difficulty to attain independence because of the poor economic position and undeveloped housing policy for youth.

Strategic goal seven is related to youth mobility, the scope of international cooperation between young people and support to young migrants. Four specific goals are specified with a number of additional measures to achieve this goal. Three of these refer to youth mobility. These are: improved economic, cultural and administrative precondi-
tions for mobility of young women and men; provided conditions for enhanced youth mobility and promotion of international youth cooperation; and improved prevention and fight against irregular migration of young women and men and support for young migrants. 28 measures are defined for these three goals (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2015: 45–48).

Concluding remarks

Critical analysis of the mainstreaming of migration in key development and sector strategies in Serbia is particularly important in Serbia, where migration is not included in the policy, economic, academic or any public discourse in the measure expected (Rašević, Nikitović & Lukić Bošnjak, 2014: 609). General conclusion is that the implementation of these documents would reduce emigration flows from and increase immigration flows into Serbia. Simultaneously, the mainstreaming of the phenomenon of migration in relevant documents is of a different degree and quality, starting from its lacking (for example in the Strategy for Supporting the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises, Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness for the period 2015–2020), or being formally integrated (for example in the Strategy on Promotion and Development of Foreign Investments), or that the phenomenon has not been fully integrated (typical example is the Strategy of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Serbia for the period 2014–2024), to what we feel is well-integrated with awareness on limitations and potentials of migration in the strategies related to the development of industry, education, as well as scientific and technological development.

References


3.2. To Stay or to Leave? On Emigration of Youth from Serbia

Mirjana Bobić
Milica Vesković-Andelković

Introduction

Continuous emigration represents prominent and complex demographic, social, cultural, human, etc., challenge for a country, especially one undergoing long term and harmful process of social transformation and global integration as is a case with Serbia nowadays (without Kosovo and Metohija throughout the text) but other Balkan states as well (Penev, 2010). Ever since the last decade of the 20th century, negative natural increase accompanied with negative net migration starting from 2009 brought about population decline, stark greying and distortion of socio-demographic structures (age and gender, marital, educational, economic, etc.), (Bobić & Blagojević-Hughson, 2012).

Migration trends of youth (15–30)1 in Serbia throughout the 20th century show that internal mobility by far exceeded cross-border one. Namely, in 20th century Serbia and ex-Yugoslavia underwent huge

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1 This age group is defined in concordance with National Youth Strategy. However, we advocate that the referent age span should be modified to 19–35, due to many reasons, such as prolonged schooling, low mobility of young cohorts, late transition into adulthood in Serbia, cultural specificities of Mediterranean countries, etc. (see in: Bobić, Vesković Andelković and Kokotović Kanazir, 2016:25)
changes in all main social domains (political and economic system, social structure, values, etc.). Prior to the Second World War, children were an economic asset of families in a population with a large share of illiteracy. Farming the land prevailed with youth predominantly staying in their places of origin and engaging in agriculture. Patriarchal family was widely spread with most of the internal migrants being women, who got married and moved to their husbands’ houses whereas sons-heirs continued living with their parents in villages. Only a small number attended schools and moved out (quite few were women with their education substituting dowry). Migration was mostly directed towards capital city and big towns where an academic degree could be obtained. Throughout the post-war period very few youth population emigrated abroad in order to gain higher education.

As opposed to the pre-war period, the ensuing period was characterized by an increase in the number of people who left villages and went to cities in search of jobs. It was due to delayed and then accelerated modernization (industrialization and urbanization). Migration of urban youth, also looking for jobs increased. If we leave aside postwar political emigration of Serbia’s youth we may conclude that this labour migration trend has been resuming up to day. The external migration of youth hastened in 1960s, when Serbian citizens went to work in Western European countries as ‘guest workers’. The youth, usually single, emigrated as soon as they graduated from secondary schools (mostly blue collar professions). Although Serbia, i.e. SFRY, was economically more developed than other socialist states (because the state leadership cooperated both with East and West), the living standards were still lower compared to the developed West. Not only was the decision to emigrate a personal benefit and one’s channel of social promotion but also a strategy aimed at improving a financial status of a whole household and thus contributing to diversifying familial income portfolio (Grečić, 2010, Antonić, 2004).

In the 1980s, the work emigration declined, but numbers of emigrants to the West continued to grow due to family reunification policies. Volume of youth departing to study abroad was slow on increase. The overall illiteracy rate was decreasing and volume of population completing tertiary education growing which also raised the number of youth attending undergraduate or graduate studies abroad. The
number and share of highly-educated migrants, however, soared in the 1990s. As opposed to the previous generations, who had left Serbia before the disintegration of SFRY preserving affectionate memories of their homeland, which probably prompted them to plan their return, the new youth exodus in 1990s might be described as ‘one-way ticket’ – they have been leaving never to come back (to the war and poverty in the country that marked the end of the second millennium), (ibidem).

By 2000, the wars in ex-Yugoslavia have ended, overall impoverishment slowly alleviated, but the emigration of young experts has continued despite the political turnover and de-blocking of post socialistic transformation processes. New waves of youth emigration, however, greatly differed from the motivations and flows of those in 1990s. They no longer moved out never to come back and many of them pursued their advanced studies in many foreign countries, rather than just in one and their spatial moves may be qualified rather as mobility than migration (more on these concepts see below). Second, as opposed to the youth emigrants in the 1990s, who were primarily fleeing difficult living conditions in their motherland those leaving Serbia at the turn of millennia up to date are usually urged by need of acquiring new knowledge, applying human capital in different conditions, meeting leading experts in their fields, although searching for jobs and better payment have yet remained remarkable (Bolčić, 2002; Despić, 2015).

This Chapter is aimed at discussing recent empirical data on youth emigration from Serbia and considering its consequences in demography, economy, family, social protection, local development, etc., including also means of combating them. It is structured so that after introduction we present theoretical framework consisting of macro, mezzo and micro paradigms and considerations. Third part brings description of empirical data collection strategy. Fourth part is devoted to the discussion of main findings in light of theoretical assumptions and the conclusion argues for some alternative stances to the phenomenon (‘win win’) and reflects upon potential practical and political implications.

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2 On the basis of representative research of households in Serbia in 1994, Bolčić estimated that around 30.000 highly educated young people (15–34) left Serbia out of 220.000 of all vocations in the period 1990–1994 (Bolčić, 2002)
Theoretical considerations

According to IOM Glossary, migration is defined as ‘the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification’ (IOM, 2011:62). The mobility we refer to in this text corresponds to another notion from the Glossary – ‘circular migration’ meaning ‘The fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination’ (IOM, 2011:19).³

Present day globalization related migration is not a new phenomenon. International migration has always been closely related to major social changes. Long distance mobility expanded in 16th century with the acceleration and spreading of capitalist world market (Castles, 2008). The industrialization of the 19th and the early 20th century instigated the first ‘age of mass migration’, while the ‘second age’ started after 1945. In the last 30 years, international migration has been vastly intensified due to hasten globalization, i.e. modernization in transport, information and communication. Although international migrants comprise only 3% of world population the truth is that the figure conceals some important aspects of the phenomenon. First, present day migration is unprecedentedly speeded up due to technological improvements and it denotes moves across large territories for a short period of time. Migration is claimed to be a ferment of global social change and it is also highly concentrated: there are established ‘emigration cultures’ in certain less developed regions, countries and places of settlement in developed countries (10–25% of the OECD states) and 20–45% in global cities (Castels, 2008). However, far more peo-

³ UN Statistical Division proposed the definition of an international migrant (UN, 1998) as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence with the time element of at least 12 months stay in destination country (Fassman and Musil, 2013:10). Using this time denominator the person is treated as a long time emigrant from departing country and immigrant in receiving one. Short time emigrant is a person who moves out for reasons other than tourism for less than 12 months, but more than 3 months (ibidem:11)
ple move internally within their nation states (Skeldon, 2006). From the point of view of international policies and core countries, contemporary mobility is also perceived as a ‘win win’ option presupposing free circulating of talents, highly educated persons without necessary integrating into local regions. At the same time immigration of those persecuted, fleeing from poverty, warzones, natural disasters as well as low skilled are all treated as involuntary migration, which has to be managed and closely monitored. Therefore, current era of mass migration hides imbalances of power and wealth between center and periphery, North and South and harsh conditions of human exploitation and marginalization (Castels, ibidem, de Haas, 2008, King and Lulle, 2016). When speaking of South and Eastern European countries in the contexts of world system and migration system theories it comes out that international migration is a result of penetration of capitalist markets, wage differentials in between center and semiperiphery (developed countries vs. less developed ones), political imbalances and stratified economic order. This intrusion of core capitalism is facilitated through neoliberal political regimes at semiperiphery (Serbia included), foreign direct investments and multinational corporations (Fassman and Musil, 2013). In this perspective, migration operates as a global work force supply system (Sassen, 1988, cf. Fassman and Musil, 2013:26).

Migration is a response to economic insecurity, unemployment, low living standards (Pau Baizan&Amparo Gonzales-Ferrer, 2016; Portes, 1997; Castels and Miller, 2009). International migration is also a response to major social transformation in the country of origin and labour force demand and labour force restructuring in destination places (Pau Baizan&Amparo Gonzales-Ferrer, 2016). Informalization and de-regularization of western economies introduced a lot of precarious jobs that have been rejected by local, well-educated citizens and therefore brought about dualization of employments. Irregular migrants especially in the South of Europe and elsewhere are welcomed to unskilled jobs, care work, domestic services, agriculture, tourism, etc. It means occupying lower socio economic statuses, working longer and receiving lower wages, thus worse working conditions and entering precariousness. Nevertheless, even these posts can only be accessed through migrants’ social networks which thus increase chances of engagement but at the same time produce concentration of migrants in certain occupations including also their territorialization (Pau Baizan&Amparo Gonzales-Ferrer, 2016).
Migration is shaped by national and international institutional practices i.e. admission policies of destination countries/places which have been changing over time and space (Penninx, 2016). Several periods might be distinguished in policies of immigration and integration in Europe ever since the end of the WWII. So called postwar guest worker scheme along with decolonization (1950–1973), oil crisis and insertion of stronger migration control (1974-till the end of 1980s), East-West migration within Europe and asylum migration (1989–2004), Intra EU mobility and asylum migration (2004 up to date), (Penninx, 2016). Regulations inserted throughout Europe and West are responsible for immigrants’ settling in (residence rights) as well as access to basic services: labor market, housing, education and social protection. Serbia has been one of the countries with low level of policy responses to migration and belated if not still inexistent recognition of mobility as a development resource equally for emigrants, immigrants and transit persons (Rašević, 2016).

Nowadays households create so called migration contract by which the reciprocal obligations of family members are instilled (Stark, 1991). Families support mobility of one or more of its members as a strategy of pooling resources, diversification of revenues and risks minimization. Returns of migration in terms of remittances allow families to make potential investments in education of its members staying behind, as well as healing, housing, agricultural production, consumption, etc.), (Pau Baizan & Amparo Gonzales-Ferrer, 2016, Heckert, 2015, de Haas, 2008).

Migration networks are indispensable brokers of present day migrations and mobility. Network theory of social capital presupposes personal investments in valuable resources aimed at gaining market returns (Lin, 2001). The basic principle of social network lies in interaction among actors. Inasmuch as actors mutually interact they most probably share common sentiments and activities and vice versa. Furthermore, in as much as they share mutual sentiments they most probably perform in a similar way and share resources. Membership in social networks allows a person to create new identities and gain higher social importance, reinforcing social recognition, emotional well-being, mental health, etc., (Lin, 2001). At the level of individuals, personal resources (social, economic, human capital) are of crucial importance when using migration as a viable strategy for combating
poverty, insecurity and downward social mobility at home (Pau Baizán & Amparo González-Ferrer, 2016: 348). Capability to migrate is however selective and is linked to one’s social position in terms of age, gender, education, family status, occupational status and social networks acquisition (ibidem). Migration is also an emancipatory strategy for young adults in the course of their transition to adulthood, and it may act as a liberation path for women under patriarchal structures (HDR, 2009). For vast majority of actors, migration is also a strategy of work portfolio diversification and way of households’ risks mitigating (de Haas, 2008).

Revised model of ‘push and pull’ deals with both macro and micro level determinants of migration (Fassmann, Musil, 2014, cit. fr. Rašević, 2016). People contemplate moving when they consider life opportunities in some other place more attractive compared to home and when benefits of mobility are higher compared to costs. Especially significant are the perceived conditions at labor market operationalized through employment opportunities, wage levels and promotion prospects. Information on the destination country as well as established migrant networks are also of high relevance. Furthermore, some other ‘pull’ factors seem to be also relevant: social benefits, security, ecological protection, open future, democracy, quality of health care, etc. Individuals compare balance of positive and negative factors in both regions of destination and origin and bring decision to/not to move (Rašević, 2016:7).

At the micro level it should be pointed out that freedom for mobility is one of basic human rights and therefore should not be restricted no matter of a reason (Human Development Report, 2009). Nation and country losses related to youth emigration and especially skills are usually tackled through pessimistic or neo-Marxist discourse: costs of education, health and other services, not to mention their families’ investments (de Haas, 2008). However, instead of mourning over emigration and blaming migrants themselves for leaving a homeland whatsoever, more efficient ways of mainstreaming migration into human development should be put in place such as opening up existing emigration channels, ensuring human rights for all kinds of migrants, decreasing costs of migration, strengthening internal mobility, finding solution that benefit both local communities who receive migrants and places of origin, etc., (Human Development Report: 4).
Human capital development through education migration is prolonged investment by which risks are diversified across economic sectors and geographic regions and produce gains to both migrants and their families in a long run (Heckert, 2015). Human capital is personal asset and encompasses both certified degrees and skills gained through special trainings, work experience, etc. Personal investment in education and training presupposes expected returns and it can be well transferred by migration, whereas destination countries accumulate brain gain while origin countries are faced with brain loss. Migrant him/herself might benefit through expected wage differences owing to human capital investment and migration but brain waste may occur as well if migrant cannot find a job according to qualifications especially in long term perspective (Fassman and Musil, 2013).

Youth migration is on the rise in developing countries and it is a strategy of enhancing life chances and choices through both domestic and international mobility (Heckert, 2015). International migration of young people is however usually tackled as a problem and drawback for population and a state, since it produces demographic direct and indirect losses, losing of its intellectual potential and modernization driver, etc. Usually, calculations are made on the basis of investments in upbringing, education, human and cultural capital accumulation all of which are going to be exploited by some destination country. However, youth migration might also be revisited from another neoclassical or optimistic perspective. Herein, potential gains from youth migration might be multiple: 1) better employment and education opportunities; 2) lower opportunity costs; 3) longer life expectancy to realize benefits out of migration and 4) in as much as one possesses social networks probability of work emigration might could be even tripled (Pau Baizan & Amparo Gonzales-Ferrer, 2016).

Our Chapter strives to discuss a phenomenon in a complex way, both from the standpoint of a loss and potential gain and relying onto a paradigm of ‘migration development nexus’ (Mitrović, 2015). The latter came to the fore in 2000s striving to overcome binary divisions in the discourse of international migrations (temporary vs. permanent, forced vs. voluntary, low skilled vs. high skilled, emigration vs. immigration, 4 As authors claim there is a new ‘win win’ option emerging in a literature on migration, by which all 3 parties might become benefactors: destination places, origin ones and migrants. However this seems to be very complex linkage and therefore needs further investigation (Fussman and Musil, 2013).
losses vs. gains, etc.,) while trying to connect distinct geographies (states of destination and origin), temporalities (migration and integration as finalized processes and mobility and settling in as ongoing adjustments including also returns to homeland), (King and Lulle, 2016).

The fact is that youth emigration from Serbia is instigated by several outstanding structural drives such as: labor force shortages and labor demand posed by Western wealthier but ageing societies, lack of opportunities for the youth in general to get any (decent) employment, let alone professionals who primarily search modes to improve expertise, acquire higher level and quality education, better paid posts, etc. Secondly, long term emigration from Serbia enabled a creation of huge diaspora community all over the world (Filipović, 2012) and almost each and every individual and household preserve strong ties with compatriots abroad, whose financial support preserves everyday living up to date. If we put aside potential immigration flows to Serbia projected for the future, we would particularly stress here the date of expected EU integration which will probably mark extreme population exodus (Nikitović, 2013).

Therefore what we try to push as an argument here is that Serbia could prosper much better by plausibly using its social networks with diaspora and emigrants, especially those who left recently, in 1990s and afterwards. Owing to the new IT revolution they are already in permanent touch with their countrymen via cheap phone calls, Skype, Facebook, etc. In an era of low cost and fast transportation vast majority of them not only frequently visit home and retain close relations with local citizens but they nonetheless create transnational business enterprises or are about to do so. Not only do they send large remittances but they possess high social ones, too (know how, professional knowledge, proactive attitudes, etc). Notwithstanding great losses related to youth mobility in terms of demographic, economic and social ones, i.e. negative natural growth, ageing, distortion of age and gender pyramid, lack of work force and consequently insufficient pension budgets, social, cultural and other consequences, there seems to be possible to advocate for some more up to date policy responses which would benefit individuals (wishing to move), their local communities and economy and society at large.

Therefore we proceed with the analysis of same basic data on migration on a state level. Then we turn to migration intentions of youth
in 8 middle scale towns in Serbia in order to find out how large is the readiness to move and conclude by giving some potential political recommendation for overcoming the losses in a longer term.

On the basis of official statistics and empirical data we will present basic features of youth emigrants and their push and pull motives from various local communities of Serbia.

Methodology and data sources

Comprehensive research of migration – based on both statistical (e.g. census) data and sociological surveys – always is accompanied by series of problems and constraints regarding the coverage of a phenomenon, as well as the quality and comparability of collected data. Census data do not provide sufficient information on both distances and directions of migration flows. Some limitations appear in the interpretation of data obtained in field researches on migration in Serbia, particularly at the lower territorial levels (municipalities, settlements), due to the unreliable migration statistics at the local level or lack of full and systematical insight into population mobility5.

In this Chapter we used statistical demographic and comparative demographic method when dealing with census data. A case study method was applied in a survey research in selected eight towns in Central Serbia and Vojvodina. It should be pointed out, however, that this survey was not designed to capture migrations but instead was focused on territorial capital of inhabitants living in selected towns in Serbia. Only part of the questionnaire was devoted to potential migration intentions as well as returns. Therefore the scope of the research of migrations was pretty restricted. Besides this, representative surveys were also carried out among youth in two counties in southern Serbia (Jablanicki and Pcinjski Okrug), (Bobic & Veskovic-Andelkovic, 2016). Altogether we have used three sources of empirical evidence in trying

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5 Serbia’s territory is divided into five NUTS 2 statistical regions since the SORS (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia) has not possessed the required data for the Autonomous Province (AP) of Kosovo and Metohija ever since 1998 and did not conduct the 2011 Census there. Therefore all data on migration as well as census and vital demographics are based on data on Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija.
to gather some evidence on youth migration. It should be noted that, as opposed to statistical sources the quoted empirical researches had focused primarily on migration experiences and migration potential, i.e. both on prior mobility (internal or external) and future plans eventually. The latter is especially relevant for developing policies and, in particular, designing measures to counter push factors perceived in local communities. When it comes to explanation of the empirical evidence we would basically resort to using paradigms related to contemporary globalization, socioeconomic developments at the semiperiphery of world capitalism and revised push and pull model.

Data on the number of Serbia’s citizens living/working abroad (the so-called external migration) have been collected and published in censuses ever since 1971 (1971, 1981, 1991, 2002 and 2011). The accuracy of the information on migrants and the comparability of data over timeline are ever-present challenges of both Serbian as well as more developed statistical offices. For instance, estimates say that the under-registration of emigrants in the 1981 and 1991 censuses stood at around 30% and that their registration increased in the subsequent censuses (Predojević, 2011).

Information on Serbian citizens living abroad in the 2011 census was obtained only from the members of their families residing in Serbia, while the possibility of conducting the census abroad was missed, which, again, directly affects both the coverage of the emigrants’ population and the reliability of the gathered data.

As already noted, two recent empirical researches were used as supplementary data sources in this Chapter. These two field works were complex and carried out in several phases. The first, entitled ‘Territorial Capital in Serbia – Structural and Action Potential of Local and Regional Development’, was undertaken by the Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy University of Belgrade in 2013 and 2014. Case study method was applied wherefore data refer only to the municipalities in which they were collected and cannot be generalised to the broader social-territorial zones. Representative samples were designed in eight central and northern Serbian cities: Kragujevac (n=376), Novi Pazar (n=295), Užice (n=321), Šabac (n=342), Sombor (n=288), Zrenjanin (n=304), Leskovac (n=301) and Zaječar (n=313). The researchers first collected data in central Serbia (in 2013), selected against several criteria: 1) that the city had the status of a functional
urban area of national importance;\textsuperscript{6} 2) that it was big enough to enable the implementation of endogenous development and multi-actor and multi-scalar management strategies; and 3) that the city was not located in one of the most developed regions (Vojvodina-Belgrade) or the least developed regions (southern and eastern Serbia) in terms of its degree of urbanisation and infrastructural and institutional capacities under the NUTS 2 classification.

We also used data collected within another empirical research for our comparative analysis. This research was conducted in 2010 and 2013\textsuperscript{7} by the NGO Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) within the joint UN PBILD project ‘Strengthening Capacity for Inclu-

\textsuperscript{6} Belgrade is the only Serbian city with the status of a European metropolitan growth area. Only Novi Sad and Niš have the status of functional urban areas of international importance, while 16 towns including the selected ones have the status of functional urban areas of national importance (Petrović, 2014:87).

\textsuperscript{7} The first stage of the research was conducted in 2010, with the aim of investigating migration situation, living conditions and progress of the youth population living in this territory and any problems in the co-existence of people of different nationalities in southern Serbia. Apart from the further deterioration of economic trends in entire Serbia (especially in the south, traditionally characterized by low economic standards) in 2011, and especially in late 2012 and early 2013, an incident broke out in late 2012, when a monument was erected to commemorate the former members of the LAPBM (ethnic Albanian ‘Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa’). The Serbian Government’s order to remove the monument in January 2013 provoked fierce reactions among the ethnic Albanian population. The ongoing talks between official Belgrade and Priština brokered by Brussels indicated that all developments in Kosovo and Metohija reflected on South Serbia, with a large ethnic Albanian population. Namely, during the talks, a demand was voiced that Albanians in south Serbia be granted the same status as Serbs in northern parts of Kosovo. These events significantly affected the shaping of public opinion in the whole state, particularly in these districts, and led to higher inter-ethnic tensions, further exacerbating life in this part of the country. All these developments encouraged the UN representatives to repeat the research, in order to verify the previously assumed interplay between socio-economic factors and the lives of youth, including also migration prospects and inter-ethnic relations. A comparative analysis of data collected in both stages seemed necessary and invaluable to achieve that purpose. However, as a thorough analysis of the effects of turbulent political events on migratory potential goes beyond the pre-defined framework of this paper, we decided to use only more recent base of data collected within the second stage of the project, implemented in March 2013.
sive Local Development in South Serbia’ and ‘Promoting Peace Building in South Serbia’. The project involved a survey of citizens living in the territory of the so-called ‘second hot emigration zone in Serbia’ (Penev & Predojević-Despić, 2012: 50), the Jablanica (N=830) and Pčinj Counties (N=848), notably, in the following five local towns: Bujanovac, Preševo, Medveđa, Leskovac and Vranje. Research aimed at collecting data from the citizens living in this region on huge emigration, the life and status of youth and constantly sensitive inter-ethnic relations in this multi-ethnic region. It needs to be noted that this was a representative empirical research in two stages of research tailored to respond to the specific needs of the project, wherefore the analyses of the obtained data were generalised at the district rather than the city level.

The first group of relevance to this Chapter comprises respondents with migration experience, identified by their responses to direct questions on their former places of residence, similarly formulated in both researches of territorial capital (‘How long have you been living in this city?’ ‘Where have you lived the longest?’). The second group comprises respondents expressing the intention to migrate, identified by their responses to questions about their future plans. Out-migration plans and directions were identified within the project on territorial capital in Serbia on the basis of the respondents’ answers to the question ‘What are your plans regarding your place of residence?’ referring to those with migration intentions.

The out-migration intentions and directions were identified within the UN PBILD project on the basis of the respondents’ responses on two questions: ‘Have you considered moving from your place of residence because of your job or for another reason?’ and ‘Where were you planning on moving?’

Given that empirical fieldworks are the only possible sources for analysing migration motivations, the so-called push and pull factors were set as the priority during their processing. We placed particular emphasis on the young population (under 30 years of age). Our interpretation of the results was guided by the micro-analytical model—which is in accordance with the theoretically most favoured approach to migration, that is, our approach focuses on the individual.

The conclusions we drew about the migration experiences and motivations are based on the respondents’ replies to questions about their past and, in that sense (if their honesty is not brought into ques-
tion), drawn conclusions should not suffer from any shortcomings, i.e. their reliability should not be brought into question. Analogously, we drew our conclusions on migration potential by analyzing their responses to the questions about their future plans. These conclusions cannot be treated as absolutely accurate due to the lack of data on the ultimate outcomes of their plans. Namely, research has shown that the vast majority of individuals abandon their initial migration plans (Pavlov, 2009; Božić, Burić 2005; Fassmann & Hintermann 1998) due to various barriers, such as financial and emotional costs, legal constraints, etc. Furthermore, our analysis was additionally burdened by the heterogeneity of the collected data – they were collected in two separate researches, wherefore we drew only tentative conclusions from our comparison of the databases. This is also the reason why we will, for the most part, present the analysis of the data of these researches of towns and districts separately.

Despite the possible limitations of the methodological approach and reservations about the accuracy of the data processed, we think that study on migration trends based on empirical research is useful for several reasons: first of all, the case study enables us to check adopted theories on the profile of potential migrants and compare them with the migration profile based on official data. Second, this is the only way to collect qualitative data on the respondents’ views about the social, economic and cultural determinants of their local communities, which provide insight in the motivations for potential spatial mobility. The results of these analyses are the most relevant in practical terms as they provide the basis and guidelines for developing national migration policies (which population should be targeted and which factors need to be taken into consideration to keep up the potential migrants from leaving or to encourage their circular movements and investments in a homeland), i.e. for mainstreaming migration into local and global social and economic sustainable development.

Discussion

Comparison of the shares of the migrant and homeland populations aged 15–30 in Serbia based on official census statistics clearly shows pronounced discrepancies. Share of youth in the external migration population (23.4%) is higher than their share in motherland
population (18.4%). Viewed from that perspective, the demographic profile of young persons working/living abroad can be assessed as more favourable, in view of age as a biological, demographic and socio-economic development resource.

Figure 3.2.1: Comparative outlook of youth emigration (15–30) and population in Serbia.

Source: Census data, 2011 (Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia)

Census data disclose that on average youth population is more numerous abroad compared to those living in the country. This is especially prominent with females, namely around 7% more young women reside across borders compared to domiciles.

Although the number of youth external migrants has been growing from census to census, their number still lags far behind the number of youth not even considering moving out of their places of residence although they are aware of the hardships in their local communities. The first reason lies in the selectiveness of migrants in terms of not only age and gender, but economic capital i.e. financial status as an important determinant of modern-day migration (Bobić & Babović, 2013). Namely, in order to achieve one's intention of emigrating one needs the initial capital to fund the basic costs (journey, housing, food, etc.), which cannot be covered by most scholarships as well as for the time when the person searches for a job. Second,
individuals are embedded into local society of their country of origin and, thus, are emotionally attached thus preserving feelings of insecurity of living elsewhere. Therefore, although dissatisfied with life in their local communities, many young people rarely realize mobility as our researches evidence demonstrates bellow.

Migration is a risky undertaking and the proponents of prospect theory advocate for stability as a basic personal need whereas mobility is treated as an adjustment in globalized risky societies (Morrison and Clark, 2016). Loss aversion is related to people’s attributing emotional values to commodities they are used to on a daily basis and not only rational calculus. Commodities such as housing and other valuable goods imply not only market exchange but also users’ values, personal attachment and reference points all of which boosts people’s immobility and strengthen risk aversion related to migration. Mobility presupposes information collection and high transaction costs including also erroneous decisions. Moving requests selling housing for their owners (e.g. parents with children) which marks a big decision since it is the outcome of enormous financial and social capitals at least for persons moving voluntarily.

Figure 3.2.2: Youth plans for the future regarding place of residence, Serbia, 2013–2015 (in %).

Source: Own calculations
Figure 3.2.2. provides an overview of potential migrants aged 15–30 from towns in Serbia based on the above empirical data. Over half of young respondents have no intention of moving out. The above data also reveal that the share of potential youth emigrants is higher compared to the ratio of potential internal migrants in 5 out of 8 towns and both counties in the south, with the exception of Užice, Leskovac and Zaječar, where the situation is opposite. The list of their potential destination is headed by European Union countries, although some respondents also mentioned Australia (2.4% in Užice, 1.6% in Zrenjanin and 3.8% in Leskovac), Russia (2.4% in Užice, 1.8% in Kragujevac, 1.6% in Sombor, 2.7% in Zaječar and 1.6% in Leskovac) and Turkey (4.8% in Novi Pazar – which was expected due to the fact that many citizens have already emigrated there and because of ethno-religious affiliations).

Figure 3.2.3: Reasons for leaving the country (push).

![Graph showing reasons for leaving the country](image.png)

Source: own calculations

As we can see, unemployment is the key motivation for emigration highlighted by young respondents in all towns and the Pčinjski District. In the view of the Jablanički District, unemployment is just as grave an issue as the wider economic problems – 47.4%. What is striking, given the recent developments in southern Serbia, is that youth in Central Serbia and Vojvodina – but not in southern Serbia – recognize, to a greater or lesser extent a threat to security as a problem of their communities, which prompts them to consider cross border mobility. General poverty
in the south of the country appears to have been fully substituting other problems, including those caused by the long lasting tensions among Albanian, Serb and other ethnic communities living there.

The reasons behind considering moving to another country reflect the problems which youth identified in their local communities as indicated in Figure 3.2.4.

**Figure 3.2.4: Youth Population’s Motivations for Emigration (pull) (in %).**

![Bar chart showing youth population’s motivations for emigration](chart.png)

*Source: Own calculations*

Better job, in terms of better-payments and career prospects, as well as higher quality of life, entailing healthier and less stressful style prevail in responses. Marriage was specified by as few as 16.6% of the youth respondents in Kragujevac and 4.6% in Sombor. However one in 5 young persons in Zrenjanin and almost one out of four in Šabac advocate for schooling as a reason for cross border mobility. Education is one of the major motives for internal mobility of youth especially those residing in towns and places without university centers.

Work related issues are also among important reasons specified by the young ‘mobile’ respondents. Inhabitants of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEES) have high rate of international migration since 1990 due to demographic, economic and political imbalances, but
the principal reason is the wish to improve living standards (Okolski, 1994). Relative economic and social deprivation of CEE compared to EU bolsters migration. According to EUROSTAT from 2014 unemployment rate of young persons in Serbia aged 15–24 is among the highest in Europe (47.1%) and as such is similar to Spain, Italy, Greece and Croatia (Tomanović and Stanojević, 2015). Among those aged 15–29 the unemployment rate is 38%. Recent sociological surveys carried out on representative samples and in depth interviews in 2011, then Survey on work force (Statistical Office Republic of Serbia, 2008–2014), and survey on revenues and life conditions (SILC) from 2013 and 2014 have all pointed out that as many as 50% of youth is unemployed, whereas almost 60% work under precarious conditions, without basic rights deriving from stable contracts (e.g., paid leave, social and health protection, etc.) in grey economy and they often hold underpaid posts (Tomanović, Stanojević, Ljubičić, 2016). After finishing education only one in three young persons gest employed and after five years, only one in two. Seven years later vast majority of them have flexible working arrangements, seasonal and temporary jobs, even those with tertiary education. It looks as if it becomes more and more difficult to obtain basic human rights out of stable posts and work contracts (Stanojević, 2016).

We can sum up empirical researches from Serbia by stating that both problems and needs of Serbia’s youth fully reflect the general social situation in the country. This is corroborated in another researches of this population conducted in 2010 and 2011 (Jarić & Živadinović, 2012; Mojić & Petrović, 2013). Lack of trust in the stability and sustainability of the social order in Serbia is the main reason why youth are contemplating emigration since they believe their futures are more secure elsewhere (Jarić & Živadinović, 2012; Mojić & Petrović, 2013). The results of latter researches are consistent with our findings also with respect to the conclusion that unemployment and low living standards are the chief motivations for potential out-migration (ibidem). These facts, as well as the results indicating that youth are willing to change their lives by moving to another place in Serbia because of work provide major inputs for state policy makers. At the same time, the decision makers should attach utmost priority to the creation of new jobs, as well as vocational education tailored to the needs of the labour market, if they opt to keep young people in the country and revitalize the local communities – demographically, economically, socially, culturally and ecologically.
Similar pushing factors for youth migration holding tertiary education and with scientific ambitions were found in Ukraine (Lubov, Hvozdovych, 2012:73–74): 1) the high unemployment rate; 2) low level of employment according to the specialty; 3) the low level of material and technical basis for scientific research; 4) the salary divergence in Ukraine and abroad; 5) institutional barriers to perform international cooperation; 6) the poor innovation infrastructure, complicated mechanism of knowledge transfer and imperfect venture capital market; 7) housing problems and others. The strive for mobility of young students and researchers from Serbia are equivocal, namely lack of opportunities to improve knowledge base in the country and low level of state funding of science and research (Pudar Draško, Krstić and Radovanović, 2015). Those who return to Serbia have to do so either due to visa expiry or inability to find jobs and stay any longer. Once they return they face huge obstacles in terms of diploma recognition and nostrification of degrees attained abroad.

Conclusion: Toward a ‘win win’ strategy?

Other than immediate losses related to migration so called ‘knowledge migration’ in various forms of outsourcing, consultancy, scientific collaborations, etc., is very widespread in less developed countries with high shares of young people with tertiary educations. Already in 1995, Russian scientists warned about increased hiring of their specialists and professionals in Western companies calling it a new form of ‘brain drain’ (Khromov, 1995, cf. Lubov, S., Y.Hvozdovych, 2012:77). However many Asian countries (India, China, Korea, and Thailand) have succeeded not only to overcome emigration of the skills but also to find out ways to transform this drawback into brain circulation or even returns (Zweig, D., Fung, C.S., 2008, cf. ibidem). They instigated programs such as: fundraising for supporting of returnees’ scientific activities, postdoctoral centers with posts for overseas’ PhDs, ‘incubators’ in hi-tech zones for overseas’ returnees, establishment of world class universities, attraction of venture capital, better living and working conditions for returnees, diverse and active cooperation with diaspora organizations.
Migration of young people will evidently continue in Serbia because of strong pushing motives and globalization of labour markets, work migration and intellectual mobility whatsoever. In any case social, demographic and economic implications for the country will be outstanding and should be got over by appropriate state actions directed toward those who stay as well as those who wish to leave.

First it is the economic empowerment of young people in Serbia which should be enforced by creating socioeconomic conditions to decrease unemployment and make jobs more stable. The second important issue is also tackling the regional developmental disparities and strengthening internal mobility so that not only 3 big cities have been burgeoning whereas the vast majority of territories especially in the southern and eastern parts are being depopulated and devastated. Many young respondents who participated in upper mentioned sociological surveys expressed willingness either to move or to commute on the daily basis provided they could get jobs and sustain high travel costs.

Our field data have approved for considerations laid out in theoretical part of the Chapter. Evidently there are strong structural drives pushing for emigration related to precariousness of social position of the vast majority of population and youth particularly on one side but youth’s agency on the other (strive to find a way out) including also human capital enriching especially for skilled ones. Long term emigration from the country ever since the beginning of the 20th century up to date has contributed to creation of a well-established diaspora and migrants’ social networks. Latter also known as chains of migration do act as important prerequisite for those reflecting to move out and as researchers show they even triple chances of realization of mobility. However, other than getting well-paid posts, young persons also strive for a good quality of life, separation from family of origin, union formation and childbearing. Economic independence is a precondition for transition into adulthood as well as housing, quality education, health and social protection and population policy measures. Work family balance, as well as the raise of cultural consumption, seems also to be important asset of life satisfaction especially at local level. Migration comes out as a response for frustrating in meeting these basic human rights and a way out of bleak everyday living.
Finally we would enlist 3 major goals in terms of turning migration losses into potential gains for which the state actors should find ways and resources to support them:

   Instead of suppressing mobility should however been supported and/or facilitated by state (bilateral) agreements, mediation of chambers of trade, National employment agencies, etc. Diploma recognition of those who returned to Serbia and accreditation of degrees accrued in Serbia abroad would be also important means for easier temporary and circular moves. Also, decreasing of costs of those who wish to emigrate as well as those who wish to return. Agreements with most emigration countries should be enforced as well as programs of skills mobility (through Universities, like Marie Sklodovska Curie Actions, H2020, DAAD, Erasmus Mundus and other EU programs). Reducing of barriers for employment and startup companies (bureaucratic procedures) for returnees wishing to invest in Serbia is also of high relevance.

2. Transfer of social remittances, ‘know how’, new values and beliefs;
   Modern interactive means of communications enable virtual research centers which maintain and develop collaboration with those who work and live abroad – through migration networks. Diaspora, emigrants and returnees are major social mediators and facilitators of cooperation and instigators of local developmental projects including also virtual diaspora university and networks of knowledge (Filipović, 2012)

3. Transfer of financial capital (savings, remittances, investments);
   Financial capital investments might boost small and medium scale enterprises, ethno-business, family firms, etc., which could be not only providing for living and consumption in homeland but also be established as a developmental resource, especially at local level as has sporadically already been a case. This kind of endeavors are usually instigated by members of diaspora as well as returnees (see: Bobić, Vesković-Andelković, Kokotović-Kanazir, 2016)
References


3.3. Migration and Security Policy of the Republic of Croatia

Ružica Jakešević

Introduction

In the longer historical perspective, human migration has never been as closely associated with security concerns as it is now, in the first decades of the 21st century. A combination of factors has contributed to the notion that, under specific circumstances, migration can present a security challenge to various referent objects (states, societies, individuals – citizens or migrants). In this Chapter, the analysis is focused on the Republic of Croatia, the newest EU member state, whose territory served as a corridor for the safe transfer of migrants to their final destinations, mainly Germany during 2015/2016. The specificity of its position throughout migration crisis stems from the fact that while it is an EU member state, it is not the member of the Schengen zone. During the six months period (September 2015-March 2016), various domestic political actors in Croatia took different positions regarding the nature of migration that Europe was facing at that time, and consequently advocated for different approaches and policies. There were also some bilateral disagreements with all the neighboring countries on the route – Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia. Almost a year after the Balkan route had been closed, the general assessment is that Croatia was practicing humanitarian approach, allowing migrants to cross its territory, providing short-term assistance and shelter as well as organized transfer to the Schengen borders. Such approach enjoyed wider public support, since people tended to sympathize with refugees,
with whom they shared common refugee experience. Additionally, there are some arguments ‘that people generally respond positively to refugees in initial stages, given their humanitarian plight’ (Beswick & Jackson, 2015: 75). Nevertheless, as domestic and international political circumstances had changed throughout 2016, there are some clear indicators that in the case of possible reopening of the Balkan route, Croatia would practice stronger border controls and that it would apply more security-oriented approach. These indicators are visible in the public discourse, as well as in some legislative measures regulating the role of different security actors in practicing border management.

This Chapter analyzes the implications of migration, particularly mass and irregular, on the security policy of the Republic of Croatia. Given the fact that security policy of each country largely depends not only on internal, but also on a number of external factors, the analysis will include broader trends that have recently affected the increased inclusion of migration flow into security discourse. In addition, relying on the theory of securitization and social constructivism, the Chapter explains the process of including migration, as so-called non-military challenge, into the scope of security studies.

Therefore, the first part of this Chapter refers to the theoretical analysis of interconnectedness between migration and security. What follows is the analysis of the overall Croatian experience with migration, which was very specific during the 1990s due to extensive forced migration. Since the character of migration trends in Croatia had changed at the beginning of 2000s, the Chapter continues with description of how (and if) these trends affected its migration and security policy. Finally, it provides an overview of the effect that recent European migration/refugee crisis had on the development of Croatian security policy. Hence, this Chapter is based on the hypothesis that the global securitization of migration and the recent European refugee crisis have affected the changes in the Croatian security policy.

Migration and security – theoretical framework and trends

Migration has been present as the global phenomenon for centuries, but its existence as the security phenomenon is of more recent date. Global migration trends have been widely discussed and theorized
about within many scholarly disciplines, since migration presents multilayered phenomenon which stems from a combination of social, economic, environmental, political and security factors. Increasing number of migrants worldwide – 244 million in 2015 – (UN, 2016: 2) gives a strong impetus for the research of the impact of migration in different sectors – including security. Therefore, describing growing number of migrants worldwide in terms of ‘crisis’ has a powerful political connotation. Such trends have prompted more frequent consideration of migration from the perspective of security studies (Weiner, 1992–1993).

Given the dominance of military component of a security and the dominance of a state as almost exclusive referent object during the second half of the 20th century, it can be said that the issue of migration relatively recently entered into security studies. This happened with changes in the global political agenda during the 1980s (Wohlfeld, 2014: 61) and in the early 1990s, along with the broader process of re-conceptualization of security. In this context, the nature of migration and way of thinking about it changed significantly, and consequently it was increasingly presented as one of new, non-military security challenges (Huysmans and Squire: 2009). In order to systematise these new circumstances, a group of scientists (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde) within the Copenhagen School of security studies have developed analytical tool which consists of a combination of the sectoral approach to security and the concept of securitization (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Emmers, 2010: 134). The sectoral approach, introduced by Buzan in the mid-1980s, presented a major contribution to the ‘expansion’ of security, which went beyond military sector and included political, economic, societal and environmental ones (Buzan, 1991). Within the concept of securitization, developed by Ole Wæver, security is treated as a product of the *speech act*, since it analyzes the way in which important (political) actors attach security meaning to certain political issues, which then demand action or use of measures surpassing regular political procedures (Waever, 1995). The issue of contemporary migration is increasingly being analysed within this theoretical framework.

Along with the scholarly debate, the issue of migration and movement of people for different reasons became inevitable feature of national strategic security documents of various countries (Adamson, 2006), as well as special policy area, which is increasingly being regulated at national, regional and global level. It also became the issue
which is highly internationalized, since external migration is becoming predominant form of movement in globalized world. Being an ‘external’ activity, which involves movement of people across borders and territory of at least two countries (country of origin and receiving country), but usually involves crossing the border of several countries (transit countries) or even continents, migration has become the subject of discussion and bilateral, regional and international regimes, the aim of which is to provide certain common sets of views, procedures and actions in order to assure the proper management of this phenomenon. Despite the fact that the issue of migration has been regulated by the norms of international law as well as by laws of each individual country, it still causes disputes in bilateral and multilateral relations.

Very current issue of migration towards the territory of the EU member states has stimulated debates regarding some common EU policies and regimes (such as migration, asylum and border management), which point to the existing disagreements on the next steps regarding the development of Common European Asylum System and EU migration policy. However, international migration proved to be quite powerful tool for political mobilization on the domestic political scene in many countries, whereby securitizing discourse is being increasingly used by political groups which oppose immigration for various reasons. There are several groups of reasons/arguments which are frequently being used as possible challenges/threats to different entities (or referent objects).

First, there are internal security reasons, which emphasize the possibility of deteriorating public safety with the increasing crime rate among migrant populations. However, these often superficial assessments are rarely supported by precise empirical data on the one hand, and rarely take a deeper account of the root causes of certain crime rates among migrants, on the other (for example, low level of social inclusion, lack of integration measures, denied access to labour market, housing or education system) (Mears, 2001; Bell & Machin, 2013)

Second, there are economic arguments, which are used in order to point out to the costs of temporary or permanent integration of migrants and social rights they enjoy, without contributing to the system at the same time. However, proper integration policies should enable migrants an access to the labour market, for the benefit of migrants themselves, but also for the local population and the state economy.
Another aspect of this dimension is connected with the situation within labour markets, where (majority of) migrants fill in the job posts for which the local population is not interested. However, it is a paradox that even in such circumstances, migrants are accused of ‘stealing’ jobs from the local populations, as well as lowering the cost of labour.

Third group of arguments is explained through the prism of societal security, whereby the identity of receiving community/society presents the referent object of security (Roe, 2005). The question here is how the new population is going to affect cultural practices, way of life, values and the sense of ‘we’ within receiving society. Hence, the value which is the primary object of societal security is social identity.

Fourth, national security concerns are being increasingly pointed out, especially after September 11th (Adamson, 2006) and the beginning the era of global terrorism. Additional dimensions or favourable conditions for the increased securitization of the migration into Europe can be found in broader circumstances which indicated a growing threat of terrorism (terrorist attacks in France and Belgium), (sex) crimes against women committed by migrants (attacks on women in some German cities), economic hardships in some EU member states as well as concerns for societal security’ (Jakešević & Tatalović, 2016: 1248).

All of these aspects and many others are tackled within the increasing body of literature which deals with migration-security nexus. However, it is generally perceived that discussions regarding the nexus between migration and security in the European context have primarily kept focus on security of citizens (as those who possess certain set of rights within certain political unit) and the state (Wohlfeld, 2014: 68), while it is rarely about the security of migrants – their human security. One feature of the research has traditionally been the focus on ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ migration and it has often been emphasized that different forms of irregular movement of people have clearer security dimensions than projected migration. It is worth noting here that in the context of the recent migration flows into Europe, due to deteriorating security situation in the wider region of Middle East, proponents of securitization often emphasized that refugees actually crossed borders illegally, mainly without valid documents, outside the official border crossings.

The terminology or the language used is of critical importance in determining the nexus between (state) security and migration. In this respect, Elspeth Guild points out that ‘different words which we use
to describe the individual, carry different implied understandings of the relationship of belonging and security’ (Guild, 2009: 21). During the recent European migration crisis, proponents of different camps (traditional security vs. humanitarian approach) used different terminology for people wishing to enter the EU – mainly terms ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’. Although there is a definition of refugee, which is provided in the 1951 UN Convention on status of refugees and stateless persons, there is a very vivid debate about the validity of that definition in contemporary circumstances, especially since the term and the concept of security has also undergone significant changes during the last six decades. Indeed, particularly peace studies and critical security studies have pointed out to so many new levels, forms and objects of security, as well as sources of threat and ways in which certain entities (including people as individuals) can be endangered.

There are even more detailed distinctions within the term ‘migrant’, which suggest that there are different categories of migrants, who are entitled to different forms of protection – for example, economic vs. political migrants. Since the economic security is widely debated within contemporary security studies, and since economic hardships and low level of development can be quite interlinked with traditional security threats (Beswick & Jackson, 2015) and hence can present very powerful push factor for migration, it is disputable whether it is useful to make such clear distinction.

Croatia and contemporary migration – regional and European context

In recent years, international migration has been increasingly put in the context of security challenges faced by modern states. Processes in international community that started at the beginning of the 1990s were marked by conflicts in different parts of the world, which have had serious consequences for security and stability of many countries. Primarily, the internal conflicts that were encouraged by ethnic or religious differences were generally very long lasting and, as a consequence, produced an extensive migration of internal and external character. ‘Securitization of refugee crises and illegal migration is an increasing trend in different parts of the world. Refugee crises are the
result of numerous wars and conflicts that are characteristic of the contemporary age. With growing number of migrants from underdeveloped to developed countries, migration presents increasingly complex social phenomenon that is affected by many factors, such as political, economic, environmental and religious (Tatalović & Malnar, 2015: 24).

Conflicts which had occurred following the process of dissolution of the SFRY, affected large areas, primarily in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and resulted in forced migration of massive volumes. This forced migration consequently led to changes in the ethnic structure in post-Yugoslav states. Therefore, it can be said that almost all states that emerged out of the Yugoslav dissolution had considerable experience in the management of a large number of refugees and displaced persons during the 1990s, while at the same time hundreds of thousands of people also found refuge in various European countries, where they were granted rights according to the rules of international protection.

Thus, until the end of the 1990s, Croatian experience with contemporary migration had predominantly been related to the forced migration as the consequence of conflict caused by the disintegration of former Yugoslavia (see Kranjec & Župarić-Iljić, 2014). In earlier periods, economic and political reasons were the main push factors for migration from Croatia, which is why it has been characterized as emigration rather than immigration country (Jakešević & Tatalović, 2016). This characteristic has been maintained until the present day, given that the trend of emigration for economic reasons is still very intense. Emigration of Croatian citizens in recent years is a source of major concern, especially due to the fact that it’s usually young and educated population which decides to emigrate. For example, in 2014 the number of emigrants outnumbered the number of immigrants in Croatia (Eurostat, 2016). Such trends have a negative impact not only on the economy, but indirectly on national security as well.

Besides the fact that Croatia, as well as countries in its immediate surroundings, presents a source for many economic migrants, the

8 For example, according to German Federal statistical office, 50,628 Croatian citizens moved to Germany in 2015, while at the same time 12,918 moved out of Germany. At the end of 2015, 297,895 Croatian citizens lived in Germany. Available at: http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/evo-koliko-se-hrvata-uselilo-i-iselilo-iz-njemacke-u-2015-godini-1070100 (accessed January 27th 2017).
country represents a transit area in terms of broader migration flows. Due to its geographical position it is recognized as one of the routes used by irregular migrants to get to richer countries in Western Europe. This transit character was very visible during the last (mostly forced) mass migration flow, which Europe was faced with during 2015/2016. Due to the fact that leaders of the EU member states could not agree on a common position and approach towards migration crisis, this situation has led to the abolition of some of the fundamental principles of the functioning of the EU (for example, free movements within the EU area of freedom, security and justice) and initiated a redefinition of European policy in the field of asylum and migration. Currently, as a consequence of the events in 2015 and 2016, EU institutions are focused on re-establishing the Schengen area and strengthening external borders, among other things by introducing European Border and Coast Guard Agency in October 2016 (European Council, 2016), as an extension of FRONTEX functions.9

Within public discourse which relates to the Croatian approach towards recent European migration crisis, there is often a link made between Croatian experience with war and large number of refugees and displaced persons with empathy expressed towards people in the migration wave. Although migration flows, particularly those caused by wars and conflicts, have some common characteristics, to a large extent they depend on the historical period and social context. ‘At the beginning, contemporary refugee-migration crisis in Croatia was taken almost synonymously with the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s with the emphasis on humanitarian aspect and empathy shown by citizens (including representatives of public authorities) towards refugees. As time went by, other aspects of this crisis gained prominence. Besides humanitarian dimension, the issues of legal status, organizational, material-financial, health, psychological, domestic and foreign political and security dimensions became the subject of discussion’ (Esterajher, 2016: 15).

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9 ‘The main role of the European Border and Coast Guard is to help provide integrated border management at the external borders. It will ensure the effective management of migration flows and provide a high level of security for the EU. At the same time it will help safeguard free movement within the EU and respect fully fundamental rights’. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/14-european-border-coast-guard/ (accessed January 28th 2017).
European migration crisis presented a serious test for the authorities of the Republic of Croatia, which were supposed to come up with a response that would not disrupt its relations with important European partners or lead to the politicization of this issue at the domestic political level, and also be considered legitimate by its citizens. Such intense migratory wave on the eastern border with Serbia, where, at some point, the daily influx of migrants/refugees reached the number of more than eleven thousand people (Novi list: 2015), was a challenge for the border police, local border communities, humanitarian organizations, all the entities accountable for the provision of the first response in crisis situations, as well as for the overall system of crisis management. Similar to some other countries along the route, this situation in Croatia was characterized as a humanitarian issue, and due to the fact that people in the migration wave did not perceive this country as their final destination, all the organizations involved in managing the crisis directed their efforts towards ensuring the shortest possible stay of migrants on its territory.

Already at this stage, some actors were advocating different approach – the one that was supposed to be based on stricter border control and redefinition of the role of certain components within the national security system, in particular the armed forces – that is, an approach that emphasized the security dimension of migration. Such diversity of opinions was a consequence of suddenness of the crisis and the lack of analyses and strategies that would help policy makers in determining their actions. They reacted in line with current assessment of the situation (transit character of migration), but also in line with the public perception. Although during this period migration crisis was not securitized, it did affect security policy by encouraging its reevaluation and redefinition, whereby first changes within the national security system have already been introduced, along with the development of the homeland security concept.

It is important to note that even in previous periods the European context presented very important factor, which influenced the creation of Croatian migration policy, but also its security policy. The normative defining of both of these areas began in the early 2000s, when the integration processes in between Croatia and both NATO and the EU intensified (Tatalović, 2008).
Logically, the creation of security policy was to a greater extent affected by the process of fulfilling the requirements for NATO membership (especially defense component), while the area of migration and asylum was an important part of the process of harmonization with the EU *acquis communautaire*. Nevertheless, Croatian security policy, still based on partially outdated strategic documents, emphasizes the importance of harmonization with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (and Common Security and Defense Policy).

The Issue of Migration and Croatian Security Policy

The growing number of different categories of migrants worldwide has contributed to the notion that the movement of people has become one of the global security issues. ‘Mass movement of people has raised numerous questions regarding the ethnic balance in destination countries, sovereignty and citizenship, available work force, unemployment, xenophobia, multiculturalism perspectives, human rights protection...’ (Tatalović, 2006: 128). If we focus on the classical concept of national security, with security of the territory and national sovereignty (state) as core values which have to be protected (Baldwin, 1997) mostly from military threats, than it is quite difficult to find direct explanation how migration can present a challenge/threat to those values. Nevertheless, strategic security documents of various countries make reference to migration as a challenge for their national security systems and national security altogether. Hence, for example, Adam-

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10 For discussion on terminology see Koser, 2005.
11 References to migration as security challenge are usually enumerated in the section devoted to ‘challenges, risks and threats’. For example, such references are made in Austrian Security Strategy (2013), A Security Strategy for Germany (2016) or French White paper on Defence and National Security (2013). However, German security strategy provides very detailed view of migration from German perspective, stating that: ‘Migration in itself does not pose a risk to Germany’s security. On the contrary, Germany needs legal and orderly immigration to compensate for its aging population. In large numbers, uncontrolled and irregular migration can, however, entail risks both for the immediately affected region as well as for Europe and Germany. The ability to absorb and integrate migrants can be overstretched, which can lead to
son states that ‘international security scholars and policymakers are finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the relationship between migration and security in a highly interconnected world defined by globalization processes. Globalization is changing the overall environment in which states operate, including how they formulate their security policies’ (Adamson, 2006: 167).

Thus, for example, in the study ‘Croatian Military 2000’, the section that analyzes North Africa and the Mediterranean as part of the security environment, among other things notes that: ‘fundamentalism, territorial aspirations, arms trafficking, terrorism, unemployment and refugees are among features of parts of northern and Equatorial Africa which are situated in the immediate European neighborhood and affect the security of parts of the Mediterranean’ (Hrvatska vojska 2000, 1999: 248). Another publication that preceded the adoption of the National Security Strategy, stated: ‘One of the greatest challenges of contemporary security, faced by all European countries, is migration. Millions of people from Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa are trying to get to the area of Western Europe, that is to leave areas affected by conflicts, poverty, poor living conditions and so on. Illegal migration is of particular concern, since currently it presents a serious problem for the transit countries as well as their final destinations’ (Hrvatska u 21. stoljeću, 2001: 29).

Such claims were backed by concrete information on growing irregular migration trends through the Croatian territory. As some conflicts intensified and instability in different parts of the world increased, so did the number of irregular migrants in Europe. From the EU perspective, Croatia is perceived as a sensitive area in terms of migration routes, primarily due to its geopolitical position and geographical location at the intersection of land and maritime routes from eastern Europe, Asia and Africa towards northern and western Europe. Among different negative security developments, interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) have resulted in forced migration which was directed towards Europe, and some of these migrants have also passed through Croatia.

The most important documents that form the core of security and migration policy were adopted in the period after 2000, when the
Republic of Croatia intensified its efforts to achieve the most important foreign policy goals – accession to NATO and the EU. During this period, border security and criminal offenses related to the crossing of state borders have become increasingly important security issue. Therefore, ‘illegal’ migration was recognized as a security challenge in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia in 2002, which, among other things, states the following: ‘Intensification of transnational threats inside and outside the region – global terrorism, organized crime, refugee crises [emphasis added] – will directly and indirectly influence national security of the Republic of Croatia. These phenomena, whether their source is within or outside its immediate environment, present a real security risk for the Republic of Croatia’ (National Security Strategy, 2002: 5). Security challenges defined in such a way, including migration, have pointed out to the importance of regional cooperation in achieving wider security goals at regional and European level.

Migration policy of the Republic of Croatia, although it is normatively regulated in a number of laws and regulations, cannot be regarded as thought out, complete and comprehensive public policy. In other words, its legislative framework has emerged and developed under the influence of its foreign policy ambitions, while the creation of sustainable model of migration and integration of migrants remained marginal on the political agenda. This is partly a consequence of the fact that Croatia traditionally presents emigration rather than immigration society, and that its experience in the reception and integration of foreigners is very modest. Hence, ‘although the Republic of Croatia has well-developed legislative framework, as well as strategies and action plans (the Foreigners Act, the Act on International and Temporary Protection, the Croatian Citizenship Act, 2013–2015 Migration Policy of the Republic of Croatia, 2013–2015 Action Plan for the removal of obstacles to the exercise of particular rights in the area of integration of foreigners) which define the measures for reception, protection and integration into the Croatian society, this framework has not been properly tested so far’ (Tatalović & Jakešević, 2016: 186).

As a result of the recent migration crisis, whose end is hardly predictable, despite the fact that Croatia was a transit rather than destination country, there is a noticeable emphasis on strengthening of
measures aimed at stronger border controls between Croatia and non-integrated part of Europe. Legislative changes introduced in March 2016 indicate redefinition of the role of the armed forces. With these amendments to the Defense Act traditional tasks of the armed forces were complemented with additional tasks which should be performed in close cooperation with police forces. These tasks now encompass the provision of support to the police in performing supervision and control of the border (Defense Act, 62.a).\textsuperscript{12} Clearer specification of the relationship between police and the military in carrying out traditional police tasks is given in the amended State Border Control Act: ‘Exceptionally, when the Ministry or the president of the Croatian Government considers it is necessary for security and/or humanitarian reasons, the Croatian Armed Forces can provide support in the protection of the state border in the way which is prescribed by the law governing the Croatian defense’ (State Border Control Act, 5(3)). In such exceptional situations, members of the Croatian Armed Forces are obliged to act under the police instructions. Amendments to both of these acts were enacted within the urgent procedure, without previous public hearing or consultations. Such procedure was explained by the urgency of situation caused by the migration crisis, but after the procedure was completed the Information Commissioner\textsuperscript{13} concluded that even in such circumstances the public should not have been excluded (OBRIS, 2016). Additionally, Center for Peace Studies and Social Democratic Party submitted two separate requests to the Constitutional Court for the assessment whether these laws are in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Hence, such vision of ‘urgency’ was

\textsuperscript{12} The then First Deputy Prime Minister Tomislav Karamarko explained the logic behind these amendments by saying: ‘The Croatian army can assist the police in guarding the borders in some specific and special situations. One such situation can be the arrival of a greater number of those suffering people who left Syria and other countries. We must protect our border as Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, etc., are doing’; Available at: https://eblnews.com/news/croatia/karamarko-defence-act-be-amended-so-army-can-help-police-border-12463 (accessed 25 January 2017).

not unanimously accepted by the part of the public and the opposition in the Croatian parliament. Due to the fact that Germany and other European destination countries do not pursue an ‘open door policy’ in a way that it was done in 2015, the fear of possible reopening of the Balkan route affects the strengthening of security at the expense of humanitarian approach to migration. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the expansion of powers and functions of the armed forces is aimed at providing assistance to the police in the case of such assessment that there is a need of complete closure of the border.

The indicative trend regarding the security aspect of migration in Croatian security policy can be observed through the analysis of the three recent public reports issued by the Croatian Security-Intelligence Agency in 2014, 2015 and 2016. The 2014 Report provides only general reference to migration in the context of the assessment that Croatian territory is situated on the Balkan route through which a number of illegal activities are being conducted – among them ‘illegal’ migration and smuggling of people. It states that ‘illegal migration takes place along the same routes as drug and arms trafficking (...) and that human trafficking is connected to other illegal markets’ (SOA, 2014: 23). The same section which deals with organized crime notes that the number of ‘illegal’ migrants decreased in 2013 due to the efficiency of the Croatian security institutions. It also claims that (economic and forced) migration pressures on Croatian borders are expected to increase once Croatia becomes a part of the Schengen zone. Next Report (2015) recognizes that the most frequent land route of the ‘illegal’ migration is in the vicinity of Croatian border with Serbia, that the trend of decrease of ‘illegal’ migrants on the Croatian territory is continuing, and that the number of asylum applications has dropped by 50% (SOA, 2015). It contextualizes ‘illegal’ migration within the broader security challenges stemming from the unstable European environment (Middle East, Northern Africa and Ukraine). Moreover, it states that ‘illegal migration has become a major humanitarian challenge’ (SOA, 2015: 22), which at the same time presents an increasing security risk for European states, due to the identified closer cooperation between criminal and terrorist groups. These two reports, which preceded the outbreak of the European refugee crisis, are quite general in their reference to (irregular) migration, which makes them different from the 2016 Re-
port. The latter Report contains a separate section ‘Migration wave’, which widely explains the effects of 2015/2016 migration through Croatia. It states that recent mass migration towards Europe presented a mixed migration flow consisting of people escaping from poverty and catastrophic security-political situation. It is very ambiguous regarding the language used, since terms ‘illegal migrant’ and ‘migrant’ are used interchangeably. In terms of security aspects of recent migration crisis it points out that it presents major security challenge for global and especially European security. The argument for such estimate is confirmed by growing interconnectedness between organized crime and terrorist groups, as well as the fact that ISIS used this migration route for infiltrating its members into European territory (SOA, 2016). It acknowledges that migration generally does not present a security issue. However, certain aspects of migration have security dimension. After terrorist attacks in Europe, security risks associated with migration pressure are increasing. Internal instabilities due to possible non-integration of migrants into society, growing xenophobia and extremism as well as weakening of the cohesion within the EU present the most significant risks stemming from uncontrolled migration. All of the abovementioned indicates current trends in the development of the security policy of the Republic of Croatia.

Conclusion

Croatia’s national security cannot be perceived in isolation from security of the region in which it is situated or from the European context, since it is the member of both NATO and the European Union. Membership in these organizations provides certain security guarantees, but also obliges member states. Hence, Croatia and its allies share common security risks, but also enjoy the opportunity of joining their security capabilities aimed at providing more effective response to security challenges, including migration – which is predominantly humanitarian issue, but can also have a security dimension.

Currently, Croatia is undergoing the process of defining its new national security concept, which should be adapted to current and future security challenges and overcome outdated strategic security documents, which are dating back to the early 2000s. In this context it is
important to analyze whether Croatia possesses sufficient capabilities to provide efficient response to contemporary security threats or if it needs to strengthen certain capacities.

Given that global trends suggest that the mass migration will continue in the future, the European Union, including Croatia as its member state, should develop effective migration policy, with particular emphasis on integration, in order to mitigate negative security risks associated with migration. A particular danger lies in the anti-migrant sentiment and populism which occurs in a number of European countries, but also in the United States, which is particularly worrying if we take into account the global role of this state. Therefore, in order to avoid securitization of migration at different levels (national, regional and global), and to strengthen the principle of solidarity between EU member states, which was endangered due to inability to find an adequate joint response to the recent migration crisis, it is necessary to clearly define the role of security sector(s), with special emphasis on the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is extremely important in the process of creating a security strategy and security policy, in order to ensure that certain security measures and activities are not in misbalance with particular security challenges, which could lead to violations of human rights and democratic values. In addition, it should be noted that the quality of integration policies in ethnically diverse societies can significantly contribute to reducing the negative security potential which is increasingly associated with migration.

However, some European countries, including Croatia, are currently organizing their military forces, not only for their traditional function of defense against armed aggression, expeditionary tasks and providing support to civilian institutions in certain situations, but also to perform other functions, including police work. The concept of organization and functioning of the armed forces which has been dominant since the late 1990s and early 2000s, which also has emphasized the importance of professionalization, is currently under serious revision. Therefore, due to increase of non-traditional security challenges, some countries, including Croatia, are thinking about restoring the concept of the military reserve, including compulsory military service. Public opinion on this issue is quite divided, whereby some actors consider that providing the armed forces with additional functions, as well as possible reintroduction of some form of compulsory military ser-
vice, leads to undesirable militarization of society. Such development is seen as opposite to the concept of human security. For all these reasons, Croatia and other European countries are at the point when they must define their national security strategies in line with new security environment on regional and global level.

Finally, although Croatia has certain experience with different kinds of migration, primarily as the country of origin or a transition state, it still doesn't have long-term sustainable migration policy. Additional unfavorable circumstance is that there is no such sustainable policy at the EU level either. Recent changes in the legislation indicate that the migration is increasingly viewed not only as humanitarian, but as the security issue as well. This trend will be affected not only by relations between political actors at the domestic level, but also by similar trends in neighboring countries.

References


**Sources**


Part IV
Reflections
4.1. Migration of ‘Pariah People’: The Case Study of Roma in the Balkans

Andrej Kubiček

Introduction

When reading the studies about policies and discourses concerning refugees brought to Europe by ‘The migrant crisis’ (Wodak, 2015), a sociologist who is acquainted with Roma issues can draw many similarities between representation and treatment of different people on the move. It seems that ‘migrants’ from the Near East have become Roma in a sense. Even a brief review of the mass media reports all across the Europe can clearly show that the old *topos* of ‘lazy-and-potentially-aggressive-gypsy’ whose only life goal is to enjoy all the benefits of the social care has been taken by the new actors (Kubiček, 2014; Kubiček, 2015). But, the social and discursive ‘scenario’ for their roles seems to be written a long time ago. Literary, 1000 years ago. It looks like Roma and the XXI century refugees are sharing more than just the same roads stretching from Pakistan to Western Europe.

This should not come as a surprise, nor should it be interpreted as a mere coincidence. Persisting narratives are prescribed from one group to another and sustained because they are both determined by specific social relations and intertwined with them. The purpose of this

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1 Roma elites are preparing to commemorate 1000th anniversary of their departure from India in 2018.
Chapter is to describe host-guest dynamics as a *longue* durée process on the example of Roma people in the Balkans region from the perspective of historical sociology of migrations. This approach can offer far better explanations than studies about contemporary migrations of the Roma, which fail to describe deep rooted socio-historical forces at play. To accomplish it, it is not enough only to present historiographical and ethnographical data concerning this subject, but one also needs to integrate explanatory model in a proposed description. On the other hand, it is also not sufficient to theorize in formal and abstract categories, by claiming that ‘relations between domestic populations and the immigrants have always been like that’. Social relations have their histories, but they can’t be reduced to an array of facts without any logic behind them. Max Weber’s concept of *Pariavolk* (Weber, 1958; Weber I, 1978; Weber II, 1978; Veber, 1997) has a heuristic potential for analyzing the specific case of millennia long movements of Roma people across Asia and Europe as socially determined phenomenon, by integrating theoretical model and historical data.

Before that, we still need to solve one terminological dilemma which has important methodological implications. During the last millennia, over a vast area stretching from India to all of the corners of Europe we meet different populations on the move, sharing similar characteristics. Because historic accounts haven’t been written by them, we can’t determine their identity. Were they ancestors of modern Roma people? Or were they even a singular (proto)ethnic group? These are doubtful assessments. Although the ethnic name ‘Gypsy’ is considered as a racial slur since the end of XX century, and the expression Roma or Romani is preferred as politically correct one, in this Chapter the first word will be used to refer to members of specific social (not ethnic) group. There are two reasons to do so: first, (quasi)ethnic name will be used in a historical authentic way, and second, connection between social status, migrations and (proto)ethnic group

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2 Term 'Gypsy' ultimately comes from word 'Egypt(ian)'. Serbo-Croatian word 'Cigan' or 'Ciganin' has the same root as other names for Roma people in most of European languages, but it doesn’t have a well documented etymology. Most widely proposed interpretation is that it comes from medieval Greek ἄθιγγανος (*athínganos*), which means 'untouchable', although it doesn’t seems to be true (Soulis, 1961: 145). Other, more likely hypothesis claims that the origin of this ethnonym can be found in Persian word 'Chāngar', which denotes region in India (Mujić, 1952: 138; Digard, 2002), or a person who produces lime.
will be stressed. This set of social relations, which can be very complex (Janković, Kubiček, 2016), is crucial for an adequate understanding of this topic. All generalizations presented in this Chapter are describing typical relations between hosts and migrants, and do not have an aim to portray any nation or an individual person in particular. In a way, only migrating groups can be considered as pariahs and gypsies, and most of the ancestors of modern Roma were such. Those Roma which adopted sedentary lifestyles ceased to be gypsies, and affirmed their new ethnic Romani identity, or started to identify with the host society (i.e. to assimilate), although in both cases they still have to cope with old stereotypes and prejudices.

Itinerate lifestyle of the pariahs is intertwined with their political status, which can be at best described as vulnerable and insecure. Precariousness of their social position leads to migration (among other challenges and hardships), and migration are causing further diminishing of their power. Their spatial and social positions are both volatile, which is perceived as a ‘normal’ condition by domicile population(s) (Feldman, 2015). This argumentation leads to the main hypotheses of this chapter – that concept of migrations can reveal structures behind stigmatization, prejudices and discrimination. Furthermore it can serve as a basis for the more general theory of racism (Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar: 1998).

**Pariavolk**

‘Pariah’ is a term filled with history of misunderstanding, and in a way, a concept which has its own history of migration. It doesn’t represent any particular of the four castes (*varnas*) in traditional Indian society – as it is usually meant in the West – but originally denotes a lower subdivision in the caste system, and is territorially tied only to a small portion of south-eastern India (Tamil Nadu and Kerala). Yet, during the British colonial rule it was spread all across *The Raj* by officials who used it to denote all ‘depressed classes’ (Viswanath, 2014: 3). Later it was introduced into European languages as a synonym for outcasts, and with this meaning it has entered the everyday usage. In the 1823 German Jewish poet and playwright Michael Beer wrote the one-act play *Der Paria*, about an Indian outcast’s tragic fate and his sacrifice. The term ‘Pariah’ was afterwards used outside of Indian context
by Theodore Herzl and Bernard Lazare (Momigliano, 1980), aiming to describe both the current and historical unfavorable social situation of the Jews. Yet, it was still a metaphor which merely summoned images of exotic lands. Max Weber adopted this term and elaborated it in a sociological way, but it was a theoretical endeavor with many risks. Some authors, such as Adair-Toteff, have argued that the concept of pariah-people is one of the most disputed concepts of both Weber’s sociology of religion and his general sociological theory. His conception was labeled many times as racist and anti-Semitic, although in-depth analyses show that those accusations are untrue (Adair-Toteff, 2015: 84).

Still, the concept of pariah-people cannot be explained at the first place, without understanding another, broader Weber’s term – the ‘guest-people’ (Gastvolk), which appears for the first time in his study The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (published in 1915).³ In a way, guest is quite similar to Georg Simmel’s conception of the Stranger (Simmel, 1971). They are both considered at the same time close in spatial and economic sense, but very distinct in symbolic and political sense. Also, Gastvolk carries one additional trait which is connected with the very meaning of the word ‘guest’, and is crucial for this Chapter. Guests come and go, but guest can also be a ‘person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer’ (Simmel, 1971: 143). Guest peoples are considered as migratory, and ‘wandering’ is perceived as an essential aspect of their very social being, even when this is not true at all (in case when they actually represent a subjugated native population). Migration, real or supposed, are connected with phenomenon of guest-peoples/strangers, so this is also true for pariahs. Paradoxically, even though Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed all had experiences of being refugees, people in The West – and we can include Near and Middle East here – have frowned upon migrants for a long time, interpreting causes and consequences of the movement of one population in very negative moral categories.

³ ‘Usually nine kinds of degraded “castes” were distinguished: certain kinds of slaves, descendants of certain slaves and coloni, beggars, descendants of former insurgents, descendants of immigrant barbarians (guest tribes), musicians and performers participating in family ceremonies, actors and jugglers as in the Middle Ages’ (Weber: 1951: 98). It is apparent that Weber had a conception of pariah-people in The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, although he didn’t mention it explicitly.
Also, topic of the guest-peoples is a rare – maybe even only – occasion where Weber actually mentions ‘Gypsies’, explaining that they are not only typical, but also the only kind of guest-peoples in Europe, while there are many kinds of such groups in India, dispersed in peripheries of villages and cities (Weber, 1958). However, more prominent place is taken by the Jews, people which Weber considered as a prime example of both pariahs and guests as ideal types in European case, while not all of India’s guest-people are also the pariah-people. Difference is clearly defined in *The Religions of Ancient India*: ‘Frequently, the representatives of a guest industry are excluded from intermarriage and commensalism, and therefore are held to be ritually “impure”. When such ritual barriers against a guest people exist we shall, for our present purpose, use the expression pariah people’ (Weber, 1958: 12). In the other place – in his study of Judaism, Weber defined a pariah nation similarly – as a ‘guest people ritually, formally or in effect, separated from the social environment’ (Weber, 1997: 10–11).

Weber related the migration with the economic situation of one group in the study about Hinduism: ‘The purest form of this type is found when a people in question have totally lost their residential anchorage and hence are completely occupied economically in meeting demands of other settled peoples – the gypsies, for instance, or, in another manner, the Jews of the Middle Ages’ (Weber, 1958: 13). In the *Economy and Society* there is another similar observation: ‘Thus, in some instances, merchants may be members of the most highly privileged stratum, as in the case of the ancient urban patriciate, while in others they may be pariahs, like impecunious wandering peddlers’ (Weber, 1978 I: 477).

Ambiguity of spatial and symbolic distance isn’t the only discrepant relation which pariahs/strangers and domicile population share. Beside mentioned aversion, Weber stresses out that they are typically tolerated because of their special skills, which locals lack or find disgracing: ‘“Pure” anthropological types are often a secondary consequence of such closure; examples are sects (as in India) as well as pariah peoples, that means, groups that are socially despised yet wanted as neighbors because they have monopolized indispensable skills’ (Weber, 1978 I: 386). In one other place in the *Economy and Society*, Weber adds that pariahs can even be ‘frequently privileged’, ‘by virtue of their economic indispensability’ (Weber, 1978 II: 934).
Following the line of argumentation, it is logical to assume that one group needs to guard secrets of its trade in order to maintain their monopoly. Weber writes about it\(^4\), and adds that self segregation, both spatial and ritual, can be part of this strategy. This often leads to formation of ethnic community of pariah group, or rather to belief in common ethnic origin (Weber, 1978 II: 934). Another consequence of monopolization of certain trade or craft is emergence of strong belief in magical qualities of the said peoples (Weber, 1978 I: 483) and faith in charismatic nature of their skills (as an assumption that they are God’s gift) (Veber, 1997: 37).

To sum up, the basic elements of the pariah-people concept are: (1) assumed or real) spatial mobility (2) monopoly on certain trade; (3) charismatic legitimization of their trade; (4) self-segregation and belief in specific means of salvation and (5) segregation and imposed ritual barriers by settled peoples. Presentation of those five aspects will begin with the spatial mobility, as a central theme of this Chapter. Still, this topic won’t be depleted there, because migration constitute a constant and essential part of all other four elements as well, and they altogether produce and accumulate stigmatization and political insecurity on a structural level. In this way, Weber’s concept of pariah people allowed us to operationalize preliminary hypothesis.

**Spatial mobility (assumed or real)**

Different names given to Roma can be strongly connected with the migratory nature of this group in its essence. In countries which were under influence of Arabic language and culture, from Persia to Balkans, Romani people are named ţorbati or gurbeti, which is connected with an Arabic word for wanderer, or more literary to ‘someone who is not at home’. Other names used for Roma in Persia also indicat-\(^4\) ‘This occasional sale may then develop into a regular system of profit-making exchange. In such cases it is common for tribe’ crafts to develop, with interethnic functional specialization and trade between the tribes, since the chances of finding a market often depend on maintaining a monopoly, which in turn is usually secured by inherited trade secrets. From this may develop ambulatory crafts or possibly pariah crafts or, where these groups are united in a political structure and where there are ritual barriers between the ethnic elements, castes, as in India’ (Weber, 1978 I: 131).
ing their migratory characteristics. *Kowli* denotes that they have come from Kabul; *Čingāna* from Changar province in India and *Jat* also indicates foreign, Indian descent (Digard, 2002). Common name for Roma in many Balkan languages, *čergari*, comes from Turkish *çerge*, meaning ‘tent’;\(^5\) which is traditional for nomads. In some parts of Europe (Scandinavia), Roma are commonly referred to as ‘the Tatars’. On the other hand, very word for non-Roma person used by the Roma, *Gaja* (*Gadžo*), comes from Romani word *gav*, which means ‘village’. All those (quasi) ethnonyms clearly suggest that Roma were identified as (1) people deprived of permanent home(land) or/and (2) as foreigners coming from the East.

In the oldest existing historical source mentioning Roma, the 11th century *Life of Saint George the Athonite*, term ‘Sarmatian people’ is explicitly used to stress their nomadic nature, comparing them with Iranian pastoralist from a modern-day Eastern Europe. Yet, even more illustrative depiction of migratory nature of the Roma can be found in this wonderful text written by Nicephorus Gregoras: ‘During this time [i.e. the first decades of the fourteenth century] we saw in Constantinople a transient group of people – not less than twenty in number – versed in certain acts of jugglery. None of the older generation had ever heard or seen them. They came originally from Egypt, but then, as if following a circular route from east to north, they wandered through Chaldaea, Arabia, Persia, Media, and Assyria. Then turning west they passed through Iberia in the Caucasus, Colchis, and Armenia and from there through the lands of all the tribes which inhabit the intervening territory up to Byzantium; and in every country and city [they visited] they gave performances of their art [...] Moving from Byzantium, they travelled through Thrace and Macedonia and went as far as Gadeira [i.e. Gades in Spain], and they made almost the whole world a theater for their art’ (Soulis, 1961: 148–149, emphasis added). Famous Byzantine author finds causes of Roma’s migration in their specific trade – offering entertainment to sedentary population all across the Mediterranean basin in highly professional manner. Also, specific group he is referring to is rather small in number. Much later, in the XV century Western Europe, Roma people were identified as pilgrims (again from Egypt), whom Pope ordered to wander for seven years (Trigg, 1973:

4). Also, these groups were sometimes described as rather large (more than one hundred people), and led by ‘count’ or ‘duke’ although in other sources they numbered around ten people. Begging and stealing seems to be the only means of survival of Roma that early western chroniclers wrote down (Pym, 2007: 4–5). Since those groups haven’t been perceived as having any particular profession, their lifestyle was interpreted with only similar activity known in the West – going to pilgrimage. All examples clearly show that the Roma people were generally considered as ultimate aliens, hailing from semi-mythical lands and wandering around without any goal to settle and integrate in any particular society. Purpose of their traveling was to make living, usually by inducing sympathy of settled and better off peoples.

Ottoman sources are informing us about the great troubles state officials had with collecting taxes from nomadic Roma people. Suleiman the Magnificent’s Qanun recognizes non-territorial administrative unit for Roma people in Rumelia, Çingane sancagi (Mujić, 1953: 147) (similar unit was given to Yuruk Turks, who were also nomads, but not craftsman – they were herdsmen and warriors). But his successors had to put even more effort into levying tax. During the end of 17th century it was hard to find any magistrate who would accept to collect taxes from Roma, so they were left alone. Also, in many provincial archives there is evidence that officials were receiving special instruction on how to effectively tax wandering Roma (Mujić, 1953: 151).

Other example of clash between Roma’s migratory lifestyle and state policies took place in the 18th century on the other bank of the Sava River, in the Syrmia region. New Austrian military administration desperately needed qualified work force in the frontier, so would employ Roma craftsman, but only if they were ready to abandon nomadism and settle down. This has led to many conflicts (Petrović, 2000). Austrian policies have affected nomads even more severely after the 1761, when new ruler, Maria Teresa, started with planned settlement, which targeted wandering Roma in particular (ibid.).

But, Maria Teresa and her son’s Joseph brutal attempts6 to end nomadic lifestyle and control their subjects were only the beginning. Log-

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6 Maria Teresa forbade usage of the word ‘Gypsy’, preferring ‘new peasants’ instead. Her decrees also imposed taking away children from the nomads; recruiting young Roma to the army; forbade marriage between them, keeping of horses, settling near forests, and usage of Romani language; ordered what
ic of modern state was austere, and in the next two centuries nomadic Roma will be severely treated (Lewy, 2000). Their very social being was incompatible with newly founded concept of state borders and control of territory and population. As Leo Lucassen explains, in pre-modern societies a vast majority of people were poor and powerless, yet some were tied to land (even by force), while the others wandered across the land. In a modern state even a poor citizen is still a citizen, providing that he/she is permanently settled and registered. On the other hand, wandering people were not only classified as different, but also stigmatized as dangerous threat to the rest of society and the state, even though they were, and still are, powerless by definition (Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar, 1998: 68–70).

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, many factors have contributed to renewed Roma migrations from east to west. The most obvious one is, of course, economic and social security pull factor, but there is as well notable push factor in form of insecurity and exposure to violence in many former socialist countries (Strielkowski, 2012). In a way, Roma are predecessors of now contested concept of a ‘Europe without borders’, but they were merely doing what their ancestors used to do, stigmatized and driven by political insecurity and modest economic opportunities. Only this time they were not the only pariahs in European part of globalised World, as in Weber’s time, but were joined by many other immigrants from Africa and Asia. In a sense, Roma are bridging a blurry gap between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ models of immigration in European context (Lucassen, Feldman, Oltmer, 2006: 291–294).

**Monopoly on certain trade**

In the previous part, connections between migration and particular type of profession were clearly indicated. Still, what is the true nature of this connection? In agrarian and pastoral societies craftsman’s status is typically low. There are exceptions in cases of artistic crafts and urban artisans who make lucrative products or have relatively stable market demand. But craftsman, as well as traders, who deal with kind of clothing they will have to wear etc. (Petrović, 2000). It seems that Maria Teresa understood complex nature of pariah-people phenomenon long before Max Weber.
agriculturalists and herdsmen have hard time making for their living. First, they don't own any land or (large) cattle, so they can't produce substantial amount of food or raw materials. On the other hand, autarchic communities which buy their goods and services can live without them, while pariahs must trade in order to get basic life needs. Also, the demand for any type of everyday goods, as well as entertainment, is typically low in agrarian societies. That's why people who supply them always need to be on the move in order to look for new customers.

It is possible that ancestors of Roma people have brought to medieval Europe advanced technical and artistic skills in metallurgy, masonry and carpentry from India, Khorasan and Iran. But, historic data do not support this hypothesis completely, even though hegemonic Roma ethno-history claims that their ancestors were brought westwards as skillful and sought-after craftsman. Earliest mentions of Jats, people (a possible ancestors of Roma people in Sind), were written by Arab conquerors, who described them as nomads, herdsmen and fishermen who lived on margins of Hindu society and were prone to robbery. They lived in houses made from wicker and had responsibility to collect firewood for higher caste city dwellers. Jats were explicitly compared with Berbers, Bedouins and Kurds (Wink, 2002: 160–161), which are all nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples. Another, classical Persian source, Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, mentions an episode in which Shah Bahram Gor (Bahram V, historic reign 420–438) invited 12.000 musicians called Luri and gave them cattle and donkeys with loads of wheat, so that they could sustain themselves and play music for poor free of charge. But, after one year, Luri came back starved to shah, and sad they don’t have anything to eat, because they have eaten not only wheat, but the oxen as well. Bahram was very angry with them, and banished Luri from their lands, taking donkeys and their musical instruments away from them. They have been wandering around ever since, trying to survive by singing and stealing (Mirga, Mruz, 1997: 15). Name ‘Luri’ suggests that those people really were professional musicians, which comes from Persian word which denotes musicians: Luti. But, other names used for Roma in Iran, such as Āhangar, shows that some of them were engaged in blacksmithing as well (Digard, 2002). Up to this date, in some parts of Bulgaria local Roma have a strong self-identification as the ‘Usta Millet’, which means ‘a craftsman nation’ (Erloova, 2012: 240–241).
Contrary to Persian sources, Byzantine one doesn’t mention music as occupation of ancestors of Roma. Apart from being professional magicians and diviners – which will be described soon – typical Roma’s professions listed are acrobatics and taming of bears and snakes (Soulis, 1961). It seems that they were also engaged in simple crafts, such as production of sieves and strainers or colanders (ibid, 151). Blacksmithing is surprisingly also rare, and appears (at least in sources) only after XV century. German travelers described Romani smith in Peloponnesus, amazed by his craftmanship, which was described as ‘wretched and strange.’ He made nails sitting on the ground, with an improvised anvil in the open, while his wife (instead of an apprentice) helped him to maintain the fire burning (ibid: 155). This description is paradigmatic, because it suggests that most Roma have traveled and worked together with their families, and that those three fields (migration, working and family life) have become inseparable, which has led to further alienation from domicile populations. This become even more striking as those domains of society become separated during the period usually referred to as modernization. Also, marginal nature of their products seems to be a reflection of Roma’s marginal role in society. It is clear that they were partially integrated in a host society only in terms of economy, by production and trade of some specific modes of goods and services. On the other hand, it is obvious that they have lacked any political power or symbolic recognition – legend about Shah Bahram has metaphorical meaning which proves this point: Roma people are summoned, provided and, in the end, punished by a powerful man (ibid).

Vast number of documents from Ottoman archives shows that Roma had modest standard of living: in the Qanun of Suleiman the Magnificent, Roma Muslims are separated from the rest of Muslim population and obliged to pay 22 akche as the Çift resmi tax, which was a minimal sum (other subjects had to pay tax from 22 to 57 akche) (Mujić, 1953: 147), and their family heirloom was also small, typically including only bedclothes and some kitchenware (Mujić, 1953: 162). Most common Romani trade was blacksmithing, and many of them adapted well to militaristic organization of ‘The Eternal State’. Their skills were in great demand in the Ottoman army, which was typically on the move, so the Roma could join them with their caravans. Beside simple smiths who produced nails and other trinkets, and repaired
ships and forts, in the cities in modern-day Macedonia (Skopje and Bitolj) and Metohia (Prizren) we can find urban artisans who owned shops and were well integrated into Ottoman society. They even had formal craftsman exams and licenses, and guild-like organizations recognized by the state (Mujić, 1953: 159). Other common professions for Roma in the Ottoman Empire were horse trading and music, both civilian and military (*mehter*). Other reports from urban areas of the Balkans are also suggesting that (at least some) Roma people lived integrated life of petty craftsman. Best example is medieval (XIV century) Dubrovnik, in which there were some Roma cobbler, hat makers, butchers and owners of small shops, although most of them were workers without any particular profession (Petrović, 1976: 141). On the other hand, in the Venetian lands in modern Greece (Peloponnesus, Corfu and some other islands), Roma craftsman (cobbler and blacksmiths) were segregated and lived outside cities or villages (Soulos, 1961: 155).

Great changes in (Southeast) European society, as well as in the modes of production, have severely affected Roma people. Non-agricultural professions were no longer de-valorized, so symbolic barrier of their monopoly crumbled. Most of simple, dispensable goods for everyday use Roma used to produce were now industrially manufactured. But social disadvantages accumulated during the many centuries remained. Field research done by Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić in small village of Masurica in Southern Serbia (1,300 inhabitants) has shown that most Roma living there were forced to become seasonal farm workers or to live from welfare. In the 1984 there were 31.4% of Romani households which lived solely from welfare, while in 1992 the number raised to 66.7% (Mitrović, Zajić, 1993). Masurica represents a case study of typical degradation of Roma’s social posi-

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7 But there were also examples of Roma engaged in other trades, which were more lucrative, but still considered as crafts at that time. Roma man named Smolyan (Ismolan) in 16th century Bosnia was known as ‘cerrah’ in Turkish or ‘ranar’ in Serbo-Croatian, which means that he was a wound healer. From archives in Sarajevo we can learn that he performed surgical operations of hernia and removed bladder stones (Mujić, 1953: 172).

8 Introduction of plastics in the 1970s put one of the last Roma crafts, basket weaving, out of use. Cheap goods from the Eastern Asia in the 1980s and 1990s are not worth repairing, so other typical Roma crafts (repairing umbrellas, pots and pans) become unprofitable (Marković, 1993; Bamski, 1993).
tion in many rural areas and small cities, in its most severe form. This again invoked new types of migration. Large part of Roma migrated to big cities, where they have started living from new pariah professions: paper and scrap metal collecting, begging and welfare. Others continued their migration westwards, toward states which offered better job chances or larger degree of social care, especially Germany, Austria and Scandinavian countries, and to lesser degree to France, Belgium and Italy. Those new migrations have not only fortified image of Roma as ‘ultimate aliens’ who do not have anything in common with ‘regular citizens’, but have also deteriorated weak social ties Roma have had in their countries of origin. Last wave of migrations have contributed to further accumulation of negative life chances for many Roma people who lost their citizenship, or diminished their cultural competencies and social capital, both in their native and their new countries, again leading to new stigmatization.

Charismatic legitimization of the trade

In his study about ancient Judaism, Weber pointed to legitimizing character of biblical story about Cain and his descendants, who were blacksmiths, musicians and founders of the first cities as result of the curse (Veber, 1997: 37). While talent for the music is sometimes considered as ‘otherworldly gift’ even today, the same was true for metallurgy ever since it was discovered. Yet, it is worth noting that part of Cain's curse also included eternal wandering as well. Mircea Eliade, in his study The Forge and the Crucible: The Origins and Structures of Alchemy, have showed that blacksmithing was considered sacred and mystical in many cultures and historic periods (Eliade, 1978). In societies without thermometers and stopwatches, working with metal in fact can easily be interpreted as an extraordinary talent. Also, artisans used to rely on singing chants in order to measure passed time during the different processes of metal working. Apart from this anthropological perspective, it is worth noting that many professions were strictly separated from settlements because they were noisy, polluting or outright dangerous.

In the already mentioned Georgian hagiographical text Life of Saint George the Atonite, written in Mount Athos around the 1068
there is an episode in which the saint confronts a group of ‘Adsincani’. Emperor Constantine Monomachus wanted to exterminate stray dogs which have overrun his haunting ground and killed many animals there. To do that, he summoned a group of people, ‘descendants of Simon the Magician, named Adsincani, who were renowned sorcerers and villains’ (Soulis, 1961: 145) and asked them for help. They have managed to eliminate all the dogs with enchanted (poisoned) pieces of meat, and the Emperor was delighted. He called them to his palace to show him their magic, but the saint George the Atonite made a sign of cross over magical piece of meat and disenchanted it (Soulis, 1961, 145). Ethical implications of this narrative relevant for Christian society of mid 11th century are not important here, but clear suggestion that Roma are able to do something which is quite unusual is a proof of charismatic nature of their crafts. Also, their foreign, alien appearance seems to enforce their supposed magical competencies. But, it is even more important to notice discrepancy of power between the pariahs and settled peoples. Roma’s services are represented both as disposable and as product of deception.

Finally, even begging, although contemporarily not considered as legitimate ‘profession’, could be monopolized on the basis of charisma. Tihomir Đorđević recorded an old Turkish folktale in Niš, about the one poor Muslim who got rich very quickly. God wanted to test his kindness, and have sent angel Jibril (Gabriel) in form of the gypsy to beg him for charity. Turk declined, so the God cursed him to be poor once again. That’s why Turks never refuse to give alms to Roma beggars9 (Đorđević, 1984). Roma’s otherworldly gifts and they nomadic lifestyle seems to merge in this short tale, because they are depicted as potential guests from some other world. But, nonetheless, begging has remained to this day an ultimate stigma of the Roma people. This should not come as a surprise, because it symbolically represents precarious position of pariahs in all of its powerlessness and dependence on domicile society. Begging, as well as receiving social care is considered to exclude a person from one society, and makes an ultimate alien out of him.

9 There are folk stories which explain that even thieving as result of God’s grace bestowed to Roma people. Elwood Trigg quotes tale which claims that Jews have planned to pierce Christ’s forehead and heart with nails, but some gypsies stole them. God was pleased with this action, so he rewarded gypsies with ability to steal without punishment, and to be responsible only to him (Trigg, 1973: 72).
Self-segregation and belief in specific means of salvation

Closed nature of Roma groups through much of the past had many causes. Endless migration and traveling in small groups forced them to depend on their families and relatives as their only support. Other reasons come from maintaining monopoly on specific trades. There are lots of subgroups, especially of Roma from Romania (which live all across the Balkans), who are following strict endogamy, or at least were doing it in the past. Their names are coming from different crafts: *Aurari* (gold panners); *Băiești* (which means ‘miners’, although they are carpenters); *Lingurari* (spoon makers); *Ursari* (bear tamers); *Lăutari* (musicians/singers); *Kalderashi* (cattle makers) (Sikimić, 2005). Of course, yet another reason for self-segregation of Roma is distrust of the settled peoples, which could pose great risk for their security, and has been a case up to day (Balić, 2014).

Belief in specific means of salvation of Weber's ideal type, which is evident in Jewish case, poses many difficulties when being applied on the Roma. Reason is simple: although Roma used to represent a closed group or even more precisely, a whole conglomerate of closed groups – they have formally lost their common religion long ago. Ever since they have been practicing many different ways of salvation, they have been usually combining them in a syncretic manner. Famous Ottoman author Evliya Çelebi described Roma as ‘tyrannical, good-for-nothing, thieving, irreligious people – they pretend to be Muslims, but are not even infidels!’ (Çelebi, in: Ulusoy, 2013: 248). Western (Christian) authors had similar impression, which can be noted in Heinrich Grellman’s (1783) work, because he concludes: ‘Ancient, as well as the more modern writers agree, in positively denying, that Gypsies have any religion; and place them even below the Heathens. This sentence cannot possibly be contradicted; since, so far from having any religion, they have an aversion to everything which in the least relates to it’ (Trigg, 1973: 22).

Both cited judgments – and there are many more similar – have failed to notice rich spiritual life of the Roma people by (mis)understanding...
religion relying only on categories their authors were familiar with. Transmitting folk stories, avoiding taboos and practicing magic don't offer salvation typical to organized, monotheistic religions with Holy Scriptures. Small nomadic communities have their own way which is more practical and aimed at providing salvation in this life in a form of a 'good luck'.

Notion of Marime (Mokadi, Marengo, Marami, Mahrime) is especially important here, because it implies things and actions which are considered as taboo. Many things can be forbidden in this ritualistic way, but they are usually connected to body fluids, human hair, sexual acts, pregnancy, preparing food and so on. But more important fact here is that at least some groups of Roma have practiced self-segregation on the grounds of avoiding Merime, which could be transmitted by the settled peoples (Trigg, 1973: 70). Such practices could bind groups of Roma close together, in the similar manner that Jewish dietary laws have bound Jews through history (Veber, 1997). Presented facts lead to conclusion that symbolic self-segregation of the Roma was closely connected with both their migratory lifestyle and particular economic roles they have played. But most of all, it represented an answer to sometimes hostile, but always insecure social surrounding they were entering, or leaving. Together with mentioned quotes from Evliya Çelebi and Heinrich Grellman this make coherent picture of symbolic relations between pariah and settled peoples who don't accept them.

Segregation and imposed ritual barriers by settled peoples

Practice of segregation of Roma (both spatial and symbolic) by settled peoples is a very old phenomenon. In Byzantine sources we can find many examples of clergy forbidding believers to come in any contact with them (especially to bring them to their homes). Roma were accused of being ‘false prophets’ and ‘servants of devil’, (Soulis, 1961: 147) which are generic condemnations in medieval religious discourse. Even the strict punishments were introduced by the church: those who would use services of the Roma could be denied the Holy Communion for five years according to the Council of Ancyra (Soulis, 1961: 147).
It seems that already mentioned specific Roma alien ways of salvation could compete with the one proclaimed by the official church.

Similar practice can be found in the Ottoman Empire: ‘Gypsies, who are labeled as “half-people” (...) are not allowed to enter places of worship nor cemeteries, but they have their own mosque’ (Mujić, 1952: 163), as well as in Venetian possessions in the Balkans, where they had to live in separated settlements (Petrović, 1976). Phenomenon of *cigan-ma(ha)la* (‘gypsy-quarter’) survived up until the modern times in many Balkan countries. Sometimes they make a part of integrated city quarters, for example, the Terzi Mahala in Prizren, but more commonly they are run-down neighborhoods with houses built from improvised materials (plywood, planks, metal and plastic sheets and cardboard), without water and sanitation (Bašić, Jakšić, 2005). Houses like these can be built and abandoned quickly, so they in a sense materialize migratory tendencies of their owners. For example, in Belgrade most of those ‘wild settlements’ and ‘cardboard cities’, how they are colloquially referred to, aren’t permanent, but tend to move, usually under pressure of city government in order to make room for building projects. So, Roma population which already have moved to Belgrade from Southern Serbia or from AP Kosovo and Metohia in 2000s in search for work or safety are now being on the move from one part of the city to another.

From the legal point of view, position of Roma was very peculiar in the Ottoman Empire. They had to pay *jizya*, a tax reserved for non-Muslims, even when they were claimed as Muslims (Mujić, 1953: 150). Most probable reason for that is distrust in wandering people and the true nature of their beliefs, as well as strength of their conviction. But, situation for Roma people (at least for semi-settled) was much better in the Balkans then in The Holy Roman Empire, where they have been practically forbidden to enter under the threat of being killed on spot after the year 1500 (Lewy, 2000). The most extreme case of Roma (forced) segregation in the Balkans region is, without doubt, slavery in the principalities of Walachia and Moldova. Especially for the types of household-slaves which were referred to as *vatrași*, literary meaning ‘associated with a fireplace’. They were owned by nobility, landowners or even church (Marushiakova, Popov, 2009).
Conclusion

One can see that drawing any strong analogies between Roma and Jewish people is very problematic (even thou it is very common in everyday narratives). Most Jews were segregated throughout their history, which means that they were set apart from the rest of society while they kept strong sense of group belonging. Roma people were typically marginalized, which doesn't only mean that they were excluded from larger population, but that they didn't had any resources to maintain strong identity of their own – they have remained to be a varied group of people to this day.

The most striking deviation from Weber’s ideal type actually can explain contemporary situation of Roma migrants. Pariah status is relatively stable, yet in Roma case it formed a basis for one specific process which affects their life up to our time. This is a process of racialisation, which made ultimate aliens and unwanted citizens out of Roma who lacked means to effectively counter racist and orientalistic stereotypization. Careful reader can note that every aspect of pariah status contained a seed of social exclusion, which germinated through time as their typical professions become redundant. Without their trades, pariahs were left only with migrations and poverty as their social essence.

The logic behind the social relations between pariah-people and their hosts still proves to be a very potent force in our time, which will remain present as a heavy burden to all future attempts to integrate similar type new migrants into host societies. Although Roma are (trans)European community, their basically partake the same migratory patterns and social position in host countries with immigrants from Africa and Asia (Algan et al. 2012). Or, more correctly, new migrants from other continents have met the same destiny which Roma people suffered for one thousand years before. Still, upward social mobility represents an ultimate barrier for integration of migrant pariah communities. It was shown that in case of Roma, lack of social mobility, together with low security in terms of subsistence, has been always compensated through never ending spatial mobility, leading to many traumatic challenges both for them and for their hosts, thus making integration and settling in of the pariah people in both symbolic and political sense almost impossible. As long as whole (quasi-) ethnic group remain completely tied to meeting economic demands of the settled peoples, it will remain segregated and marginalized.
Most important of all, such ambulatory economic position is very unstable, and has tendency of drifting to precarious positions of typical urban poor. Roma are no longer constantly on the move, but they don’t symbolically belong to a culture of the host society either. To quote famous Romani jazz musician Django Reinhardt: ‘As well as settled people remain to be settled even when they travel, Roma remain to be nomads even when they stay in one place’ (Mirga, Mruz, 1997: 176).

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4.2. The Balkan Migration Route: Reflections from a Serbian Observatory

Danica Šantić
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Dragan Umek

Introduction

January 2017, a very cold winter month in Serbia marked by many days in which the temperature remains below zero. More than 7,000 refugees are stranded in the country, the highest number since the official closure of the so-called ‘Balkan Migration Route’¹ in March 2016. Most of them are in hospitality centers, but between 1,000 and 2,000 people have given life to makeshift camps in Belgrade, Subotica and along the border with Hungary, facing lack of food, clothes, heating, water, and very harsh living conditions. Pictures showing such dire living conditions have gained Serbia once again central stage in the international media, after the ‘refugee crisis’ that exploded during the summer 2015.

¹ This denomination describes the movements of mainly Asian migrants who originally entered Europe through the Bulgarian-Turkish or Greek-Turkish land or sea borders and then proceed, through Bulgaria or Greece and FYR Macedonia towards Serbia and further to countries of the European Union (EU). This route is often called West Balkan Migration Route and is a part of what Frontex describes as the Eastern Mediterranean Route (FRONTEX, 2015).
The world headlines include numerous reports from Belgrade, pointing out the miserable situation of the ‘inhabitants’ of the new makeshift camp in the core of the capital, the so-called ‘Afghan Park’. How the functioning of the route, after being established in the summer 2015, has developed in the following 18 months remains an important element of investigations, especially if put in relation to the presence of new walls on the borders of several Balkan countries and, at the same time, to the continuity of the (irregular) border crossings along what has become a structured migrant route in the core of Europe (for a recent, albeit different, overview of the formation of the Route see Beznec et al. 2016).

This Chapter is an initial result of a collaborative project led by the authors, which started in mid 2016, and is part of a broader project entitled ‘Camps in Europe’. The aim of this project is to analyze, from a geographical perspective, the system of refugee camps in Serbia, the management of the refugees, the characteristics of the related migration flows. It also studies the policies and the strategies implemented in Serbia and in the other countries along the Balkan route to face the several ‘crises’ of the past few years, as well as the role of other relevant organizations in assisting the refugees. This research is based on the textual analysis of official documents and other secondary sources related to the phenomenon in question, and on extensive field research that has included semi-structured and informal interviews with migrants, volunteers, NGO staff and government officials, as well as participant observations at multiple key sites in Serbia.

In particular, we have visited the Preševo reception center for refugees near the Serbian-FYR Macedonian border, the reception camps at Šid, Adaševci and Principovac along the Serbian-Croatian border, and at Subotica along the Serbian-Hungarian border. We have paid several visits at the asylum seekers center in Krnjača, close to Belgrade. Extensive fieldwork was also been conducted in key sites in Belgrade.

2 The park located between the bus station and train station in central Belgrade has become to be known as ‘Afghan Park’. This open space place has become of great significance for the migrants crossing Serbia since the opening of the Balkan migration route in mid-2015. The park was and remains a major point of encounter and exchange of information among these people on the move, navigating their way toward EU, especially since March 2016 and the official closing of the route on the part of most countries involved (in particular Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and FYR Macedonia).

3 For more informations about the role of Belgrade in migration flows see: Göler et al, 2012 and Šantić, 2014.
including the central bus station, the empty warehouses located behind
the station and converted into a makeshift urban camp by an increasing
number of migrants, the public parking spaces and the Afghan
Park, which, as mentioned above, has become a central place for these
individuals’ encounters and exchange of information concerning ‘the
Route’. Special attention was also given to the work of the NGOs in
support of the refugees, in particular those operating in the facilities
nearby the Afghan Park (Figure 4.2.2).

In the crafting of the present essay, primary data gathered from
the interviews and the observation in the visited sites were thus com-
plemented by desk research on the situation of refugees/migrants/asyl-
num seekers in Serbia. This chapter also makes reference to institutional
sources on the Serbian asylum and reception system. The most signifi-
cant limitations emerged during the project were due to the difficul-
ties in carrying out interviews with the refugees on the move, especially
with women. We have also been confronted with difficulties related to
language barriers, in particular due to scarcity of translators in Far-
si, Urdu and Arabic during the interviews that have been conducted
mostly in English. In addition, the extreme ‘fluidity’ of these popula-
tions movement has also affected our research in important ways. The
situation along ‘the Route’ is in fact constantly changing and this makes
impossible, for example, to calculate the exact numbers of migrants-on-
the-move, or to derive long term conclusions about their characteristics
especially in the makeshift camps. Furthermore, the data concerning
their country of origin and their age was based on their own statements,
since they usually did not have any documents, something that made de
facto impossible to verify the validity of such information.

The few notes reported in this brief intervention must therefore
intend as a first embryonic attempt to start reflecting on the broader
geographies of the Balkan Route together with their related humanitar-
ian implications.

The Balkan Migration Route

The movement of people through the countries which are part of
the Balkan region is not a new phenomenon even though the migra-
tion patterns were subject to several transformations in scope and vis-
ibility across history (Beznec et al, 2016). However, in the past decade
there has been a substantial rise in the number of people attempting to
enter Europe using the Balkan migration route with irregular means and claiming asylum in several European states (Cvejić & Babović, 2014). The major drivers of this migration are considered the impact of the Arab Spring, the war in Syria and Iraq, and the combined effects of conflict, political instability and economic insecurity in many African and Asian countries. In this context, the Balkan Peninsula has become increasingly important for the informal migration movements since 2015 since it has experienced the emergence and the consolidation of a key route used by thousands of individuals, travelling through Greece, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia before reaching their final destinations in Europe, mainly but not exclusively, Germany.

Figure 4.2.1: The Balkan Route(s).

The emergence of this route has in fact suddenly shifted the geographical gravity of the refugee-related migrations towards, complementing the existing maritime routes in the Mediterranean with new overland itineraries. This shift had caught unprepared not only the main ‘transit countries’ and ‘arrival countries’, but also the EU institutions that until that moment had a system of control (and reception) in place which was almost exclusively focused on the Mediterranean borders. The massive increase in population movements via the Balkan Route has accordingly strained the reception capacities and the asylum

procedural systems of the countries involved, and put into question their policies and border controls and diplomatic relations, in some cases resulting in heavy-handed responses by security forces. Political decisions of one country often reflected like dominoes on all the other countries crossed by the route.

After the explosion of arrivals and passages during the summer 2015, a first significant change has affected the Balkan Route in September of the same year, when the main exit point along the Serbian-Hungarian border was closed by the Hungarian authorities, with the realization of a 174 km long fence along the border. This closure caused a major shift in the route by redirecting the refugees towards Croatia and Slovenia. In mid-November new significant changes in the migration policy occurred with the adoption of the first joint restrictive measures by Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia as the result of Slovenia’s request to redirect migrants from non-war torn countries back to Croatia (Šelo-Šabić & Borić, 2016). In addition, some countries along the Balkan Route began profiling and accepting migrants according to their (presumed) country of origin. Selective admission practices allowed only those coming from ‘war-afflicted areas’, essentially Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, to cross borders and continue along the route. Those considered ‘economic migrants’ were not accepted anymore and, as consequences, most of them were stranded at the FYR Macedonia-Greek border in the village of Idomeni, giving life, at that time, to the largest makeshift camp in Europe (Kilibarda, 2016).

In the first two months of 2016, new developments led to the official closure of the Balkan Route. New rules were in fact applied in Austria, Germany and Slovenia and no more Afghans were allowed to go north. Also, FYR Macedonia built a second fence on the border with

5 At the core of mainstream political debates in many European countries was the growing arrival of ‘irregular’ migrants, marked by a often problematic use of the related terminology. The terms used to define them (‘refugee crisis’ vs ‘migration crisis’, irregular, illegal, undocumented, unauthorized or clandestine vs migrants, immigrants, emigrants or foreign nationals, refugees vs economic migrants) are often not in line with existing legal categories and the related entitlements to protection for many of these people entering Europe. Regardless of the term and definition used – migrants/refugees/asylum seekers – in Serbia, these people are usually treated like ‘people in the need’ via interventions based on humanitarian grounds (Mitrović, 2015; Mitrović, 2015a; Šantic & Spasovski, 2016).
Greece and started to periodically block the new arrivals. The Vienna Summit on ‘Migration together’ in February 2016 called for common standards of registration and the strict application of entry criteria which led to the introduction of quotas in Austria, and later on, in all other countries affected by the Balkan migration route. Finally, on March 8th 2016, most of the countries on Balkan Route have announced that their borders were definitely closed to irregular migrants, a decision also somehow related to the EU-Turkey agreement on the limitation of these movements (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016; Šelo-Šabić & Borić, 2016; Beznec et al, 2016). Following the closure of the borders along the Balkan route from Greece to Central Europe, thousands of refugees and other migrants suddenly remained in a legal limbo and were abandoned in dire living conditions.

Unique development of a ‘formalized corridor’ (Beznec et al, 2016: 4) had in fact enabled refugees to cross the Balkans within few days, which implied an unprecedented increase in overall numbers of asylum-seekers arriving in Europe. Exact number of passages through the Balkan Route is unknown, since accurate statistics on irregular migrations are very difficult to obtain. While the European Parliament estimated some 596,000 migrants transited through these countries in 2015,6 the UNHCR7 counted 815,000, while for the IOM8 they amounted to 639,152. According to FRONTEX,9 885,000 illegal border crossings were conducted along what they describe as the ‘East Mediterranean Route’ in 2015. At the same time, the Serbian authorities have declared that 577,995 individuals expressed the intention to seek asylum in Serbia (Ministry of Interior, 2016; Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016). These figures are probably much higher in reality, since only an estimated 2/3rds of the asylum seekers are registered upon arrival in transit countries (Šelo-Šabić & Borić, 2015, Beznec et

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8 IOM Weekly Flows Compilation Report No. 4. Available at: http:// doe.iom.int/docs/WEEKLY%20Flows%20Compilation%20No4%204%20Feb%202016.pdf accessed on January 10th 2017
The vast majority of people (approx. 90%) engaging with this route in search of safety and protection were primarily from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016).

The role of Serbia in the Balkan Route

Serbia is a key transit country along the Balkan Route. The aim of the majority of refugees is to move through the Serbian territory as quickly as possible in order to reach their respective destination countries in Western Europe. It must be noted that some authors have questioned the appropriateness of the term ‘transit countries’, by emphasizing how the politicized nature of the term relates to a broader securitization discourse on migration (İçduygu & Yükseker, 2012) and arguing that it artificially contributes to a linear narrative of origin-transit-destination, in this way masking the much more complex configuration of contemporary migration patterns (Collyer & de Haas, 2012). Remarkably, prior to June 2015, asylum and migration related issues had never been on the agenda of top politicians and political parties in Serbia, because until then very few migrants actually applied for asylum (UNHCR, 2012; Kilibarda, 2016).

Serbia is the part of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In pursuit of the goal to become EU member state, Serbia agreed to facilitate the transformation of the national legislation concerning migration (Beznec et al, 2016). Accordingly, the Serbian Constitution includes the right for endangered individuals to ask for asylum (Official Gazette, 2006). In furtherance of this right, the Law on Asylum was adopted in November 2007 (Official Gazette, 2007) in order to harmonize its juridical framework with that of the European Union on the same matter; it was the first law of this kind in the Serbian legal system. By adopting this document, Serbia is thus committed to assist and protect all asylum seekers, which was one of the conditions for entering the so-called ‘Schengen White List’ (a list of non-EU countries whose nationals do not require visas to enter EU). In the course of the visa liberalization process several key national documents were also adopted such as: the Law on Travel Documents (Official Gazette, 2007); the Law on State Border Protection (Official Gazette, 2008); the Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette, 2008); and the
Law on Migration Management (Official Gazette, 2012). These legal norms are further operationalized through strategic documents and regulations related to migration management and the system of reception and accommodation of asylum seekers (Morača, 2014).

In particular, the international humanitarian response to this new emergency in Serbia began scaling up in June 2015 in response to the abovementioned sharp increase in arrivals along the Balkan Migration Route. On that occasion, the Serbian government has decided to establish the Working Group on Mixed Migration Flows, which involves five different Ministries: the Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs; the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry of EU integrations; the Ministry of Health; but also the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, and the EU Delegation in Serbia. The main task of this working group was (and remains) that of providing immediate and longer-term responses to the humanitarian emergencies and of facilitating coordination and inter-agency cooperation among the different institutions in establishing adequate reception and transit facilities, in strengthening registration systems, and in offering to the refugees key services including temporary shelter, emergency health care, essential food and non-food items, water and sanitation (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016). Besides that group, a number of international organizations, such as UNHCR, UNICEF and the IOM, together with a significant number of NGOs began working with the refugees in consultation with the government and the local communities at the border crossings, at the asylum and reception centers and in the center of Belgrade, close to the Afghan Park. They provide general information on medical assistance, translation services, and psycho-

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11 The Danish Council for Refugees (DRC), the Asylum Protection Center (APC), the Caritas, the ADRA, the Praxis, the Red Cross, the HELP, Philanthropy (Organization of Serbian Orthodox Church), the Asylum Info Center, the SOS Children Villages Serbia, the NGO Atina, the Save the Children, the Psychosocial Innovation Network (PIN), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), the Divac Foundation, the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, the Miksalište, the Info Park, among many others.
logical support, including activities for children and more general legal protection; they also deal with individuals with special needs, with difficult family links, with unaccompanied children, and assist those who voluntary wish to return to the country of origin, providing them with transport services, food, water and other items.\(^\text{12}\)

**Figure 4.2.2: Geographical distribution of the asylum and reception centers in Serbia.**


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\(^\text{12}\) More informations about the activities of the Working group on Mix Migration Flows may be found on www.kirs.gov.rs and www.unhcr.rs
In addition to the existing asylum-seekers centers, also in response to the increasing number of arrivals, the government has opened several new ‘reception-transit centers’, and expanded the capacities of the existing centers. According to the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, there are presently 17 hospitality centers for migrants in Serbia, capable of hosting up to 6,000 people. These centers are divided into two categories (see Figure 4): (i) the official governmental asylum centers in Knjača, Banja Koviljača, Bogovadja, Sjenica and Tutin; and (ii) the reception centers in Preševo and Bujanovac – at the southern border with FYR Macedonia – those in Šid, Principovac and Adaševci – at western border with Croatia – and those located in Subotica and Sombor – at northern border with Hungary – and, finally, those found in Pirot, Bosilegrad, Dimitrovgrad, and Zaječar – at eastern border with Bulgaria – and in Negotin – at eastern border with Romania.

Opening of new reception centers in Sombor, Bujanovac, Dimitrovgrad, Pirot and Bosilegrad in October and November 2016 was carried out in accordance with the ‘Response plan for an increased number of migrants on the territory of the Republic of Serbia’ for the period October 2016–March 2017 and the support of the EU Delegation in Serbia. Additional reception centers may be opened in the near future in case the number of migrants will exceed the capacity of the existing facilities in Kikinda, Bačka Palanka (in Vojvodina) and Aleksinac, Niš, Vranje (in southern Serbia). The planned opening of a series of new smaller centers is linked to the intention of the Serbian Government to relocate and distribute the refugees in different parts of Serbia (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016).

It is very important to emphasize the role of Belgrade in the consolidation of the Balkan migration route. Even though it is never formally established as a reception center, the so-called Afghan Park and the surrounding areas (public parking spaces, cheap hostels, private apartments and abandoned warehouses) have seen, since the summer 2015, a significant presence of migrants, with figures oscillating between 100 and 1,000 individuals (Grupa 484, 2016). At the beginning of the 2017, with the sharp increase in the number of people populating a new makeshift camp in the center of Belgrade (up to 2000), the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, together with other governmental institutions, opened one additional facility in the military barracks in Obrenovac, some 30 km away from Belgrade, to provide the refugees with a shelter from the cold.
Notes from the field

Despite the emergence of some clear patterns, migration flows through Balkan Migration Route keep on changing as a reflection of the variable articulations of the route and the area of origin of the refugees/migrants. These changes are indeed related to the actual number of migrants, their presumed nationality, their itineraries and desired destination, their demographic profile, but also the duration of their stay and institutions that support (or try to support) them. In order to examine some of these elements, we rely here on existing official statistics, on our participant observation during fieldwork and on the interviews conducted in the past month. In doing so, we suggest to consider the events of the past 18 months as marked by two distinct stages: the first one corresponding to the period in which the route was open (till March 2016); the second one which started after the closure of the route.

The semi-structured interviews were organized according to four main key aspects. The first part was normally related to the biography of the interviewee, the second was focused on details about their travels, the third on their conditions while in Serbia including the accommodation and facilities that supported them, and the final part interrogated their plans for the future. By combining all these different sources, we were able to get some insights into the most recent changes affecting the route.

It may be helpful to have a first glance at some of the key figures characterizing this impressive change of scenario in the migrants’ mobility of the region, and of Serbia in particular. The number of foreign nationals seeking asylum in Serbia has in fact risen from just 77 individuals in 2008 to 577,995 in 2015 (see Figure 4.2.3). But if we consider the total number of asylum seekers in the period 2008–2014 – 28,285 individuals – and compare it to the 2015 figures – 577,995 individuals – the sudden shift produced by the refugee crisis in 2015 appears in all its extraordinary significance. Furthermore, when comparing the figures concerning 2014 and 2015, what emerges is that the number of asylum seekers has increased by 35 times in just one year, showing even more clearly how Serbia has been suddenly exposed to such a ‘crisis’. The highest number of asylum seekers ever recorded along the route in one single month was in October 2015, when 180,307 individuals were registered. With over 10,000 passages in some days, the one stop hospitality center in Preševo soon became a leading point of entrance and registration along the route (Commissariat for Refugees and Mi-
Despite the significantly reduced migrant inflows due to restrictive measures applied to EU borders since November 2015, in the period January-February 2016 95,792 people in transition were still recorded in Serbia (Šelo-Šabić & Borić, 2015; Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016). Only the official closure of the Balkan Migration Route in March 2016, as noted above, has remarkably affected the pace of arrivals in Serbia, with only 2,211 individuals in March, 598 in April and 861 in May. In the same period, however, there was a sharp increase in number of refugees and asylum seekers stuck in Serbia and waiting to enter the EU. In December 2016, for instance, the number has reached 7,000, the highest amount of stranded people ever recorded in Serbia (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016a). This phenomenon appears to be largely related to the decision of the Hungarian authorities, in November 2016, to introduce quotas of 20 daily admissions via two transit zones (Horgoš and Kelebija), significantly reducing the existing admissions quota. With the estimated irregular arrivals of 50 to 150 new migrants daily in Serbia, the number of stranded individuals has thus continued to rise. Most recent data show that the Hungarian authorities have further decreased the quotas down to 10 people per day, so an increased number of stranded refugees in Serbia is expected in the rest of 2017 with the improvement of the weather conditions and the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East.

**Figure 4.2.3: Asylum seekers**\(^\text{13}\) in Serbia (2008–2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>283</td>
<td>397</td>
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<td>627</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>607</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>943</td>
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<td>516</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>761</td>
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<td>1170</td>
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<td>149923</td>
<td>92826</td>
<td>577995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^\text{13}\) The Law on Asylum allows refugees to express their intention to apply for asylum either at the border or after having entered the Serbian territory. This affords them the right to stay legally in the country for a limited time period (usually 72 hours), but the majority usually leaves Serbia before a final decision is taken.
According to the Ministry of Interior data set, since 2015 citizens of almost 100 different countries have crossed the Balkan Route. It is important to emphasize that these migrants usually travel without the valid documents and therefore the registration is almost entirely based on their own declarations, which may be not very accurate. However, it is estimated that in 2015 the majority of the migrants originated in war-affected areas: 52% from Syria, 28% from Afghanistan and 13% from Iraq. A less significant number of people were registered as originating from Pakistan (2%), Iran (2%), Lebanon, Bangladesh, Morocco, and from other Asian or African countries. The number of Syrians in particular has increased by more than 80 times in the first 10 months of 2015, from only 1,161 in January to 96,524 in October. The number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan also increased by more than 60 times, from only 810 in January to 53,450 in October, while those from Iraq raised from only 77 to 17,841 during the same period (Ministry of Interior, 2015). After the closure the route in March 2016, a significant shift in the origin of the migrants was recorded: in that year in fact the majority of arrivals were from Afghanistan and Pakistan. In August 2016 the presence of individuals from Afghanistan counted for the vast majority of guests (about 80%) accommodated in asylum and reception centers. Also, (male) refugees from Afghanistan and Pakistan compose the populations of makeshift camps in Belgrade and Subotica that we have visited in the summer 2016 and in January 2017; these presences were clearly connected to the operation of the irregular migration networks and the smugglers who try to organize the illegal passages through the Hungarian or the Croatian border. Also, before the route was officially closed, more people from Africa, especially Eritrea, Somalia, Congo, were registered in Serbia, but after March 2016 there are virtually no more migrants from this origin.

What is perhaps more important, is the fact that the other demographic characteristics of the flows here discussed have also changed in observed period. At the beginning of the 2015, a clear majority of males emerged along these irregular routes (in June 2015 there was 6 times more males than females, Ministry of Interior, 2015). But important shift in population trends occurred at the beginning of October 2015, with an increased number of women and children as well as other vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied minors, elderly individuals, pregnant and lactating women, and people with disabilities or chronic illness. These populations also appeared to have less money, fewer re-
sources and less information about their journey (Šelo-Šabić & Borić, 2015), and they were largely coming from the Middle East were the civil war was infuriating. However, after the route was closed, these flows sharply decreased and were replaced by a vast majority of single males.

Results in our interviews show that the families fleeing from the war in Syria and Iraq remained in refugee camps in Turkey after the closure of the route, and that a high number of them were stranded in Greece. At the same time, we registered a growing presence of unaccompanied minors from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the interviews, the reason for this is that these young males left the country either because of the persecutions operated by the Talibans, or because they were afraid to be recruited for the army. Very few of them mentioned in interview any economic reason to migrate, while highlighting the fact that in case of economic related the families normally ask one member, usually the oldest brother, to go to the Europe in search for better living conditions and the resources to help the entire family.

As noted above, the country has a theoretical capacity of temporarily hosting about 6,000 refugees, but this capacity will be significantly expanded in 2017. Most of the refugees are now located in centers under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration: about less than 6,000 people, corresponding to about the 80% of the total (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016a; UNHCR, 2016), but recently we have also discovered that more and more people have found shelter in the warehouses located in the center of Belgrade (more than 1,000) or along the border with Hungary, often accommodated in tents or, in extremely precarious conditions, in a former brick factory. Other individuals ‘on the move’ are staying at the Asylum Seekers center in Krnjača (1,256), and at the reception and transit centers in Adaševci (1,023) and Preševo (887) (Graph 1). These centers provide migrants with food, clothes, medical help and, in some cases, also kindergartens, language classes, entertainment spots, sport activities, something particularly important especially when the duration of the stay is over six months. These centers usually accommodate the majority of stranded families and women, with a smaller contingent of young men. The Serbian authorities have also initiated a program of integration for children refugees in order to allow them to attend regular schools, and training for foster parents to adopt unaccompanied minors.

14 During this winter their number ranged between 10 and 200 people.
The rest of the migrants, between 1000 and 2000 people, have found shelter in the warehouses near the train station, in public parking spaces near the bus station and in the so called ‘Afghan Park’. Young, single men, mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, have in fact occupied abandoned depots and given life to what is, as we write, the largest informal urban camp in Europe. Some of them have been staying there for months in very poor conditions with no heating, water, electricity, or even beds. But the vicinity to the transportation facilities and the Afghan Park – as the elected place for migrants to get together and learn about the most recent developments along ‘the route’ – is their main reason to reside in such a precarious settlement. Serbian authorities have tried several times, with different methods, to relocate the migrants, but never succeeded. Since the migrants are relying on some assistance provided by NGOs and local aid groups, the Serbian authorities decided in November 2016 that all aid distributions must be stopped in order to encourage the migrants to seek assistance in the hospitality centers established by the government. As mentioned above, the opening of the temporary reception center in Obrenovac at the beginning of January 2017 is part of this strategy aimed at reducing the number of people in Belgrade makeshift camp.
The migrants that we have interviewed during our fieldwork, however, revealed that their refusal to move to the centers was related to their wish to move north as quickly as possible. Also, they normally claimed that the camps were already full, and that, in case, they would have accepted to go only to Krnjača, which is only 10 km away from the city center. The authorities have also approached the migrants located in the makeshift camp and offered to voluntarily relocate them to the Preševo Reception Centre, but only a hundred of them have accepted because its location is considered too far away from their desired destination (and from Afghan Park where the illegal crossings are organized), and because their fear of being deported to another country if regularly registered in that camp.

Conclusion

Since mid 2015, day-to-day events have gathered significant media and government attention, with a lot of changes affecting the direction and the very modalities of the Balkan Migration Route. The route has been in fact extremely ‘fluid’ (especially until March 2016, when it was officially closed by most Balkan countries), heterogeneous and dynamic, experiencing very quick changes in terms of numbers of migrants seeking international protection, but also in terms of their country of origin, ethnicity, religion, language, gender, age. These increasing flows have put Serbia on the map of some of the most important humanitarian emergencies in Europe of the past decades.

The closure of international borders along the Balkan Route has marked a shift in the approach adopted by several countries to the practical management of the refugees, from facilitation of – or impediment to – transit to responsibility for longer-term reception and protection. The creation of new physical and legal barriers has in fact led to a dramatic increase of migrants staying for a longer time in Serbia, something that has put enormous pressure on the country’s asylum system. Also, the tightening of the transit conditions has contributed to an increased relevance of the ‘services’ provided by the increasing presence of smugglers and to a greater availability of unofficial information online and on the social media about the Balkan Route, which has soon become the leading facilitator of migration flows. In fact, de-
Despite the route being officially closed, the flows of ‘irregular’ migrants and their crossings have not stopped; it has rather become less visible.

Since March 2016, significant changes have affected the route. First, the route has again changed its trajectory with growing numbers of migrants entering Serbia via Bulgarian border, the main official point of entry at present, while the (only official) exit point has become again the border to Hungary (allowing for about 10 people a day to go through).15 Second, while the number of migrants entering Serbia has substantial declined compared to the previous year, they tend to stay in the country much longer, 3 months on average. Third, more people are now coming from Afghanistan (over 50% in 2016) and Iraq (28%) and less from Syria (only 11%) (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2016). Finally, the majority of migrants are young males with a significant component of minors, mainly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and who often can barely speak any English. Under the new circumstances, the majority of these migrants are technically stranded in Serbia. The situation is rather severe, and the possibility of another imminent humanitarian crisis at a much larger scale persists, especially when the weather conditions will improve and the Balkan Route will be engaged again by growing numbers of migrants as an active path to the richer EU countries. This essay is a first attempt to reflect on the implications of the official closure of the Balkan Route for the migrants now stranded in Serbia and for the whole system of support organized by the authorities and the other organizations involved in humanitarian interventions along the route and in this country in particular. The situation of the Route is already changing while we write this brief Chapter, with the decision of the Serbian authorities to dismantle the makeshift camps in the North, close to the Hungarian border, and relocate the migrants. More work is thus needed to keep on studying the development of this extraordinary phenomenon which may have important consequences not only on the future lives of the migrants in question but also on the political landscape of Serbia and of the entire Balkan region.

15 The Hungarian authorities have introduced the quotas of 30 daily admissions via two transit zones in mid 2016. In November of the same year, they introduced even smaller quotas: only 20 people per working day. In January 2017, the Hungarian authorities have once again reduced the quotas to only 10 arrivals daily, making the situation of the migrants stranded in Serbia even more difficult and precarious.
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4.3. Stuck In-between: Exploring the Liminality inside the Migratory Transfer to Europe

Bodies, spaces and the liminality of migratory transfer

Provocative as it might be, the current waves of migrants from the Middle East and the Central Asia which are overflowing Europe aroused multiple issues. Still, comprehension of this process and its extent hardly has stepped-out from a Manichean imagery found in ‘political concerns’ and normative-evaluative matrix of the public discourse. Left without the elaborate insights, we also might drop-down precisely the social intricacy this process incorporates in its unfolding through the very course of migratory transfer – an in-between realm characterized with enormous practical investment migrants themselves perform. Fraught with sacrifice, ambivalence, ambiguity and confusion appearing in this unstructured totality of a migration process, but also with enormous willingness, expectations and imaginary conceptions, it nonetheless becomes almost equal to a religious fervor for salvation and collective ritual that is supposed to perform a ‘transfer’ to a ‘higher rank’ – as an existential act of Becoming. Even if one might find as an extremely ill-fitted metaphor to grasp – otherwise largely unexplored transitory phase of migration, with terms designating the religious and ritual conversion, the social conformity of this process nonetheless appears as a limiting case of liminality.
Ontologically denoting the stage of transference between two states, in its applicative extent, liminality often was rather restrictively employed. Nonetheless, it served almost exclusively only to nominate a peculiar stage of transitory thresholds – whether as an inscription of cultural marginality through ‘narrative embodiment’ (Chawla, Rodriguez, 2011) in semiotically-burdened postcolonial studies, or its imposition (Hynes, 2010), performative and psychological transitions (Broadhurst, 1999; Duffy, 2011; Shwenger, 2012) or peculiarities of socio-political ordering (Bryant, 2014; Melich, 2005; Bauman, 1994). What was lost in these approaches was exactly what liminality initially was designed for by Arnold van Gennep (van Gennep 1909, 1960) and re-elaborated some 50 years later by Victor Turner in his study The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Turner 1966, 1991): investigation of ambiguous effects and compositions of the rites of passage. Namely, one of the key traits of this line of thought was, nonetheless, in slight opposition to a Durkheim’s neo-Kantian anthropology, where not only the transformation processes were somehow secured from each kind of instability – as they were closely associated with a priori categories. Turner, alike van Gennep did, sought to oppose this vision by introducing not only a phenomenological aspect into investigation by noting the primary experience. Moreover, both were disputing a mere correspondence that would re-affirm the social conformity and order(s). Namely, even being reflected as a transmission within the set of positions, liminality encompasses a more giddy and undetermined set of (op)positions that are equally affecting those confronted with the passage, consequentially provoking numerous adaptations and re-assemblages of social structure (Turner, 1991; Thomassen, 2009; 2013; 2014; Szakolczai, 2000; 2009; van Gennep, 1960).

One might find particularly appealing to challenge benumbed objectivism and the fictitious idea on stability precisely with an implied anti-structural moment and flexibility of playing off within rituals and rites of passage, that, besides emphasis given to experiential structures, offers a chance to step out of numerous dualisms (especially structure/agency), still prevailing in social sciences. Presenting a ‘world of contingency where events and ideas and reality itself can be pushed in different directions’ (Thomassen, 2013: 198), liminality hence opens a horizon for interpreting lived processes that are in actu recomposing the social through flows, events, practices, exchanges and conversions, rather than a simple effect of structures. Still, liminality does not ap-
pear as directive in *explicative terms* (ibid), as being *hardly translatable* into a (linear) matrix of social and cultural enactment in accordance to ‘myths’, ‘interests’, ‘rules’, ‘justifications’ etc. Its indefinite character – that could hardly follow abstract systemic generalizations, thus necessitates further analytical extensions in order to apprehend the *composition of migratory liminality* in its *mobile* and *active* unfolding, compounded exactly though practical engagement of *bodies* and their social intertwinement through *spaces*.

Intrinsically indicating the generative mechanisms of social practices, concepts of *body* and *space(s)*, along with the associated concepts we are about to deploy, set the firm *epistemic* and more substantially, *socio-ontological coordinates* for unraveling the peculiarities residing in migratory transfer and their substantially liminal character. As a primary (material) source of *practical engagement*, in explicative sense (the concept of) a body encompasses ‘an incarnate being engaging practical know-how as she navigates active and mobile configurations of affect, action and powers’ (Wacquant, 2014: 3). Starting with its symbolic and desiring affectations and representations of the world, a *learned, affected, experiencing* and *desiring* body thus exposes the source of efficient agency, even so, irreducible to intrinistic properties because it bears the weight of particular social upbringing circumscribed in *specific habitus* (Bourdieu, 1984; 1992; 2000). Habitus, still, presents far more than a mere residuum of social upbringing. Namely, even appearing as a (structurally accorded) source of practices, practical orientation of the body within the world implies active and even *tactical* (de Certeau, 2002; Lefebvre, 2002) adaptation, brought in intricate and dynamic recomposition of relations, particularly as a mastery of disposal with effective resources or *forms of capital*, relevant in performing particular practices (Bourdieu, 1986; 1984; 1992; 2000) – in this case, migration. Its occurrence and social conformation further provokes an inclusion of the *concept of (social) space*. Seen not only as a physical externality, but also as a *social structure* contoured as a *relational topology of power*, accorded to asymmetrical distribution of capital (Bourdieu, 1984; 1992; 2000; 2014; Massey, 2008), it presents a locus where the *networks* of social relations are *practically coordinated* and *performed* through practices of actors and groups (Lefebvre, 1992; 2009; Cresswell, 2011). Space, in its manifold shapes thus makes the ‘arena’ where the relational conformation of power that (temporally) defines
positions, simultaneously co-producing it, through practical, bodily engagements. For our investigation, space possesses additional analytical dimension, as it presents also a particular *coordinate for action*, filled with affections, conceptions and appreciations that migrants endorse and thus establish their *migratory course*.

Figure 4.3.1: Stuck in-between. A liminoid, wrapped in blanket on a cold October day in Belgrade, as many of his peers, becomes a convict of waiting within the ‘in-between’ spaces of liminality.

Setting of these analytical grounds will help us to profoundly disclose a *liminal process of becoming* compounded within the very migration-course of the migrants from the Middle East and Central Asia on their way to EU, (temporarily) stuck in Belgrade parks and refugee centers due to closure of so-called ‘Balkan route’. Exposing these *mutually-linked* concepts and traversing them *jointly with empirical data* collected through 15 interviews, numerous conversations and careful observations performed from August to October 2016, will bring in front the *generative mechanisms and schemes of practices* that compose the migratory liminality. Exactly through this kind of *enactive ethnography* (Wacquant, 2014), we will be able to *reconstruct* the unfolding of migratory trajectory, practical and ethical schemes of *habitus* and specific *strategies* employed together with the means available for transfer and peculiar liminal institutions. In this way, it will be possible to unravel

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1 Interviews covered three segments: 1) social background and migratory trajectory; 2) incentives and ambitions leading to migration; 3) strategies and experiences. Together with the numerous conversations and field notes produced during observations, this ethnographic approach enables reconstruction of very structures of practices – by discerning the schemes of habitus and
equally the macroscopic and microscopic extension this migratory liminality encompasses: its affective and conative initiation – originating from particular schemes of habitus and resembling almost a religious quest for salvation, an entire geography of liminal transfer and peculiar liminal space where this transfer unfolds through practices of both material and symbolic exchanges (Descola, 2013), but also the performance of structures of power and hierarchies appearing within the liminal spaces, that in sum ‘mold’ the migrants, as ‘liminal entities’ being ‘neither here nor there’. On the contrary, ‘they are betwixt and between the position assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention and ceremonial’ (Turner, 1991: 95), and thus, stuck in-between a complex spatio-temporal web of signification, as well as bodily materialization.

Seeking for EUdaimonia: establishing the liminal vector

Coming primarily from a war-torn spaces of Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan, these – mostly youngsters, aged from 15–35, have embarked on this trip with an elementary intention to escape a state of almost perpetual war and imminent physical threats ruling in these spaces, thus, the precariousness of their position. Declasded and non-educated youngsters – who were growing up almost as nomads in tents, moving around due to combat operations, the petty-bourgeois students and shopkeepers afraid of continuous armed conflicts along with the army-trained personnel and people who lost their homes and properties due to war, eventually will become liminoids heading to Western Europe. Inciting the migration indissolubly emerges from (structural) precariousness formed due to effects of political economy of violence permeating the spaces of Middle East and Central Asia – characterized with the juncture of unrestrained violence, uncertainty, lack of (mutual) reliability, provisionally built ties and economy based on barter-transactions. Moreover, it corresponds to a ritual of status elevation Turner observed, as actors and groups entering into this kind of a ritual, and later being trapped into liminality, indeed: 1) fall in the interstices of social structure, 2) come from its margins and 3) occupy its lowest rungs (Turner, 1991, 125). Yet, the effective forms of capital employed, thus offering profound insights into the peculiarities of liminal position emerging through migratory transfer.
initiation of liminal transfer contains additional generative dimension. Against the possible mechanistic thinking, the very migratory course also emerges through a (re)construction of possibilities in broader historical relations of social inequalities (Janković, 2013), hence imminently possessing an ‘existential quality’ (Turner, 1991).²

Contrary to being seen as a predetermined plan or enactment in accordance with well established cultural map (Bourdieu, 1992), an initiation of liminal transfer in its symbolic sense resides in particular experiential structures of the body, irresistibly resembling a quest for salvation which Weber identified quite a long time ago (Weber, 1993). The story on liminoids originates exactly in the principles of bodily self-attraction for salvation from political and economic oppressions (ibid) that historically got conflated into a specific symbolism migrants endorse and instill into geographical space through, nonetheless, certain eschatology. Seeking for elementary privileges of social life is transmitted into a particular imagery and symbolism – associated to (actual) spaces liminoids are seeking to ecstatically appropriate in their salvation path is somehow close to what Lefebvre termed representational space: a directly experienced image of the world that ‘embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time’ (Lefebvre, 1992: 42). Residing between phantasmagoria and danger, these representational spaces are maybe the pillar of contemporary migration from the Middle East. They re-introduce a

² Far from being seen in mechanically-reactive fashion, the common ground for inciting the migration is exactly in what Judith Butler termed ‘existential precarity’ (Butler, 2009). Thus, in many testimonies, being born in the perpetual war, as well as the fear and threat of retaliation and unrestrained physical violence apparently produced overall precariousness that transformed into a key migrating-impetus. As it was summed up by a young Afghan male, ‘20 years of my age... It is war... We are not sleeping because of the fire, now everything is destroyed... By Taliban... But Taliban called the home and say: “I will kill you, destroy your home”... Father kidnapped, brother kidnapped’ (original spelling). One male from Kandahar said ‘Taliban bombed my house’, reminding that it had happened despite it was the zone protected by the US Army, ‘saying to my father, mother, brother: “You have to leave”’. A student of programming and a small shopkeeper from Kabul, aged 24, told me that his mother was had been killed by the Taliban. He described in detail the everyday insecurity in Kabul he was facing with constant threat of explosions, as many of his peers, who embarked on this voyage. For more thorough insights into political economy of violence forming this pre-migratory precarity, see: Josipović, Korac Sanderson and Sekulić in this volume.
bodily perceived symbolic geography – deposited on specific classification and representation of social space and vectors that rest upon desiring and tantalizing projection. That is, to play on Aristotelian concept (Aristotle, 1998), Eudaimonia: a seeking for happiness and well-being of particular socio-historic kind – a process within which this desire is getting its complete meaning.

Divisions this symbolic geography implies establish the liminal vector and the very course of migratory transfer over social space(s), as the practical coordinate to be finalized – at least from experiential structures of liminoids. Thrilled and attracted with EU as a ‘promised land’, these predominantly male Afghan youngsters set a course for the redemption of troubles through seemingly obvious sources of salvation. Being filled with an uncertainty and liminal ambiguity (Turner, 1991; Thomassen, 2009; 2013; 2014; Szakolczai, 2009), this liminal projection is comprehended in rather simplified and phantasmagoric manner. It is summed in a quite general symbolic attraction manifested in such inclinations, repeated as mantras: ‘I want to have a good life’, ‘I want to live just like you’, ‘We want your life: to be free’, etc. However simplified, these expressions reflect the auspicious means for solving the conundrums of particular theodicy (Weber, 1993), translated into an ethical call filled with evaluations and expectations. In words of 26 years-old student from Pakistan:

‘We... Some people didn’t come here cause of jobs... Only they came here for relaxed life... For life... For safe life... For good healthcare, for education... When I do the paper, do the passport... Then the life is good’ (original spelling).

One student from Kabul expressed the similar desire:

‘In Afghanistan... The money is good, but the security... Afghanistan life is very hard... When you get out of house... you don’t know... because the explosion possible near to your street... (...) And because every mother and father want to be... want have a good... good care, have a good future... Because that, more people are moving from Afghanistan, like me: my father wants me to be a great person in the future... Everybody wants to have a good job, good life, anyway, for example in Serbia, you know, you also want food, good car, you want anything’ (original spelling).
Albeit ‘every need for salvation is an expression of some “distress”, social or economic oppression’ (Weber, 1993: 106), this ‘subjective’ side – responsible for an initiation of liminal transfer, necessarily converges with a structure of available forms of capital which might appear as effective and thus, jointly (con)figurates the liminal transfer. Moreover, habituses – conceived more as a bodily adaptation to specific order(s) and directions determined rather by relatively independent dynamics found in networks of relations (Descola, 2013; Elias, 2000) than a firm and durable dispositional set (Bourdieu, 1984; 1992; 1999; 2000), guide the practical conducts of liminoids through particular ethical principles which they endorsed. Reflected as (moral) lenses through which the world is perceived and the action put in motion – particularly by setting the coordinates of spatial mediation, these principles certainly distinguish those with sorted intentions (as well as resources), from those who set off in rather opportunistic manner, by ‘catching the wave’.

Latter and the most numerous group, consists of radically deprived (Afghan) males embarking on a journey by solely ‘catching the train’, or ‘the wave’ initiated by the war situation and migrant-waves from Syria and Iraq. Marginal even in liminal process, they are deprived of any sufficient or sophisticated means to access the sites of salvation. Extent of deprivation from any resourceful means of transfer this group faces, thus, introduces a particular dispositional set that relies upon a mere ‘humanizing’ substance. Nonetheless close to what Weber found concerning the significance of salvation for politically and economically deprived groups, ‘the sense of dignity of the disprivileged strata rests on proclaimed “promise”’ (Weber, 1993: 106) and recalling of their equal status as human beings and living off a help on this journey thus reflecting a particular ethics of humility they endorse. This ethical principle thus guides the practical conduct of a number of migrants and echoes in their testimonies. As one Afghan male summed – as many others like him, when asked about the very transfer:

‘I don’t know. When I get the border open, maybe I going to France or any other country... We are hoping. Main reason is that we take the papers and then my mother, sister will come’ (original spelling).

A similar story has been said by another Afghan, a student of medicine aged 30, who also doesn’t know where exactly he is about
to situate, sees the Western Europe as a place of reciprocity that will generally secure him the following:

‘They support us... They support us Afghani people coming. And they’re good people, they know humility, they speak for us’ (original spelling).

Somehow opposed to this, the imagery found among those possessing various means for passage, is not only articulated in a manner implying a dignified stance, but is also better fitted to correspond to (virtual) demands of status accession. It appears as the mastery of transforming of social gains into economic and vice versa, by following the same vector of projection contained in liminal process of status ascension. Complying with something that might be called an ethics of exchange, these migrants – mostly the families with children and students and at the same time small shopkeepers, interrupted their studies due to both insecurities and war, as it is the case with Syrians and Iraqis, as well as emerging chances to leave their country, in case of Afghans. For them, entering into this process thus implies a strategically measured projection, embodied in careful investment of possessed resources into a liminal transfer, together with a relatively well structured set of expectations and devised path of ascent.

High level of ‘strategic investment’ is primarily articulated through son’s migration, for which the family temporarily sacrifices its resources and relies on relatives residing in EU helping him financially to pay the smugglers for crossing borders, in order to (finally) secure the way for the others. Even though here the recalling of the ethical force of humility isn’t absent, it does not go against assiduously projected process. Contrary, for this liminoid sub-group, this process and ethical forces it draws upon, appears as an establishment of a firm life trajectory where first the re-settling the potential means of gaining this kind of status accession occurs. Thus, one 24 year old student from Afghanistan said about the Germans:

‘As my sister told me: “They are the best people”, but proceed exactly with description of how his sister is helping him to reach the Germany, as the precariousness he faced in his student days, lead him to conclude the following:

‘Situation was good, but there was many problems for living: about working, situation about security (...) We want just
security. Not more money (...) I’ve quit schooling, because of the lack of money... I had to work, to find the money for my family’ (original spelling).

Here, a developed network deposited on social capital is particularly put in motion. As his compatriot, a student from Kabul aged 25 said:

‘I decide to go to Germany (...) Just security. My father worked about 13 years for a man from Germany (...) He was my father’s boss... In Afghanistan... And he told him “My son will come to work”... So, I accepted Germany’ (original spelling).

Conspicuous difference between the two modes of performing the liminal vector, reflects a particular dispositional set and leads to development of diverging 1) strategies and institutions of transfer 2) which are on the other side intrinsically linked with divergent principles of (material and symbolic) exchanges. These (vertical and hierarchical) differences will, however, again be unified on a horizon of liminal transfer: a substantial bodily practice that will be (re-)composed with all the means available and all of those ‘subjective’ acts and experiential realm of the body. Its (temporary) aim will thus be to find a path in a peculiar game of desire and willingness, pain and suffering, walking and finding the way to pass the ‘magical’ border of Hungary, set as a ‘liminal threshold’ (Turner, 1991; Thomassen, 2009; 2013; 2014; Szakolczai, 2009). Words of two young Afghans perhaps best sum up this logic, as the first said – concerning the expectations for a successful transfer over Hungarian border, ‘We will (be) injure(d), (or) we will die...’ At the same time, this magical crossing, despite all the risks, contains such a magnetic force of attraction, as it can be seen from the words of his peer: ‘They say, “If you arrive here, all of your problems will be solved”’ (original spelling).

Being-on-the-move: unfolding liminal networks

Complexity of passage and the challenges faced during the spatial transfer helped forming a peculiar mediative liminal spatio-temporal world. Deposited upon distinctive principles, mechanisms and structures of exchange that in sequential and mechanical manner enable the very physical transfer, as any social field (Bourdieu, 1984; 1992; 1999; 2000; Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992), liminal space encompasses a relatively au-
tonomous practical logic emerging through a relational intersection of objective and subjective constituencies, respectively, available means and schemes of habitus. Collective force of liminal transfer – deposited on particular spatio-temporal modus of bodily practices, still traverses various logics of spatial production and confronts the very ground of social order, instilled into space(s). It is why the migratory liminality necessarily succumbs to various (attempts) at the articulation – at the first place, projected political symmetries and the political order of the states. Yet, the later can hardly be confined into a linear logic of ‘imposition of a state order’ or delineated in a merely intellectualist fashion (such as reduction to a ‘biopolitical control’) that would simply set homogeneity upon space (Lefebvre, 1992; 2009). Due to rather heterogenous character of the state – whose spatial reach is constituted and re-produced through complex and variable matrix of practices, the regulation of migrant flows and ‘migration-management’ in sum provokes numerous fragmentations, exposing the fractious character of bureaucratic-political space and its logic exactly on the lower-echelons of authorities. Within this matrix, the whole spatio-temporal order gets to its limiting interference and ‘system of tensions’ (Elias, 2000), evoking, provoking and creating a number of actors, groups and social instances which are somehow enmeshed into liminal networks – that both determine and are being determined within this process of practical bodily movements.

Outlandish as it might be, physical dislocation deeply inscribed in migratory transfer at the first instance subjugates liminoids under violence outbreaks as a process of punishment for breaching the constancy provided by the law and custom, imposed in order to direct the movement of the body. From this point, a somato-ghnostic affection of the body through encounter with the violence – profoundly reflected in bodily injuries they’ve acquired, outlines the structure of liminal experience – itself being measured with or through the pain and exposed with particular moral outset that combines fear with disdain towards the aggressor. It is no wonder that, when questioned about their trajectory, liminoids demonstrate enormous affection and target particular experiences that describe equally a combination of materialization and signification inscribed in the spatio-temporal order: from beatings, over seclusion and interrogation, all the way to the repossession of their personal things – most commonly, money and mobile phones, but also, clothes. While only a few of them, as being reported, were exempted from these acts of appropriation, within the liminal trajectory (mostly from Afghanistan, via Iran, Turkey, then Bulgaria, or Greece
and Macedonia to Serbia and Hungary), Bulgaria and Hungary, and a lesser, but far more aggressive, extent Iran, stand out as being particularly associated with these practices.

Passing through Iran, in many testimonies, appears as particularly dangerous. One male from Pakistan told us about experience in Iran:

‘Even in Iran... They caught a, in a 3 meter room, 50 people... Iranian people see the migrants, they caught them and send back to Pakistan or whatever’ (*original spelling*).

Still, Bulgaria presents a mixture of violence and stealing, which he, being rather affected with the experiences having there, like many of his peers shared:

‘Bulgaria... The worst place for the migrants... The worst place there... When they close camp... When you say to them “I need one more”...This one’, pointing at the piece of bread, ‘They will not give you... Bulgarian police took all of our clothes... They were searching... Searching in our underwear do we have some money... I’m telling about myself: they took me 200 Euros. And the two policemen were looking at the other person, he was stealing... I think... Galaxy 6. He directly put it, hide it in his pocket. When he finds the money, he was hiding it in his other pocket... I seen it with my own eyes: he took from one passenger 500 USD and put it in his pocket’ (*original spelling*).

When asked what has been taken from him he said,

‘Two times bag, money, clothes, cell phone’, then proceeded, ‘I was beaten the two times... I was sent to camp... I saw one person that was questioned with dog (...)’ (*original spelling*).

Similarly, one younger Afghan male disclosed in detail the troubles he had with the Bulgarian police. When he was detained first time he tried to enter and cross Bulgaria and was eventually sent back to Turkish territory. On the other occasion when he entered Bulgaria, he was held imprisoned for 25 days and interrogated 3 times after which Bulgarian authorities found him as ‘proper’ person to proceed – but, without clothes. Namely, as being reported on numerous occasions, many of these Afghan youngsters entered Serbia only in their underwear and shoes, as the Bulgarian police have taken their clothes off – a practice
accompanied with repossession of money and mobile phones.\textsuperscript{3} As many others, this fellow also had visible injuries. Dogs’ biting has become a quite common instrument of coercion, both in confrontation with Bulgarian and Hungarian police. The first-mentioned one also experienced the detention and turning back from Hungarian police:

‘When the Hungarian police capture you, they will do 3 things: for example, one is spray, spray the eyes; letting the dogs (...) They will separate us (...) (and then) told to us “Who can speak English?” Who says: “Yes, I can speak English”, they will be hitting more’ (original spelling).

Figure 4.3.2: ‘Bad luck’. Drawing from a Miksalište Refugee Center, as many similar to this one, exposes the particular troubles liminoids experience over the liminal course.

\textsuperscript{3} Fraction between the public and the private interest certainly appears as the most fragile part of the state (Bourdieu, 2005; 2014). Thus, even with children in his arms and spouse accompanying him, one Iraqi male said that Macedonian policeman, without any hesitation, took him 200 Euros. It could be also heard that Serbian policemen have created a sort of 'rent' for travelling with the train back to Belgrade, after unsuccessful attempts to cross the Hungarian border. Namely, one young Afghan complained of policeman taking his last sum of money – some 40 Euros, on the name of 'train-ticket to Belgrade'.

Photo by the author.
Projected through space, these etatist principles of spatial production certainly compound the asymmetry of power expressed in often abstract discursive politico-bureaucratic and cultural molding of ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee crisis’. Exactly the state classifies and denotes liminoids according to a particular distinction to war refugees against the economic migrants, who become convicts to waiting of, as they commonly say, ‘humility’ and mercy of authorities controlling the political space, having maybe only a force of collective organizing to puncture the border(s). Enumeration, categorizations and the formation of liminal identity attributed to material being, indissolubly emerges as an intricate relational product that intersects spatio-temporal nexus, concurrently producing it with the regulation of particular practices, through order of bodily transmissions and sorting. But, being underlined by a bundle of social relations, they appear as certainly volatile and fragmented. Moreover, the generative schemata of liminal habitus as well produces spatio-temporal nexus through almost eschatological meaning that sets the very geography as a stage of lived drama, axiologically sorting it in accordance with simple moral axe of good/bad (Figure 4.3.3). It as well departs the hidden world of liminal spatio-temporality and submits it, together with the body, to a peculiar relational shaping found in liminal networks, exchanges and practices.

Figure 4.3.3: Finding the way. This drawing, found in Miksalište Refugee Center in Belgrade, was created by an anonymous juvenile, who depicted his journey – obviously starting in Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on experiences of liminal transfer, given through a simple moral axe of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.

Photo by the author.
Willingness to encounter an enormous ordeal – being nonetheless filled almost exclusively with the desire of passing, thus concurrently creates a social force and particular mastery of transfer, developing physical and ethical schemes of liminal habitus that in sum ‘objectify’ this process. Besides particular articulation of the body within space – such as finding the proper woods (or ‘jungle’ in their system of signification), to rest and hide from possible enforcement, success in performing transfer nonetheless depends on tactical interplay with material, but also symbolic means. Particular vigilance thus is performed when it comes to a game of identification, because an ascription of certain identity might either stall or enhance the objective chances for transfer – as it is the case with paradoxical prestige the status of a ‘war-refugee’ enables, against the temporal defects the registering as an ‘asylum-seeker’ or ‘economic migrant’ might have before reaching the desired country. Against the possible conspiring thinking, this is exactly the reason why the liminoids are calculably secretive, closing into a liminal networks and institutions and concurrently building the temporary ties and exchanges which will enable them a transfer, particularly those including smugglers, who, inside the liminal mechanics, take a dominant meditative role.

Smugglers somehow ‘fracture’ the divisions of political space, creating a continuous liminal space based only on restraining of disposal over the means of coercion among the lowest echelons of those holding it. Formula is simple: ‘they give the money to police for no arresting’, as one Pakistani student quotes. Market of smuggler-services is widespread and rather extensive, but concentrated in the

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4 The closure into liminal microcosm also implies a certain salvational ethics (Weber, 1993), where the question of identification isn’t only related with a liminal loss and uncertainty of identity which some researchers have emphasized (Chawla, Rodriguez, 2011; Hynes, 2010), but also a tacitly taken expectations emerging from a careful disposal in liminal exchanges and capabilities to perform a transfer. This relative autonomy and boundaries set around the liminal space have been developed exactly to correspond to finalization of the liminal path – as it is the case with keeping the secret about the impetus for migrating among the migrants themselves, which prevents the risks of possible retaliation (especially for those previously being in combat operations), also by hiding available money, or with a secret code ‘L’ (meaning ‘Liberty’), sent as SMS to compatriots and peers when they reach the soil of EU.
particular ‘dots’ – i.e. places that connect different (political) spaces and associated with numerous people involved. Here, ‘the porosity of ethnic and national boundaries primarily results from historical (de) politicization of various (symbolic and material) elements within differentiated social relations’ (Janković, Kubiček, 2016: 560, original emphasis) found in liminal space. Primarily reserved for those employing the ethics of exchange,\(^5\) thus, being ready and capable to reconvert the precious means in order to enter into a particular logic of exchange, because the smuggler-service ranges from 700 to 1500 Euros per person for crossing only one border, as being reported. ‘You cannot do anything without the smuggler’, a young Afghan concluded, after and before he finally got ‘serviced’ by one. Even then, the path isn’t secured as there are many ‘drawbacks’ with the smugglers, like when they face police that turns them back. Therefore, building of networks and reliability implies a cautious and vigilant investigation of smuggler’s prestige and his (previous) aptitudes for making the transfer certain.\(^6\)

\(^5\) A notable difference among those who employ the ethics of exchange, particularly in temporal modus of re-conversion of means for transfer, still exists. Thus, the liminoids of Arab origin (Syrians and Iraqis) somehow paradoxically benefit from being recognized as the ‘war-refugees’. This situation makes the migratory transfer almost irretrievable in character, and helps even gaining economic capital, as they immediately sell their entire property. On the other side, liminoids of Afghan origin enter both with modesty and impatience into a steady and gradual process of building political and cultural privileges, as they embark on this journey by carefully using economic capital, intrinsically intertwined with social one. Thus, these shopkeepers and students from Afghanistan rely on money either their parents or relatives (now living in Western Europe) send them via Western Union, strategically disposing it in order to perform a liminal transfer.

\(^6\) As it could be inferred from a number of testimonies, institution of smuggling does not operate linearly. Namely, this amalgam of actors – that transcends the political boundaries by including an Afghan and Punjab guy, a Greek coffee-shop owner, a Turkish driver, a Serbian and Hungarian police-officers, operates in a discontinuous fashion. Thus, these networks do not appear as firm, but as provisionally built only to organize a cross-border transfer – itself risky and uncertain, particularly as the returning back in cases when police immediately ‘catches’ the group after transfer, happens often. In effect, a liminal modus of time becomes exactly molded by this unfolding of relations, as waiting for, evaluating of and gaining information on a ‘proper’ smuggler, indeed determines the very rhythms of transfer.
Exclusive in character, smuggler service (again) distinguishes those disposing with financial gains (and other adversary means) from convicts to waiting, whose only strategy can be summed in the words of one young Afghan male: ‘We will wait until the border is open... We don’t have the money for the smugglers.’ Deprivation of financial means – even it is being reflected as a temporal deficiency in performing the transfer, still doesn’t imply passiveness, as the former are gradually entering into a tactical play ‘within the ritual’. Alternating strategies of transfer gradually developed among them thus include at least the means for mutual organizing or ‘catching up’ with smugglers – by putting an immense physical effort to follow particular group led by a smuggler and eventually crossing a border without being faced with an enforcement. The most sophisticated strategy includes working for smugglers, by becoming informants and establishing the valuable connections, i.e. promoting the services in return for gaining certain provision, that would finally provide suffice means to pay one of them.

Liminal position hence hardly appears as a mere inscription, even though it indissolubly is formed through a perplexed spatio-temporal nexus of relations. Moreover, it also hardly falls under a uniform communitas that revolves around an internal principle of affiliation (Turner, 1991)\textsuperscript{7} as the migratory transfer is unfolded through a gradually and relationally established set of institutions and principles of exchanges that co-produce entire liminal spatio-temporal nexus. Networks of passage are surely formed with the available forms of capital and their tactical disposal, that in sum determine the tempo and dynamics of crossing. Still, liminal space imminently confronts the (external) forces residing in the totality of social space that, in accordance with particular logic and through a manifold of practices, perform various clas-\textsuperscript{7} Turner’s idea of a uniform culture of communitas seems rather questionable. Albeit the principle of mutual affiliation transforms into a particular ethos of mutual help – based on sharing of food or taking of other people’s children on their backs and alike practices, and even being contained in the self-representations of the migrants, it is rather provisional and submitted to a spatio-temporal variability – especially due to a complex amalgam of ethno-linguistic differences among the liminoids themselves. It is best summed by a young student from Kabul: ‘In about when we move to here... Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, we make one. After, we move forward’. Or, in words of his compatriot: ‘When we met someone, two or three days we rely on another one’ (original spelling).
sifications and extensive networks of domination upon the migrants’ bodies. From the states in action (bureaucratic actors, police forces), all the way to volunteers serving food, these practices rest on tacit principles that define, ascribe and transmit the rights and identity (Descola, 1996) and thus, substantially mold the liminal positioning of the bodies and the very process of reconversion. These are, as we will see, compounded within *liminal microcosm*.

**Liminal microcosm and the everyday of liminoids**

Within this liminal space – extending from the country of origin all over to the country of destination, a creation of microcosmic network is inevitably reflected in appropriated (physical) space – gradually defined (as well as materialized) within the logic inscribed in *practices* and specific *type(s) of exchanges*, also including particular *meaning* and *axiomatic* this space has for the liminoids. *Liminal microcosm* found in Belgrade parks around the Main Bus and Train station and refugee centers becomes *topoi* for re-structuring the liminal process where the liminoids form and share their everyday. Most of them – and the numbers are oscillating from 900 to 1500 per day,\(^8\) primarily find their meals, as well as provision of other goods and services in Info Park and Miksalište centers, while the same number of them do so in Krnjača camp on the outskirts of Belgrade. Still, practices constitutive to liminal everyday are only seemingly associated solely with an elementary (biological) bodily sustenance or sharing of an everyday idleness, as the material qualities of space-time are submitted to a *virtual* course of liminality and to, indeed knotted, set of relations defining it. However temporal and provisional it might be, an immersion into everyday life for liminoids is set upon distinctive rhythms and spatial divisions, themselves reflecting *liminal ordering of the bodies*. Appropriation of space accorded to this ordering, inevi-

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\(^8\) These numbers come from an official estimates, performed on a daily basis through a coordinated enumeration by the volunteers at the refugee centers and Serbian authorities involved in dealing with the ‘refugee crisis’. Author got regularly informed on these numbers while conducting fieldwork.
tably corresponds to a structure deposited upon available means for completing the liminal vector. As liminoids stay in Serbia, according to their testimonies, on average from three weeks to three months, with some extending their stay up to 6–7 months, a *mastery of transfer* sets out those disposed with means providing a temporal effectiveness – be it money or a symbolic recognition from the states. This fragment of liminal space and places it occupies, insofar functions in accordance with liminal vector and *capacities to perform a transfer* deposited on numerous *internal differences*, becoming also a sector for profound structural intersections that determine the course of *liminality* – again departing those with a relatively beneficiary liminal status, from the imprivileged liminoids.

Everyday of the former group remain caught in a rather ambivalent and precarious position reflected in *bodily appearance and stance* that corresponds to the ethics of humility, primarily seeking to acquire an elementary recognition. Deprived even within the liminal terms and filling the parks and finding a roof in the abandoned warehouse – in past serving as a train shunting station, they rely heavily upon provision of food in Info Park and Miksalište Refugee Center – two spots serving meals. Being immersed in everyday idleness and convicted to waiting and even worse confronted with horrible life conditions, they still don’t give up residing in these places and refusing to depart for Krnjača refugee center – exactly because these sites locate and concentrate the ‘spots’ of conversion and acquisition of valuable capital within liminal space: information and connections. This is exactly how the *practical engagements* and *investment* arising from ethics of humility are being figured. Against passivity, it rests on devising of peculiar *everyday tactics* so to appropriate clothes and food, thus provoking a number of altercations and brawls, provisional groupings and finally, rebelling against inequitable provisions existent within liminal spaces. This embodied *ethics of humility* displays a peculiar character of imprivileged social status and mutually conflicting traits contained in each *dominated culture* (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992) since it doesn’t simply reflects only a submissive pandering, but also includes an irrepressible resistance. Rather than a Turner-type of ‘communitas’, stance of the weak, deprived and dominated, faced with particular liminal experiences, often was confronting precisely the *order of material and*
symbolic exchanges existent in liminal everyday through moral (dis) qualifications.9

A rather heterogeneous, but still opposed to those relying on ethics of humility, there is a group possessing certain means that secure them privileges in liminal everyday lives and thus lead to a differentiated practical demeanor. Multiply separated, families with children and the ones appropriated with valuable resources, at the first place reside either in Krnjača camp or, to a lesser extent, in hostel or even rent an apartment – for a short period, while waiting for a ‘proper’ smuggler, as it is the case with some Syrians and Iraqis. Moreover, conforming to the better position in the societal ranking of origin and liminal projection, they appear as more responsive to cultural necessities of liminal transfer, through imposing of (self)restraint. Visibly humble, but also dignified in their seeking for recognition – as their liminal appearance is characterized by a notable distance towards the unrestrained demeanor of the imprivileged liminoids, these liminoids primarily use the privileges of protection existing in liminal microcosm as well as engaging into particular processes of status ascension.

9 On a number of occasions, initial humbleness got transformed into an affective narration about how they were insulted by not receiving equal assistance. Particularly the young Afghans were often exhibiting dissatisfaction with the hierarchies created within liminal process and privileges Suri (one of many ethnic groups from Afghanistan) along with Syrians and Iraqis were getting: from the primacy of getting medical aid, all over to acquiring proper shoes. Over time, it also meant a developing of tactical interplay within the ritual, by pretending to be sick or tearing their (already outworn) clothes, just to get a certain attention and equal recognition. Still, they could hardly challenge the very structure of liminality, where the smugglers’ services are unavailable for them. Thus, in their eyes, the smugglers deserve particular disdain and verdict. ‘There they are’, as on one occasion a group of deprived Afghans pointed subtly at three nicely dressed men, coming out of café: ‘They look nice... They even had a shower...’ When asked to qualify them, they were employing numerous moral resentments in order to designate the smugglers as the ones who profit from this whole situation. On the other hand, this disposition towards humility, became encumbered with the practical investment into being represented as someone ‘in need’ and expressively provoking a remorse in order to acquire possible goods (through a reversible recognition), especially from the actors of mediation included in liminal transfer (organizations providing food, medical staff, etc.).
Figure 4.3.4: Queuing. A scene from the Miksališté Refugee Center Belgrade, during the lunch time, where queues, brawls, altercations and all of the bodily interactions accompany the everyday processes found in this peculiar social microcosm.

Photo by the author.

Divisions found in microcosm of liminal everyday, only remind that the ‘attributes of liminality or of liminal (“threshold people”) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space’ (Turner 1991: 95). Exactly these places are organized in accordance with numerous internal and external hierarchies, where the inscription of the particular social ordering is performed by numerous actors specific cultural and political through the logic they endorse. Except being exposed to the constant enumeration and classification primarily concerned with the ‘physical economy’ (Elias, 2000) performed by bureaucratic authorities and different political producers (NGOs and other organizations), these places also follow numerous implicit divisions inscribed in the logic of passage and appear to profoundly reflect (an internal) structure of differences overall compounding the liminal space. Insofar, they appear as conducive for discerning the (external) processes of status ascension, because the places like these reveal a certain triplicity inscribed into spatio-temporal nexus, as before, here
and there enmesh not only the bits of history into a present being. Nonetheless, they follow a line of projection that body undertakes almost intuitively by engaging into different modes of practices, exchanges and conversions that operate as key in further defining of social positions.

One of the most stalling differentiation is incarnated in departing of adult males – for whom only the ‘outside’ is reserved: the Info Park where they can get a meal and, during the Belgrade nights, look up in the sky and dream about their stars. Eliminative as it is, this principle of selection allows only families with children and juvenile males to enter the Miksalište site. Since it has been initially selective, Miksalište allows access only to those perceived as ‘being in need.’ Except the food, it collects and redistributes the clothes and shoes, and from recently, gives a chance to have a shower. Still, composition of Miksalište encompasses manifold relations that first identify the ‘proper ones’ and then juxtapose a peculiar sorting in accordance with the *internal spatial division* in a manner that conflicts various practices and spaces – of eating, drawing, taking a shower, and exactly of ‘killing time’, that follows a (typical) *binary left/right opposition*, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.5. While its temporal constitution is rather fragile one – by being dependent on various rhythms and conflicted with the temporal dynamics and tiny fractures of negotiations that reside here, thus, often succumbing to interruptions particularly in the time of the lunch, it still profoundly reflects a division on those who have and not have the liminal privileges.

As shown in Figure 4.3.5., the section on the right located in sections 1, 6, and 9 is predominantly reserved for the corporeal rhythms of eating (on limited number of tables though), which, together with a number of mobile-phone chargers, attracts mostly young Afghans. Even leaving their marks and drawings – unique *symbolic representations* of liminal experiences on the wall on the left side of the center, these representations will, as the other practices they are immersed in, remain inside the walls of Miksalište.10 Practices of these liminoids re-

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10 Another closure of liminal microcosm is found in a *principle prohibiting* the photographing of numerous drawings liminoids have left on the walls of the Miksalište, such as ‘We want go London’, ‘We don’t need water, food, clothes, just open the border’, or the most common one, ‘Open the border’ (*original spelling*). Namely, even the author was officially allowed to create photos, *censorship* put to publicizing these drawings and their symbolic content, came – as it was explained by the one of the volunteers, from EU delegation in Serbia who urged both the Government and the managers of the center to prevent further negative depiction some of the EU countries after these started filling
lying upon ethics of humility remain profoundly physical and reproductive in character thus, remaining primarily susceptible only to a spatial immediacy where the exchanges and interactions occur, as these youngsters will be mostly communicating with each other. While these practices play some part in performing the liminal vector (by eventual accumulation of information and social capital), they primarily serve to create (a temporal) and rather masculine hierarchies among the liminoids themselves, as a part of the tactics of survival while waiting for gods’ mercy to open the borders – a bit more comfortably than their compatriots exposed to bad weather.

Figure 4.3.5: Internal composition of Miksalište Refugee Center. Orders inscribed into (invisible) spatial divisions existent in Miksalište correspond to structures and hierarchies compounding the liminal transfer, exactly through concentration of particular social practices and the social structures they are conforming.

Graph by the author.

articles in Serbian daily newspapers. This hierarchization of political space – exactly through setting the ‘valid’ principles of discourse and representations, becomes an act of de-politicization that resides in the very spatio-temporal conformity and appears as additionally de-privileging.
Albeit the corner with computers and recognizable Skype interface (2) presents a space of mediation the former also appropriate to report were they are to the people on both sides of the liminal vector and thus, (also) performing a compression of spaces by extension and affirmation of social capital, decisive difference appears in practical seclusion found on the left section. Namely, even without any specific physical obstacle, it attracts those who are getting more investment into liminal transfer and social conversion it bears. They are exposing themselves to numerous determinations and particular articulations of the body, letting the actors of mediation to perform these cultural inscriptions in three Centers (3, 4, 5). In the left corner, therefore, it is far more common site where you can see families (with or without the children), younger couples as well more educated liminoids. Temporal constitution of practices – except those concerned with liminal everyday, inevitably encompasses the fine acts of cultural inscription and transmission of particular cultural skills that – looked from the side of these liminoids, present a gradual accumulation of cultural and symbolic capital – such as learning English or German language. While not necessary decisive in finalization of liminal vector, these ‘ritual acts of purification’ (Douglas, 2002) re-structure the liminal everyday and thus, the liminal process.

Conclusive remarks: Unfolding migratory liminality

Story on migratory liminality hardly ends up here, as transposing horizons of mountains, seas and planes will certainly extend into a quest for acquisition of material and symbolic means through peculiar structural permeations, bodily confrontations and spatial intersections which liminal transfer will bring in front of these (im)migrants stemming from the Middle East and the Central Asia to EU. Intimidating rationalizations such as ‘limited labor market’ or ‘terrorist threats’, along with the vacuous calls to maintain the Europe’s ‘multiculturalism’ or evoking a burden of ethical remorse through ‘humanitarianism’ that equally emerge in the public discourse, present a political semiosis (Wagner-Pacifici, 2017) that also partakes in the construction of liminality. As these, by no means politically naive acts only anticipate the
actual unfolding *modes of sociability* among different social groups, it is barely possible to portend the multiplicity of *social (con)figurations* this process might provoke. Thus, without succumbing to the *prophesying temptation* or the *finalist illusion* ‘oriented by anticipation of their own consequences’ (Bourdieu, 1992: 61), it would be suffice to recall Elias’ words concerning the effects of socio-political complexification it might evoke: ‘increased self-encapsulation, among the “haves”, of those who have more than the rest; a more pronounced cohesion of people in the same social situation to resist pressure from those outside it or, inversely, to seize opportunities monopolized by others’ (Elias, 2000: 231).

Against insistence on a ‘permanent liminality’ (Szakolczai, 2000), this process therefore inevitably complexifies the social, political and economic figurations and thus hardly falls under *fatalistic finalism* where the ‘permanency’ will take place. Namely, what we have seen in our brief exploration was exactly the practical mastery of unfolding and adapting within the process itself, which escapes from formal procedures and *geometric-like epistemic treatment* where the sorted order of op-positions would reside, by setting the very social complicity into series of acts and performances of bodies entering into a peculiar *social transmutation*, that in effect redefines the very core of the social: its spatio-temporal nexus. Liminality, consequentially, brings the effects of power, systemic conformation and the numerous structural relations into a fragile and decomposed interplay of elements, with undetermined outcome. More profoundly, it performs a peculiar *ontological metamorphosis* of the world we know. For these reasons, liminality – as the one analyzed in this Chapter, presents a genuine test for our analytical devices and concepts used in comprehension of contemporary social world of mobility.

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This book will be an important contribution to the production of knowledge on migration in the region. It will represent an indispensable reference to scholars and students of contemporary migrations in particular those interested in the recent developments and their impact within the region of former Yugoslavia, but also beyond. Policy makers and civil society representatives will also find necessary and useful material in the publication.

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The book offers an ambitious and interesting analysis of Balkan migrations. Its main positive aspects might be summarized in the following manner: Theoretical approach. Several collective books prefer national case studies; the editors of the reviewed one have opted for a conceptual ‘entry’ through the key steps of the migration phenomenon – the causes and the consequences of migration flows, as well as their management through migration and integration policies. The fourth ‘entry’ – ‘Reflections’ – is more an intellectual provocation, because critical reflections accompany all the other dimensions of the study of migration phenomena and policies.

Interdisciplinarity. The migration studies are interwoven in the border studies with their emphasis on rebordering, extraterritoriality and outsourcing of control. Migration policy has become a securitarian issue and these developments are also adequately treated in several articles. The nexus demography – migration inevitably attracts attention because socialist Yugoslavia is known for the divergent demographic trends among its constituent units. Does migration leads to more convergence is a crucial question addressed in the book.

Interscectoriality. The role of migration in crucial policy documents on a large variety of spheres – development, employment, social policy, education, youth policy, etc. – is an interesting analysis and expresses a dynamic and transversal understanding of migration.

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Overall, the book is a valuable collection of texts edited by Mirjana Bobić and Stefan Janković. The volume contains a wide variety of approaches and even there are some original ideas. Even I would say one of the great merits of volume is that it dares to incorporate geopolitics, security, military expenditure with migration. This wider perspective has the potential to overcome the simplifying and therefore misleading perspectives which have gained wider publicity nowadays.

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